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ABSTRACT 
NATION BRAND IMAGE IN POLITICAL CONTEXTS –  
THE CASE OF TURKEY’S EU ACCESSION 
 
Kemming, Jan Dirk 
M. Sc., Department of Management  
Supervisor: Ass. Prof. Dr. Özlem Sandikçi 
 
June 2006 
 
Negative public opinion on Turkey’s EU accession in many member-states might 
become a major obstacle during the next 10 years of negotiation despite supportive 
diplomatic strategies. In consumer research, images/attitudes are expected to provide 
deeper insights into preference formation and (consumption/voting) decisions than 
opinion statements. Application of marketing image research methodology should 
therefore facilitate new perspectives for political phenomena.  
 
Within this scenario, two evolving concepts meet: political marketing and nation 
branding. Both are closely investigated for this problem. The main theoretical ap-
proach consists of an emerging framework for a nation brand image in a political 
context. Central challenges are the definition of the brand image construct and testing 
the applicability of commercial brand theory for political brands.  
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Practical application of this framework is the case of Turkey accessing the EU. In a 
contextualized approach the image content, explaining factors/antecedents and con-
sequences/outcomes of Turkey’s image within the political framework are analyzed 
and measured.  
 
The conduct of the research consists of two parts: literature research reconciling dif-
ferent interdisciplinary backgrounds and a qualitative exploration with in-depth ex-
pert interviews from a sample of prototypical EU member-states.  
 
First results indicate a wide spectrum of different images across EU, depending 
mainly on knowledge conditions, contact points with Turkish people and general 
perspectives of EU development. Religion or history, often mentioned in public dis-
courses, seem not to play a prominent role. Emerging public diplomacy approaches 
in Turkey will face the challenge to integrate most heterogeneous messages and 
stakeholders of Turkey’s nation brand.  
 
Keywords: Nation Brand; Brand Image Theory; National Identity; National Image; 
Political Marketing; Public Diplomacy; Turkey; EU-Accession 
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ÖZET 
SIYASAL ORTAMDA ULUSAL MARKA IMAJI –  
TÜRKIYE’NIN AVRUPA BIRLIGINE KATILMA MÜZAKERELERI 
 
Kemming, Jan Dirk 
Master, Isletme Fakültesi 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç Dr. Özlem Sandikçi 
 
Haziran 2006 
 
Uygun diplomatik stratejiler uygulanmasina ragmen Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birligi’ne 
katilmasina iliskin birçok üye ülkedeki olumsuz kamusal düsünceler, önümüzdeki on 
yillik müzakereler için önemli bir engel teskil etmektedir.  
 
Tüketici arastirmalarinda, belirtilen fikirlerdense imaj ve tutumun, tercih ve 
tüketim/oylama kararlarini daha iyi kavramamizi saglamasi beklenir. Dolayisiyla 
pazarlamada imaj arastirmasi yöntembilimi, siyasal kavramlara yeni perspektifler 
kazandiracaktir.  
 
Bu baglamda, ortaya çikan iki kavram birbiriyle bulusmaktadir: siyasal pazarlama ve 
ülkelerin markalasmasi. Arastirilan sorun açisindan her iki kavram da yakindan 
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incelenmektedir. Temel teorik yaklasim, uluslararasi siyasal platformda ulusal bir 
marka imajina yönelik bir sistem olusturulmasidir. En önemli mesele marka imaji 
kavraminin tanimlanmasi ve bu ticari marka teorisinin siyasal markalara 
uygulanabilirliginin test edilmesidir.  
 
Bu sistemin pratikteki uygulamasi ise Türkiye’nin AB’ye üyeligi konusundadir. 
Durumsal bir yaklasimla, imaj içerigi, açiklayici faktörler/sebepsel öncelikler ile 
Türkiye’nin siyasal platformdaki imajina iliskin sonuçlar analiz edilmekte ve 
ölçülmektedir.  
 
Arastirmanin yürütülmesi iki kisimdan olusmaktadir: Farkli, disiplinler-arasi 
açiklamalari bagdastiran bir literatür arastirmasi ve AB’yi temsilen örneklem olarak 
seçilen üye ülkelerden uzmanlarla yapilan derin içerikli, kalitetif mülakatlarla 
yapilan incelemelerdir.  
 
Elde edilen ilk sonuçlar AB üyeleri arasindaki bilgi düzeyine, Türklerle olan irtibat 
noktalarina ve AB’nin gelisimine olan yaklasimlarina dayanan farkli imajlara isaret 
etmektedir. Genellikle kamusal söylemde bahsedilen din ya da tarih ögelerinin çok 
büyük rolü olmadigi görülmüstür. Türkiye’de ortaya çikan yeni kamusal diplomatik 
yaklasimlar, Türkiye’nin ulusal markasina iliskin farklilik gösteren mesaj ve 
ortaklarin entegrasyonunu saglamak gibi bir mesele ile karsi karsiya kalacaktir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulusal Marka; Marka Imaji; Milli kimlik; Ulusal Imaji; Isletme 
stratejisi; Türkiye; Avrupa Birligine Katilma Müzakereleri 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“The public has therefore, among a democratic people, a singular power, 
which aristocratic nations cannot conceive of; for it does not persuade to 
certain opinions, but it enforces them and infuses them into the intellect by 
a sort of enormous pressure of the minds of all upon the reason of each.“
                (Alexis de Tocqueville) 
 
1.1 Topic  
 
Applying marketing-based brand approaches to nations has gained some significance 
in the recent past and some interesting discussions deal with e.g. the rebranding of 
Spain or problems of the Brand USA (Gilmore, 2002a; Klein, 2002). In such a per-
spective, also the nation brand Turkey faces remarkable challenges. For European 
citizens without closer contact, mental preoccupations seem to lead to strong reserva-
tions towards Turkey. For foreigners coming to (live in) Turkey, the country turns 
out a lot different (and oftentimes mostly positively different) from what was earlier 
imagined. Put in marketing terminology: Turkey has an image problem. These nega-
tive preoccupations might pose a serious obstacle for Turkey’s EU accession process.  
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Public opinion surveys like e.g. the Eurobarometer (EU Commission, 2005b) have 
constantly shown a majority of EU’s publics rejecting Turkey’s membership. Not-
withstanding, there was and is a rather strong will by leading EU politicians to make 
Turkey an accession candidate and potentially an EU member. This tension between 
public and political will seems relevant with regard to Turkey’s considerable negotia-
tion path, especially when one considers the difficulties to rule against public will for 
a long time. The political messages seem hard to align with public opinion in the 
case of Turkey.  
 
A closer look at the surveys reveals furthermore that the public opinion on Turkey in 
Europe must be carefully differentiated. In some countries like e.g. Spain or Slovenia 
the publics hold favorable positions towards Turkey’s EU bid, while in others (they 
seem to be in the majority) like e.g. Italy or Czech Republic public opinion is clearly 
not in favor. For some countries speculation about motifs seems possible; however, 
the complete picture of the distribution of public opinion about Turkey across Europe 
seems difficult to explain at first sight.  
 
It appears promising to investigate these conflicts and try to explain Turkey’s way to 
the EU in a nation brand image perspective; this concept is expected to provide 
deeper and richer explanations than the rather superficial category of opinion: “The 
application of consumer behavior theories in the political arena can increase under-
standing of the dynamics of public opinion” (Omura/Talarzyk, 1985: 95). 
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1.2 Background and purpose  
 
This practical question also implies a general theoretical perspective: How do nation 
brand images evolve and what are their impacts in political contexts? Within this 
scenario, two recently developed and increasingly popular theory traits meet: politi-
cal marketing and nation branding. Both will need to be investigated and broadened 
for my particular question: 
· While political marketing so far largely dealt with applications of marketing 
in the context of elections with rivalling parties (e.g. Butler/Collins, 1999; 
Newman, 1999; Newman, 2001; Newman/Perloff, 2004; O’Shaughnessy, 
2002), the existing theory will need to be revisited and checked for marketing 
nations. Also, the construct of image is yet not a standard paradigm of politi-
cal, especially voting analysis (Scammell, 1999). Very interesting in this con-
text is the recently evolving practice of public diplomacy (e.g. Bardos, 2001, 
Leonard, 2002, Anholt, 2005a). Reputation management and influencing pub-
lic opinion in other countries are becoming important determinants of foreign 
politics. The link to the image question lies at hand.  
· Nation brand theory (together with branding regions, cities etc. often catego-
rized as “place-marketing”, e.g. Langer, 2002; Rainisto, 2003) has also estab-
lished an own literature tradition. Most of the approaches, however, are lim-
ited to one of the three dominant traits –the “country-of-origin (COO)”-effect 
for export products (e.g. Askegaard/Ger, 1997; Jaffe/Nebenzahl, 2001; Ja-
worski/Fosher, 2003), branding tourist destinations (e.g. Baloglu/McCleary, 
1999; Fesenmaier/ MacKay, 1996) or acquiring foreign investments (e.g. 
Pantzalis/Rodrigues, 1999; Papadopoulos/Heslop, 2002). Anholt (2002a: 230-
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231) identifies the investigation of political dimensions of nation brands as an 
evident gap in the literature. 
 
The construct of image has been broadly applied in marketing theory during the past 
50 years. Yet it turns out to be quite a vague and broad category, which is influenced 
by most different kinds of applications in a variety of contexts and disciplines.  
 
The main theoretical challenge will therefore be to develop the image construct as a 
useful explanatory dimension of how nation brands operate in political contexts. 
Relevant sub-questions are:  
· Can we conceptualize nations as brands and, if so, what are the dimensions of 
a nation brand? 
· How brand image is currently theorized and how does this concept relate to 
nation brands? 
· Overall, how and to what extent can marketing, branding and brand image 
concepts be transferred from the commercial to the political sphere?  
 
The case of Turkey’s EU accession should serve as a practical application of this 
theoretical framework. Throughout 2005 the nation’s apparent image problems 
abroad connected to the EU membership bid have entered the media discourse in 
Turkey. Also some voices from the political domain explicitly addressed this prob-
lem recently. Consequently some interesting sources from the public discourse are 
available as well as some educational non-scientific statistical material. In addition, 
some previous academic research on Turkey’s nation brand image in the broadest 
understanding needs to be recognized for this study.  
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· Ger (1991) and Altinbasak Ebrem (2004) provided excellent comprehensive 
explorative studies on the constituents of the general nation brand image of 
Turkey.  
· E.g. Sönmez/Sirakaya (2002) or Ger/Askegaard/Christensen (1999) re-
searched on selected dimensions of Turkey’s image like tourism destination 
country-of-origin effects. 
· Burcoglu (2000) and Giannakopoulos/Maras(2005) with disciplinary back-
grounds outside of the marketing domain delivered deep descriptions of the 
public discourses on Turkey in Europe and the EU. 
 
However, no academic research project so far however has been devoted to the po-
litical context of Turkey’s nation brand. In addition the conceptualizations of the 
construct image for a nation brand have been mostly insufficient in the light of cur-
rent marketing theory.  
 
As the main practical focus of this research, the image content, some explaining fac-
tors and consequences of Turkey’s image within the given political framework 
should be analyzed. The most interesting questions seem to be:  
· What are the most influential factors or antecedents of Turkey’s nation brand 
image?  
· What is Turkey’s nation brand image in different EU countries and at home 
as the self-image of Turkey?  
· What will be the impact of the nation brand image on voters’ opinion forma-
tion and behavior within the political contexts of Turkey’s EU accession?  
1.3 Possibilities and limitations   
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This research will hopefully help to approximate the fields of marketing and political 
science further to each other. Broadening its spectrum to the public diplomacy 
agenda and the marketing of supranational political entities could enrich marketing 
science. Political science, on the other hand, might gain additional insights into voter 
behaviour by applying marketing methodology and penetrating the image construct 
more deeply. 
For practical purposes, the research should contribute to close the knowledge gap on 
Turkey’s nation brand image and provide a substantial foundation for further analysis 
of the marketing and communication of Turkey’s EU accession.  
 
For the still emerging field of research on nation brands I intend to contribute to three 
of a long list of points Anholt (2002a) nicely outlined as areas for further study, 
which he sees “understudied and insufficiently researched in the academic literature 
[…]: 
· The different ways in which national brands are perceived in different coun-
tries […] and how this diversity of perception can be managed in interna-
tional branding campaigns. […] 
· How, and to what extent it is desirable and feasible, to harmonise acts of for-
eign policy and diplomacy with the national brand strategy. […] 
· The relationship between nation branding and the (rumoured) demise of the 
nation-state.” (Anholt, 2002a: 230-231). 
 
Anholt (2002a) and Olins (2002) rightly mention the high emotional loading of the 
chosen topic. With brands and marketers generally looked at with a decent amount of 
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suspicion, the idea of a nation brand seems even more an emotive subject. All the 
more important it seems for this study to operate respectful vis à vis these sentiments 
and be aware of possible misunderstandings. The very current case of Turkey’s EU 
accession is witnessing a broad bandwidth of emotional implications. Especially be-
ing in an outsider position as a foreigner, I want to state my very best scientific inten-
tions while conducting research on this issue and explicitly excuse myself in case I 
unconsciously transgressed into ethically difficult aspects.  
 
Finally I should remark that my research was conducted in line with a contemporary 
understanding of research as “building a helix of never-ending search of knowledge” 
(Gummesson, 2002: 346). Eventually a date had to be found to deliver a result in this 
specific research project and data collection had to occur in specific temporal cir-
cumstances. This thesis necessarily delivers a snapshot-impression of a quite com-
plex problem. I gladly admit and underline that issue at hand is clearly far from being 
fully comprehended at this stage. Turkey’s accession process will continue and so 
will negotiations between EU-Europe, Turkey and all other parties; consequently 
new questions will enter the stage and old questions will vanish in the haze; analysis 
and explanation of these relationships should keep reinventing.  
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1.4 Structure of the study  
 
With this in mind, my study is structured in two major building blocks. Section A is 
devoted to the theoretical literature-based understanding and development of a con-
cept of nation brand image in political contexts. Section B focuses on the concrete 
application of this theoretical concept for the investigation of the case of Turkey’s 
EU accession.  
 
Chapters 2-5 are supposed to deliver the analytic categories for this research project: 
Chapters 2 introduces into the field by locating the place marketing approach within 
marketing theory. Chapter 3 analyzes preceding theories of nation branding and out-
lines the spectrum of such an entity. Chapter 4 isolates the construct of image within 
marketing theory and tests the applicability for the case of nation brands. Chapter 5 
analyzes the political context of marketing in general and of nation branding as ‘pub-
lic diplomacy’ in particular.  
 
Chapter 6 should generate the cultural categories for the case analysis of Turkey’s 
nation brand by analyzing history and present conditions of the country’s EU acces-
sion process in terms of marketing theory. Chapter 7 explains the methodological 
choice of an explorative and qualitative approach and outlines the research design. 
Chapter 8 summarizes the findings along the emerging framework and reflects the 
findings in the light of the different theory traits. Chapter 9 finally indicates some 
practical; managerial implications revealed by the analysis of Turkey’s nation brand 
image.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
PLACE MARKETING 
 
 
 
The changes from traditional domestic to the current global economy have of course 
largely affected places like cities or countries: Labour has become mobile as have 
capital and technology; consequently, goods and services can be produced almost 
everywhere. Many areas of competition between places arise:  
“Every place – community, city, state, region, or nation – should ask itself 
why anyone wants to live, relocate, visit, invest, or start or expand a business 
here. What does this place have that people need or should want? From a 
global perspective, what competitive advantage does this place offer that oth-
ers do not?” (Kotler/Haider/Rein, 1993a: 14) 
 
This competitive environment brings along the necessity for places to employ strate-
gic market thinking and planning:  
“Now more than ever, places must think, plan and act on their futures, lest 
they be left behind in the new era of place wars. The durable lesson of the last 
20 years of places seeking to improve themselves is that all places are in 
trouble, or will be in the foreseeable future” (Kotler/Haider/Rein, 1993a: 16). 
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2.1 Broadening the marketing concept 
 
Place marketing is one of many recent applications of the marketing concept. After 
the early 1970s the spectrum widened to include nonbusiness organizations, indi-
viduals, and ideas. It was then when Kotler and Levy (1973) first discussed the trans-
ferability of marketing theory – which was before that mostly limited to business 
perspectives. Kotler (1973: 90) introduced his generic understanding of marketing as 
“a logic available to all organizations facing problems of market response” mainly in 
the light of upcoming theories of Social Marketing. The generic concept broadened 
marketing in two significant ways: “By extending it from the private sector into the 
non-commercial and public sector and by broadening exchange from only economic 
exchanges to any kind of exchanges. [...] Marketing therefore includes all organiza-
tions and their relationships with any public” (O’Cass, 1996: 39).  
Structures and processes of marketing in the non-commercial world developed sig-
nificantly in the past 30 years. Marketing has e.g. become a mainstream orientation 
of public sector management and is applied both strategically as part of a manage-
ment concept and tactically for the delivery of public policy. In a radical and broad 
formulation, marketing became a generic concept applicable for all organizations and 
their relations to all relevant publics while exchanging all sorts of values – tangibles 
and intangibles like symbolic values (Csaba, 2005: 129). In a sense, marketing has 
become inevitable. Kotler and Levy wisely foresaw this development in their famous 
quote: “The choice facing those who manage non-business organizations is not 
whether to market or not market, for no organization can avoid marketing. The 
choice is whether to do it well or poorly” (Kotler/Levy, 1973: 42).  
 
 11 
Within this background, the concept of marketing places has gained significant atten-
tion in theory and practise. As the scheme by Kotler, Haider and Rein below shows, 
approaches to modern strategic place marketing largely resemble conventional com-
mercial marketing activities. The main elements of the place marketing task contain 
actors, processes, structures and strategic decisions; noticeable is also the complexity 
and multitude, with many stakeholders involved on different levels of the planning 
and decision making process.  
 
Figure 2-1: Levels of place marketing (Kotler/Haider/Rein, 1993b: 19) 
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2.2 Place branding 
 
Later in the 1990s, place marketing was increasingly approached also with the con-
cept of place branding. In times of growing product parity, substitutability and com-
petition between places, branding provides an attractive approach.  
 
Having been a rather insignificant topic in marketing and reduced to the issues of 
labelling and packaging within product politics in earlier stages (Csaba, 2005: 128), 
branding theory has found enhanced awareness during the last two decades of the 
20th century. Leading marketing textbook authors like Keller (2003a) or Kotler 
(2003) today see branding as a core activity and brands at the center of marketing. 
Like marketing in general, also branding underwent a significant broadening and 
rose interest in business surroundings outside the traditional areas of product and 
service marketing:  
“Branding is everywhere. We have moved from its origins, in the branding of 
throwaway goods such as soap powders and soft drinks, to branding political 
policies and lifestyle choices. This is partly the result of the increasing influ-
ence, sophistication, and reach of the media, and partly a testament to the fact 
that branding works and that is does so because it is grounded in some in-
nately human ways of making sense of the world” (Grant, 2002: 81). 
 
Ubiquity of brands has lead to the understanding that we live in rich brandscapes 
(Biel, 1993: 67; quoting the anthropologist John Sherry). From the general brand-
scape of availability we as consumers choose a personal brandscape for our lives. 
Many research approaches have treated the relevance of brands for the individual 
‘identity project’ (to which I will refer to later in the context of nation brands) and 
linked it to important psychological constructs of familiarity and reassurance. 
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Predominantly as an effect of globalization, the understanding and management of 
places as brands arouse:  
“Branding is, potentially, a new paradigm for how places should be run in the 
future. A globalised world is a marketplace where country has to compete 
with country – and region with region, city with city – for its share of atten-
tion, of reputation, of spend, of goodwill, of trust” (Anholt, 2005a: 119). 
 
Parallel, growing parity among places in terms of products, destinations, technolo-
gies or cultural particularities evokes the needs of self-justification and distinction for 
places just as it had for product brands in commercial marketing (Csaba, 2005: 141).  
 
As we will analyse later, the branding process with regard to places seems more dif-
ficult and complex than for products or services, and some authors even deny the 
possibility to develop a place like a brand (Hankinson, 2001: 128); the majority in 
the literature however supports the benefits of this analogy:  
“For places to achieve the benefits which the better-run companies derive 
from branding, the whole edifice of statecraft needs to be jacked up and un-
derpinned with the learnings and techniques which commerce, over the last 
century and more, has acquired. Much of what has served so well to build 
shareholder value can, with care, build citizen value, too; and citizen value is 
the keynote of governance in the modern world” (Anholt, 2005a: 121). 
 
2.2.1 Development of branding theory 
Branding itself is much older than modern marketing hype might make us think. 
Early traces of pictorial promotion can be rooted back to commercial activities in 
ancient Rome (Room, 1998: 14). The modern conception of branding and the use of 
individual brand names (and trademarks) have their origins in the 19th century in the 
Industrial Revolution and the following development of advertising and promotion 
for commercial products and services (Gilmore, 2002b: 57; Room, 1998: 14-15).  
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The classical perspective sees a brand mainly as a differentiating visual, verbal or 
symbolic identity of a commercial object, as found in a recent definition by the 
American Marketing Association (AMA): brands are a “name, term, sign, symbol, 
design, or a combination of them intended to identify the goods and services of one 
seller or group of sellers and to differentiate them from those of competition” (quoted 
in Kotler/Gertner, 2002: 249).  
As we will see, such an approach will be too narrow and will not hold for the broad 
account of brands as it will have to be understood for the purposes of this thesis. We 
saw already that the discourse on branding is no longer bound to tangible products or 
services, but is applied to entities ranging from the individual to places and nations.  
 
Therefore many current philosophies in marketing literature (e.g. Aaker, 1996; de 
Chernatony, 1999; Louro/Cunha, 2001) go far beyond seeing brands as a marketing 
communication devices; they analyze branding at the level of holistic management:  
“Branding in a company is a total approach to managing a business, with the 
brand providing the key to company strategy and corporate culture. Accord-
ing to this definition, the brand becomes a central organising function of the 
company, and may prove to be the company’s most valuable asset” (Anholt, 
2005a: 117). 
 
This advanced conception is also found in recent place branding literature:  
“Branding goes beyond PR and marketing. It tries to transform products and 
services as well as places into something more by giving them an emotional 
dimension with which people can identify. Branding touches those parts of 
human psyche which rational arguments just cannot reach” (van Ham, 2005: 
122). 
 
An important representation of this transformation is the concept of corporate brand-
ing. The branding unit is an organization instead of a product. While this concept has 
so far been largely applied for companies, one interesting task of this thesis will be to 
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see if the corporate branding concept also holds for non profit organizations or for 
more complex organizational entities such as place brands.  
 
2.2.2 Current dimensions of branding 
In the contemporary broad reading, the functions of brands as seen in brand literature 
are abundant (Louro/Cunha, 2001: 851-852; Rao/Agarwal/Dahlhoff, 2004: 126):  
· enabling firms to adopt differentiation-based strategies 
· increasing efficiency of marketing activities by economies of scale and scope 
· creating shareholder value 
· generating cash-flow and long-term financial contribution 
· serving as barriers to entry for rivals  
· acting as isolation mechanisms 
· facilitating decision making for customers and attenuate search costs 
· evoking customer loyalty  
· providing emotional and symbolic benefits 
 
Some authors claim that the integration of the (intangible) brand’s value in the bal-
ance sheets of the companies lead to the current peak of the branding phenomena 
(Freire, 2005: 347). As one of the main indicators, brand equity, which expresses the 
“differential effect of brand knowledge on consumer response to the marketing of a 
brand” (Keller, 1993: 2), has become a quite common expression for the strategic 
relevance of brands and their (monetary) value for firms, stockholders and consum-
ers.  
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Apart from these financial aspects of a brand, in a general sense, branding could be 
seen “to pertain to a strategically produced and disseminated commercial sign (or a 
set of signs) that is referring to the value universe of a commodity” (Askegaard, 
2005: 156). These non-economic and semiotic aspects of a brand underline their cul-
tural relevance as narratives or “storytelling called branding” (Twitchell, 2004: 484).  
 
With slow changes in marketing theory paradigms from a management-centred ap-
proach to a customer-centric understanding (Gummesson, 2002: 327), brands were 
not only analyzed in their functions for the brand owner, but also increasingly inter-
preted in their social role and symbolic relevance to the brand consumer: “A brand is 
a perceptual entity that is rooted in reality, but it is also more than that, reflecting the 
perceptions and perhaps even the idiosyncrasies of consumers” (Keller 2003a: 13). 
As we will see later, understanding of the receiving end of brand messages has very 
important implications for the brand management process.  
 
In line with brand theory of consumer research, brands are analysed in their broader 
social and cultural context as symbolic units. Brands facilitate communication in 
information-overloaded, sign-dominated societies and they enhance orientation for 
the individualized consumer who is released from traditional life context. They serve 
as a tool for an individual’s self-identity construction and express the chosen life-
style: “We are what we have is perhaps the most basic and powerful fact in consumer 
behavior” (Belk, 1988: 139). But more, granted the individualization, brands are also 
indicators of belonging to a social entity (Freire, 2005: 354). 
Global availability of goods or approachability of tourism destinations should be 
understood as leading to branding of places. Place brands fulfil a symbolic function 
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like any other consumer brand – tourism is symbolic consumption (Mor-
gan/Pritchard/Pride, 2002) and a product’s country-of-origin serves as a marker/sign 
differentiating a consumer from others; at the same time (as we will see in more de-
tail later), a nation brand can enforce national identity and amplify the sense of be-
longing.  
 
Resembling ongoing competition between (research) programs within the emerging 
theory field, Holt (2004: 14) identifies four different models in brand theory and 
practise with each specific axioms and assumptions: 
· The classical brand theory, which is still predominant in most textbooks, 
stems from the management-centred marketing paradigm. In this model, 
brands are organized around the key words ‘USP’ or brand essence, to be de-
fined by brand management. A brand is a set of abstract associations.  
· In the midst of the 1990s the model of ‘emotional branding’ entered the stage. 
Terms like brand personality and brand experience underlined the acknowl-
edgement of the consumer in this model. A brand becomes a relationship 
partner for the consumer.  
· Together with the rise of the internet and new communication behaviours, the 
model of ‘viral branding’ developed. Aiming at spreading (brand-related) vi-
ruses via lead consumers into the social networks shifted the authorship of a 
brand even further to the consumer.  
· To this picture, with the cultural branding approach Douglas Holt recently 
added his reading of (successful) brands as cultural icons and authors of their 
own myth. As a member of the emerging stream of consumer research, Holt 
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sees brands performing an identity myth for the consumer in the post-modern 
marketplace. 
 
The cultural branding approach will turn out to be promising for the analysis of na-
tion brands because of the complexity and multidimensionality of these brands, but 
especially due to some considerations referring to management aspects. Until now 
Holt’s concept is only outlined for commercial brands. It will therefore need to be 
included into the place brand framework and developed for the purposes of this the-
sis.  
 
So far with the term place brand I referred to all kinds of geographical locations. This 
broad and unspecific range includes everything from small entities such as shopping 
malls to huge social and political units like supranational organizations. The theoreti-
cal assumptions about place brands in general must remain platitudes. Some authors 
question if place branding even forms a coherent field of inquiry (Csaba, 2005: 141).  
More insightful details in the mechanisms can be investigated at the specific level of 
interest. The place unit to be analyzed in more detail for the purpose of this thesis 
will be the nation.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
NATION BRANDS 
 
 
 
In the past twenty years the brand understanding of nations has spread from an in-
sider application to more common domains:  
“The idea that countries behave like brands is by now fairly familiar to most 
marketers, and to many economists and politicians, too. Originally a rather 
recondite academic curiosity, the notion is gaining broader acceptance, and its 
value as a metaphor for how countries can position themselves in the global 
market place in order to boost exports, inward investments and tourism, is 
fairly well understood” (Anholt, 2002c: 43).  
 
Part of the analogy’s success is the omnipresence of nation brands in every day’s 
parlance:  
“From Greek mythology to French panache and Russian roulette, from Ger-
man engineering and Japanese technology to British rock and Brazilian soc-
cer, […] references to countries and places are everywhere around us in our 
daily life, social interaction and work” (Papadopoulos/Heslop, 2002: 295).  
Nations evoke a range of attributions in the minds of the people of the ‘global vil-
lage’, and individuals or other nations interact with a nation based on these attribu-
tions.  
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Systematic analysis of trade between nations, as observed by Adam Smith or David 
Ricardo in late 18th and early 19th century, is an important starting point for under-
standing global markets. Ricardo’s theory of comparative costs explaining the basis 
and the benefit of trade among nations, the 20th century adaptation by Heck-
scher/Ohlin (Meier, 1998: 39) or Michael Porter’s concept of National Competitive 
Development (Kotler/Jatusripitak/ Maesincee, 1997: 83-84) provide a general back-
ground for the economic competition of nations.  
 
The second half of the 20th century brought the concept of marketing into this pic-
ture; which was not about new phenomena, but brought in new models for explana-
tion: “after all, if countries want to compete in the international arena, they must (us-
ing standard marketing terminology) differentiate and strategically target certain 
world markets” (Samli, 1999: 84). 
 
 
3.1 Terminological distinctions: nations and national identity  
 
In the marketing literature on the issue, the terms ‘country’, ‘nation’, ‘nation-state’ 
and ‘state’ are mostly used interchangeably (Kleppe/Mosberg, 2002). In common 
speech they are also casually used as synonyms. A look at political and sociological 
literature however offers a different perspective.  
 
Although broadly applied in the marketing literature on nation brands, ‘country’ 
seems to be the least precise category for the political context, since it is by strict 
definition related to a geographical, but not to a political unit. According to Web-
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ster’s universal dictionary, country designates “the territory of a nation [or] a state” 
(Webster’s, 2002: 134).  
 
Content-richer terms when referring to the political unit of a country seem to be ‘na-
tion’ and ‘state’. The concept of nation implies historical, social and cultural aspects, 
while the concept of state refers to political structures, institutional and legal ques-
tions. Modern nation-states as conflux of both concepts are characterized by the idea 
of citizenship (demanding duties and providing rights at the same time) on the build-
ing blocks of nationalism and community (O'Shaughnessy/O'Shaughnessy, 2000; 
Smith, 1992).  
 
The concept “nation-state” nowadays faces many challenges and undergoes perma-
nent reinterpretation. Obviously e.g. the community of birth as a constitutive idea for 
nation-states must fail facing multicultural societies and global migration (Dunn, 
1994: 8). The assumption that spheres of cultural (nation) and political (state) overlap 
and form an identity has become broadly criticized and doubted (McCrone/Kiely, 
2000). Still many nations urge to become independent states, and minorities in many 
nation-states are citizens, but not nationals of their host country (Turkish migrants in 
Germany might serve as a good example). The state’s monopoly to build a nation is 
on retreat (Kaufmann, 2001).  
 
At the same time we witness the internationalization of former tasks of nation-states. 
The boundaries between nation-states and supra-nation-states seem to blur. National 
borders become more permeable in economic and political terms in the global age 
(Close/Ohki-Close, 1999; Hardt/Negri, 2000; Habermas, 1996). Within the suprana-
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tional EU-project for example we see thrifts of different social domains: while eco-
nomical and military politics seem to go the global way, cultural, religious, and his-
torical patterns of national/regional identification re-emerge. 
 
This latter trend indicates that the nation has not lost all of its relevance especially in 
the cultural domain. A broader, more pluralistic and voluntaristic reading of the na-
tion (Smith, 1992) has no contradictions with other, supranational levels of organisa-
tions. It implies a reconfiguration of how nations are thought of and practised – 
rather as broad and dynamic cultural entities instead of fixed and limited units. The 
nation becomes “a discursive terrain within which competing notions of individual 
and collective selves are negotiated” (Dzenovska, 2005: 174). A central object of this 
negotiation is the national identity. 
 
While in early stages of nationalism, national-identity was a key achievement by the 
nation-state by creating hymns, public holidays, monuments and other symbols of 
national unity (Grew, 1986) – in some readings historical efforts in nation branding 
(Olins, 2002)1 – still nowadays national identity seems powerful. Globalisation can-
not offer substitutes for uncertainties and questions of belonging (Giddens, 2001); 
and supranational organizations like EU have so far failed to create a common sense 
of European identity (Smith, 1992; Eurobarometer, 2003).  
 
Identity is being formed as part of the reflexive action taken by individuals in a world 
of multiple social and political possibilities and discrepancies (Castells, 1997; 
Cherni, 2001; Moreno, 2002). It is important to distinguish individual and collective 
                                                 
1 Olins (2002) especially analyses the nation-building cases after intense revolutionary cesuras like 
e.g. France after 1789 or Turkey after 1923 as early examples of nation branding.  
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identity: Whereas the (post-) modern individual may well cope with dual or multiple 
identities and accept contradictions for example between ethnic, national and reli-
gious identities, the collective identity, amplified by mass media, appears rather 
“pervasive and persistent” (Smith, 1992: 59). The challenge for the modern individ-
ual having to choose among a variety of lifestyles and identity patterns is amplified 
by the lack of cultural authority or value found in the multitude. This is where indi-
vidualism finds its limits and a new reading of post-modernity for marketplace cul-
tures after a period of severe social dissolution gains momentum:  
“The individual who has finally managed to liberate them from archaic or 
modern social links is embarking on a reverse movement to recompose their 
social universe on the basis of an emotional free choice. […] Post-modernity 
can therefore be said […] not to crown the triumph of individualism but the 
beginning of its end with the emergence of a reverse movement of a desperate 
search for the social link” (Cova, 1997: 300). 
 
Such a social link or community for the Self can be provided by places like nations. 
Our national identity helps us to position ourselves in the world – we know who we 
are and redefine and locate ourselves in rediscovering our national culture (Smith, 
1991).  
The nation is the field of identification that can offer the greatest range of historiciza-
tion of the own self (Berger/Luckmann, 1966). It can offer a heroic past as collateral 
for a glorious future serving the individual to “surmount the finality of death and 
ensure a measure of personal immortality” (Smith, 1991: 160-161).  
Furthermore, national identity is the realisation of the ideal of fraternity (Smith, 
1999: 162). “Identity is derived from confirming our solidarity with people who are 
like us” (Riches, 2004: 643). National identity resembles the relationship between 
family and community, celebrated in the form of rituals and ceremonies, which 
highly appeal to the aesthetic senses like beauty, comfort or pathos.  
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In this understanding despite many challenges the concept of nation is an interesting 
unit of analysis for branding activities; it seems most rich and comprehensive among 
the commonly synonymously used categories of nations, nation-states, states and 
countries for the purposes of this thesis. National identity to the very day represents 
the most fundamental and inclusive collective identity. In this context, the role of 
branding will be fruitfully analyzed as a tool to enhance national identification. Links 
between national identity and the construct of nation brand image will be indicated 
later when analyzing image concepts in marketing and the interplay of brand identity 
and brand image at the nation brand level.  
 
 
3.2 Dimensions of nation brands  
 
Nation brands refer to a broad bandwidth of areas, all contributing to an overall 
brand impression.  
“Nation brand is an important concept in today’s world. Globalization means 
that countries compete with each other for the attention, respect and trust of 
investors, tourists, consumers, donors, immigrants, the media, and the gov-
ernments of other nations; so a powerful and positive nation brand provides a 
crucial competitive advantage. It is essential for countries to understand how 
they are seen by publics around the world; how their achievements and fail-
ures, their assets and their liabilities, their people and their products are re-
flected in their brand image.” (Anholt/GMI, 2005c: 1).  
 
Some spectacular role models are often quoted in the literature to underline the suc-
cess of nation branding strategies. Among the three most prominent are probably 
Spain, Ireland and New Zealand, which should serve as examples for the current 
relevance of the discussion.  
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· Spain managed to overcome a dramatically bad reputation as an “impover-
ished European backwater” after the death of Franco in 1975 in only 20 years 
time (Olins, 1999: 15-16). Very thoughtful strategic marketing efforts, suc-
cessful global events like the Olympic Games in Barcelona 1992 or Seville’s 
world fair 1995, and consistent and creative nation brand management trans-
ported the country’s remarkable transformation in an exemplary way (Gil-
more, 2002a; Kyriacou/Cromwell 2005a).  
· When Ireland entered the EU in 1985 it was regarded as Europe’s poorhouse. 
A wisely developed strategic scenario and a very consistent positioning in 
emerging markets led to the country’s great success as an IT center, devel-
oped practically from scratch and attracting investors in a large scale (Kyri-
acou/Cromwell 2005a). Nowadays, Ireland is considered as one of the 
healthiest economies of EU-Europe (Ögütcü, 2005) and – in analogy to eco-
nomically prospering Asian tiger states – referred to as the “Celtic tiger” 
(Olins, 1999).  
· New Zealand developed from a rather low-profiled attachment to Australia to 
a significant nation brand, well established in the minds of the international 
community and smartly managed in the fields of industry, education, culture 
and tourism. The well-done promotion of the filming of “Lord of the Rings” 
exemplifies the nation’s efforts for a quite positive and profiled international 
perception (Ryan, 2002).  
 
In the past years the topic of nation brands has gained significant relevance in aca-
demia and in practise. In different science disciplines, but mainly in economics and 
management, it has even become a fashionable issue. Correspondingly, Papadopou-
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los and Heslop (2002) identified over 750 major publications in this area in the last 
40 years.  
A couple of aspects are predominant in the discussion. As indicated before, the 
“country-of-origin”-effect and the promotion of a tourist destination occupied his-
torically the greatest share. In recent years, some new aspects have added to the 
broad scope of nation brands:  
“Clearly, there is far more to a powerful nation brand image than simply 
boosting branded exports around the world – if we pursue the thought to its 
logical conclusion, a country’s brand image can profoundly shape its eco-
nomic, cultural and political destiny” (Anholt, 2002c: 44).  
 
3.2.1 Promotion of tourism  
At first sight, the promotion of tourism to a country occupies most common ground 
with nation branding and seems to be the loudest voice. Falling costs in international 
travel, rising spending power of tourists, and the constant search for new experiences 
during the holidays led to rapid growth in the tourism industry. Twelve percent of the 
global GDP are spent on tourism expenses (Kotler/Gertner, 2002: 255). At the same 
time, the tourism destinations are threatened by ‘product parity’ of geography (like 
beaches) and activities/resorts, leading to increasing efforts of rivalling countries in 
this international marketplace demarcating their destinations and branding them dist-
inguishably (Anholt, 2005a: 120). In this context, the branding effect for a nation 
hosting international events like the Olympic Games, World Championships (e.g. in 
football) or world exhibitions is also mentioned in the literature (Kotler/Gertner, 
2002: 256). For the consumer, holiday destinations have become lifestyle products; 
they are expressive devices disseminating messages about identity and group me m-
bership (Morgan/Pritchard/Pride, 2002).  
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The identification of tourism as a strategic asset of nations was followed by signifi-
cant increases in promotion budgets and branding initiatives. However, it is impor-
tant to note that promo ting tourism is not quite the same thing as branding a nation. 
In fact, tourism is merely a part of the whole of a nation brand:  
“Although the economics of more and more countries do depend on tourism, 
other factors may be equally important, such as stimulating inward invest-
ment and aid, encouraging both skilled and unskilled workers to immigrate, 
promoting the country's branded and unbranded exports internationally, in-
creasing the international business of the national airline, facilitating the 
process of integration into political and commercial organizations such as the 
European Union or the WTO, and a wide range of other interests” (Anholt 
2002c, S. 54).  
 
3.2.2 Country of Origin-Effect 
The country of origin (COO) of a product as a decisive factor for consumers was the 
other dominant domain of nation brand research. The ‘made-in’-label has – along 
with other criteria such as price, packaging or design – become one of the most im-
portant extrinsic cues to product evaluations of a customer (Kotler/Gertner, 2002: 
252). Potential COO-effects are one of the most exhaustive researched aspects in 
international buying behaviour(Papadopoulos/ Heslop, 2002: 294).  
 
Within this research area some authors observe a shift from “the traditional ‘made-
in’ or ‘country-of-origin’[…] to a new level well beyond its required use on product 
labels, as broader place associations that rarely connote just the place of manufac-
ture, and are often borrowed, have become commonplaces” (Papadopoulos/Heslop, 
2002: 296). This more comprehensive understanding is often termed ‘product-
country-image’ (PCI) or ‘product-place-image’ (Ger/Askegaard/Christensen, 1999) 
and illustrates the change from an exclusive occupation with classical products or 
services to more complex products like countries or other social entities: “From be-
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ing elements in the branding of products and companies, places are becoming brands 
in their own right, managed to support local brands and businesses” (Csaba, 2005: 
144). As for tourism promotion, also for COO/PCI most nations and their export 
promotion authorities recognise the importance of managing this reputational asset 
(Kotler/Gertner, 2002: 252).  
 
3.2.3 Attracting capital  
A significant exemplar of the newer domains for nation brands is the area of foreign 
direct investments (FDI) and international financial capital flows, as indicated for the 
case of Ireland. In times of speed and hyper-reactivity characterizing the movements 
of global capital, not only rational economic analysis (as probably mostly assumed 
for such critical and momentous decision making), but also largely perception and 
image determine the direction of the flow (Pantzalis/Rodrigues, 1999).  
A unique positioning of the nation brand for the international financial community 
promises great rewards. Foreign business investments are expected to create substan-
tial new employment and contribute to the domestic growth. Compared to the popu-
lar topics ‘destination promotion’ and ‘COO/PCI’, this area of research is rather un-
dertheorized within the broad framework of nation branding (Papadopoulos/Heslop, 
2002: 302). 
 
Attracting human capital is increasingly mentioned in the literature. Nations are in a 
fierce competition for talented immigrants as the key production factors in (partly 
aging) societies and a well-positioned and credible nation brand with a positive repu-
tation for immigrantion can turn out to be an essential condition (Anholt, 2005a: 
121).  
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3.2.4 Culture and people 
History, traditions and heritage are important cornerstones of a nation brand. In a 
global space of cultural multitude, the growing demand on the part of the consumers 
“for an even wider, richer and more diverse cultural diet” (Anholt, 2005a: 121) has 
made ‘cultural exports’ an interesting competitive edge for nation brands. Occupa-
tion with other nations’ cultural heritage gains popularity; progress in information- 
and communication technology help spread cultural products globally. The enter-
tainment industry truly globalized. 
 
Closely connected to culture and heritage is the ‘people’ dimension of a nation 
brand. Both celebrities (sport, film or pop-stars, politicians etc.) and normal people 
represent a nation to other nations, e.g. by appearing in the media, by migration or by 
travelling (Kotler/Gertner, 2002: 251).  
 
3.2.5 Politics and governance  
With the sovereignty of the nation-state becoming increasingly challenged, nations 
begin to stronger acknowledge their dependence on the goodwill of corporations and 
individuals. The notion of the ‘brand state’ represents most different readings from 
the symbolic entity to the organisational principles of branding in governmental ac-
tion (van Ham, 2001).  
 
The holistic nation-brand management approach has not taken hold of the majority of 
politics yet (Kyriacou/Cromwell, 2005a/2005b; Vaknin, 2005), but a trend is visible:  
“The spread of democracy and democratic-type governance in many parts of 
the world and an increasing tendency towards transparency of government 
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and open relationships between state players, as well as a growing interest 
and awareness of international affairs among publics, drives the need for a 
more ‘public aware’ approach to politics, diplomacy and international rela-
tions” (Anholt, 2005a: 120).  
 
3.2.6 National identity  
National identity, as discussed earlier, is an important building block for the market-
ing of a nation and the nation brand itself (Boerner, 1986). Laurenson (2005) be-
lieves that a national identity can be elevated to the status of a nation brand, since it 
resembles the beliefs citizens of a nation developed about themselves in the course of 
the interaction with the environment as the rest of the world. The intermeshing of 
outside- and inside perspective enhances both external and internal strength of the 
national identity.  
“Eventually, if you’re big enough and have been around for long enough, that 
national identity will gain international recognition. This in turn can reflect 
back on the people, helping to further evolve their own beliefs about their na-
tional identity. This has been the case for nations like Italy – style, Switzer-
land – precision, or in an education context, the UK – status and prestige 
through heritage, the USA – status and prestige through global leadership” 
(Laurenson, 2005: 2). 
 
An important social effect of national identity for the gestalt of nation brand can be 
observed. The process of nation branding is largely about a collective self-analysis 
(Frost, 2004b): “A nation brand is a national identity that has been proactively dis-
tilled, interpreted, internalised and projected internationally in order to gain interna-
tional recognition. It is brand management that permits this elevation from national 
identity to national brand” (Laurenson, 2005: 2). 
 
But nation branding is not only about turning national identity inside out. It can also 
have tremendous amplifying impacts on the notion of identity of the domestic popu-
lation: “just as commercial branding campaigns, if properly done, can have a dra-
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matic effect on the morale, team spirit and sense of purpose of the company’s own 
employees, so a proper national branding campaign can unite a nation in a common 
sense of purpose and national pride” (Anholt, 2002a: 234). National identity and na-
tion brand identity are mutually meshed, sustained and reinforced in a full cycle of 
brand building.  
 
Figure 3-1: National Brand Effect (NBE) Cycle (Jaworski/Fosher, 2003: 107) 
 
 
3.3 Management of nation brand  
 
In summary, a list of most different approaches and perspectives to nation branding 
can be distinguished (Csaba, 2005: 142-143; Anholt, 2005b):  
· Promotion of tourism 
· Promotion of exports and enhancing product country image (PCI) 
· Promotion of culture and national heritage 
· Attraction of investment, business and development 
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· Attraction of people (as residents, workforce, students or future citizens) 
· Promotion of external reputation and political influence 
· Mobilization of internal support by building national identity.  
 
The challenge is how to master this complexity with conventional (product) brand 
management concepts and frameworks; this issue will also necessarily include basic 
questions of legitimacy when broadening the branding concept to nations.  
 
3.3.1 Questions of legitimacy 
Many voices have been raised on whether the commercial branding concept is appli-
cable to nation branding (and to the non-profit field in general, Csaba, 2005). Mostly, 
any nation-branding project (as most place branding projects, too) is exposed to some 
principal unease about applying the concept of branding to nations. “The problem 
seems to be not so much with what goes on but with the words used to describe it. It 
appears that is the word ‘brand’ which raises the blood pressure” (Olins, 2002: 246). 
Olins goes on identifying three potential reasons for this: snobbery, ignorance and 
semantics (2002: 246). It is either the notion of superiority over business triviality, 
mutual knowledge gaps with businessmen being as ignorant about cultural and his-
torical traits as cultural scientists are about business (terminology), or it is simply the 
fixed semantic reference of branding to business contexts that is causes discomfort.  
In the stream of branding criticism arousing around the turn of the 21st century (e.g. 
Klein, 2001), branding gained a notion of a “perverse tool used by greedy compa-
nies, with the objective of manipulating consumers minds and increasing their prof-
its” (Freire, 2005: 350). Applied for places, branding was feared to corrupt the loca-
tion’s authenticity and result in the abuse of natives.  
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For Olins (2002), none of these arguments can pose a substantial scientific objection 
to the theoretical approach transferring the concept of branding to nations. Clearly 
the one-sided blame towards insatiable entrepreneurs as the evil behind branding 
completely ignores all other sociological backgrounds that caused the evolution of 
brands as identity markers (see Chapter 2). However, for the case of nations and na-
tional identity there might be stronger ideological forces at work than we expect in 
other social areas.  
Csaba (2005: 145) accuses Olins of overseeing the tension between the sacred and 
the profane in the question of nation branding. Even with waning force, the extraor-
dinary value of nationhood and especially of national identity is still around and 
much of the principle resistance against the nation branding project might rely on 
emotional ties.  
 
Approaching the overlap of branding with national affairs is seen as a striking exam-
ple for a “neoliberal political rationality within which the lack of autonomy of 
spheres (for example political and economic) is no longer visible” (Dzenovska, 2005: 
177). The animosity complained by Olins (2002) could be read as ongoing principal 
discomfort with the integration of economic and political spheres that historically 
had been separate (Dzenovska, 2005: 178)..  
Good nation brand management will need to discover and articulate these discom-
forts. In such a process, branding might even turn out to increase the local self-
esteem and thereby contribute largely to preserve a place’s particularities (Freire, 
2005: 359) – as expressed in the Nation Brand Effect.  
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Successful cases indicate that the branding techniques are useful for nation branding: 
“What governments can learn from branding are the prescribed methodologies; polls 
are similar to brand benchmarking surveys – there’s an initial query phase, then hy-
potheses are formed on the product side – what the product should be called or how 
it should be positioned” (Frost, 2004b: 3). 
 
Yet, also significant problems should be considered: 
· The analysis of identity and of target group perception will be much more 
complex for nations than for products. 
· The goal of obtaining a fully integrated communication mix for branding will 
prove quite difficult. 
· Modification, alternation, repositioning etc. of the product(s) is much easier 
in the commercial world and will be sometimes impossible for nation brands.  
· Measuring success by isolating factors seems often impracticable. Corpora-
tions can for example rely on balance sheets and profit-loss statements for 
measuring their progress, while similar indicators for countries seem not in 
sight (Frost, 2004a).  
 
 
 
3.3.2 Nation brands as corporate brands  
The key problem in comparisons like the ones above lays in the fact that nations are 
mostly considered equal to product brands. There is good reason, however, to equate 
nation brands rather with corporate brands. It is important to repeat that the nation 
brand in the advanced understanding goes clearly beyond promotion of individual 
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products of a nation. Rather, tourism, exports, inward investments or singular cul-
tural products are components of a comprehensive nation brand. They can be pro-
moted and sold individually, but they don’t fully identify the nation. In fact, promo-
tion will not turn out to be the strongest tool to brand-manage such a complex entity 
as a nation (Anholt, 2005a: 118).  
 
It is thus suggested to have nation brand compared with corporate brands; also corpo-
rate brands are mostly not in the heart of promotions, but serve as an umbrella brand 
to the product brands. The task for nation branding is to manage the orchestration of 
the reputational assets (Kotler/Gertner, 2002), not primarily to sell individual prod-
ucts at global markets. The strength of the core brand will influence all individual 
levels: the stronger the nation brand, the more promising is the use of this asset for 
the promotion of single products.  
 
In that nations offer a large variety of outputs and at the same time represent a gen-
eral strategy common to all different categories, they appear comparable to large 
corporations with multiple business fields (Papadopoulos/Heslop, 2002: 307-308). 
“The national brand (developed on the basis of brand identity) is supposed to conjure 
images that are general, yet specific enough to attract the interest of the world that 
matters and result in a purchase decision” (Dzenovska, 2005: 175). Under this um-
brella the different products of a nation brand as presented above will be united. In 
line with Balmer/Gray (2003: 975) and Csaba (2005) I propose to therefore analyze 
national brands as a broadening of the corporate branding concept. Many of the prob-
lems mentioned above like the identification of target groups or the isolation of suc-
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cess factors will also hold for corporate brands and challenge severely the currently 
predominantly product-orientated paradigm:  
· “Corporate brands are fundamentally different from product brands in terms 
of disciplinary scope and management; 
· Corporate brands have a multi-stakeholder rather than customer orientation; 
and 
· The traditional marketing framework is inadequate and requires a radical re-
appraisal.” (Balmer/Gray, 2003: 976). 2 
 
As nations, corporate brands are multiplex, federally governed, organized on a supra-
level and not easy to change (Balmer/Gray, 2003). Critical factors for successful cor-
porate brands are the degrees to which internal target groups (mainly employees) live 
and understand the corporate brand (Anholt, 2002a). This question is also crucial for 
a nations, expressed in the degree to which the inhabitants incorporate the nation 
brand as part of their reflexive (national) identity.  
Also, when looking at the image research in marketing theory later on, we will wit-
ness further resemblances to this discussion especially with regard to the multidi-
mensionality and to the demarcation problems of corporate brands as compared to 
product brands.  
 
The similarity between nation brands and global companies (to which I refer to as 
large, often transnational corporate brands) can also be observed in the opposite di-
rection: global brands are taking on roles of the nation brand:  
                                                 
2 Therefore, Balmer/Gray (2003) have to be supported in their finding that this branch of marketing 
has yet to be developed: the theory of corporate level marketing/branding. The recently published 
anthology by Schulz/Antorini/Csaba (2005) can be read one general attempt for such theory develop-
ment.  
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“Global companies and brands have to assume many responsibilities that 
were previously seen as the responsibility of nation-states. In some senses, 
such brands have become part of the public domain and have to take political, 
cultural and moral responsibility. As such, country and company branding 
have become more similar and therefore share similar political and manage-
rial challenges.” (Kleppe/Mosberg, 2002: 40-41).  
Olins (1999) even goes so far in saying that companies and countries begin to trade 
identities, with nations discovering the branding domain at the same time as compa-
nies learn to face questions of the public.  
 
3.3.3 Management conditions  
The literature mentions focal characteristics of branding like “unity of purpose” and 
“decision-making authority” (Papadopoulos/Heslop, 2002: 306) that nation brand 
management will struggle with, including aspects like:  
· Who will legitimately represent a territory like a country and an entity like a 
nation?  
· With local, regional and national levels of power intermeshing, who will be 
able to lead the process? 
· How can the most different sources of information be practically controlled?  
· Can the power of the payroll in commercial brand management be replaced 
by the power of persuasion (also see Quelch/Jocz, 2005: 231)? 
 
Indeed there is a multitude of stakeholders and opinions in the nation branding proc-
ess. The number of jurisdictions, administrational and managerial institutions in-
volved on different levels brings along not only quarrels about horizontal and vertical 
lines of competencies, but also challenges of ensuring coherence of messages and 
contents.  
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Another problem is regarding the continuity of leadership in a temporal sense. Brand 
management is oftentimes understood as a high-level managerial issue (Quelch/Jocz, 
2005: 230-231). In corporations this problem is taken care of in form of organisation 
structures and processes ensuring consistence and continuity; for a nation brand 
however short- and middle-term leadership changes inherent to democratic govern-
ments might turn out to be critical as long as the value of a strong nation brand as a 
selling point for politicians is not considered independent of political party interests 
(Kyriacou/Cromwell 2005b). Nation brand practitioners therefore repeatedly under-
line the importance of also largely involving and listening to non-governmental 
stake-holders of nation brands in the brand building and management process 
(Kleppe/Mosberg, 2002: 40; Yan, 2003: 455) – from business associations, NGO’s 
or other special interest groups down to the level of citizens.  
 
In such an understanding of the nation brand as a complex project, the oft-quoted 
dichotomy of commercial vs. non-commercial brands also becomes obsolete. A well-
managed nation-brand necessarily comprises both business and non-profit interests 
(Csaba, 2005: 131). For social processes in need of a profitable division of labor in 
competitive environments, generally the formally distinct border between govern-
mental- and non-governmental or profit- vs. nonprofit organizations has become 
blurred (Csaba, 2005: 132). A similar argument can be developed regarding branding 
as a technique or method per se being too commercial (Csaba, 2005: 135). Again, a 
well-integrated process involving all relevant social domains (business and non-
business) and providing “concerted internal justification” (Csaba, 2005: 136) coun-
teracts such an objection.  
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It is thus important to point out that the residents/citizens are a core element of a na-
tion brand and their inclusion in the process of nation branding is essential (Blich-
feldt, 2005: 394). To “motivate and inspire” (Blichfeldt, 2005: 396) the population to 
“live the brand” (Anholt, 2002a: 230) becomes a central management task. Common 
desire for growth can motivate various agents in a community (Papadopou-
los/Heslop, 2002: 307). 
 
Accordingly, the degree of professionalism in running the nation brand can be as-
sessed based on how well the government manages to incorporate (professional) 
support from outside into such projects, not only to survive election cycles, but also 
to ensure quality and state-of-the-art work. Repelling the political dominance in na-
tion branding project and ensuring the essential democratic consensus are key issues 
(Csaba, 2005: 146). 
 
But also some dissents will be sustainable and there is no necessity for one single 
approach/strategy for the nation brand. Again alluding to some similarities with the 
corporate brand, Papadopoulos/Heslop (2002: 308) point out that there can be several 
distinguished strategies, but they have to be coordinated so that they do not conflict.  
 
Researching deeper into the subject of brand image in the next chapter, we will real-
ize that the manageability of (nation/place) brand images is limited anyhow. The 
foundation of running a nation brand will be rather to understand the perception than 
to guideline the image building or image changing (Blichfeldt, 2005).  
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In this sense, nation brand management can much less be a top-down process as it is 
mostly performed on the corporate side (Csaba, 2005). Rather, the combination of 
bottom-up and top-down processes appears to promise the most successful, justified 
and legitimate approach to nation branding.  
 
Dealing with the question of leadership, sometimes the argument of lacking experi-
ence in marketing on the side of politics is found when transferring brand-
ing/marketing theories between products and countries (Frost, 2004a: 1). Obviously 
this argument has another quality: it is not a structural, but rather a process-related 
argument and can therefore not be weighted equally. Rather increasing experience 
and professionalism will probably do away with this problem. Also, many outside 
professionals are already of support to governments and political agencies in this 
regard and will be so in the future.  
 
In general, as a rather young approach, nation branding will yet have to develop pa-
rameters and instruments according to the specific conditions. The argumentation so 
far has shown that the essential question is not about whether it should be done, but 
how it can be done.  
Some concepts from the commercial world will necessarily display shortages if ap-
plied for nation brands (e.g. for the question of validation) and need some autono-
mous conceptual work. One must agree with Papadopoulos and Heslop that in such a 
broad sense “the area is still largely in an exploratory phase” (Papadopoulos/Heslop, 
2002: 298). A new discipline like nation branding will have to play around creatively 
with the concepts at hand. The approximation towards the corporate brand seems to 
be a first step.  
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Other steps will follow. The direction of the transfer will not necessarily be one-
directional: “Is it not corporate branding that is moving into territory normally asso-
ciated with places, governments and civic institutions when it deals with culture, 
identity and social responsibility?” (Csaba, 2005: 148). The development of a consis-
tent model of branding nations will most probably provide new insights also to the 
commercial areas of branding.  
 
Acknowledging the high complexity of nation brands, branding should not be seen 
dominantly as a device of influencing people. In management terms, branding is 
rather a diagnostic instrument to “investigate, understand and respond to people’s 
perceptions of the place” (Blichfeldt, 2005: 399). In other terms, not the entity itself 
can be branded in a fully controlled management approach, but the techniques can be 
used (Gudjonsson, 2005). Some parallels to current versions of general brand theory 
responding to former management-centred paradigms in marketing, as introduced in 
Chapter 2, are evident.  
 
 
 42 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
NATION BRAND IMAGE 
 
 
 
The concept of image is probably one of the most gleaming constructs in marketing. 
Despite the vital success, it is yet applied quite controversially. Within marketing 
science and practise dissimilar and partly contradicting definitions, nomenclatures, 
models and conceptualisations for brand image can be found – indicating that the 
construct is lacking theoretical foundation.  
 
General theoretical roots of image constructs are manifold and clearly much older 
than marketing. Theories on subjective perception of the world can be traced back in 
ancient philosophy, take for example Plato’s allegory of the cave. Philosophy of the 
modern age differentiating between the object and its representation in the human 
cognition, found in Kant’s or Schopenhauer’s work, is an essential foundations in the 
history of ideas (Franke, 1997: 7). Psychology evolving as an individual science at 
the end of the 19th century focuses upon human perception of reality. In the eco-
nomic field, however, the assumption of the ‘homo oeconomicus’ was dominant, and 
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it took until the second half of the 20th century for the preoccupation with the relation 
of psychological conditions of consumption to arise. In the 1950s different disci-
plines (re-) discovered the concept of image for their purposes..  
 
Most authors identify the hour of birth of brand image research in the field of mar-
keting with the benchmarking contribution of Gardner/Levy in 1955. In the article 
“The Product and the Brand”, image is identified as the concept which summarizes 
best the different approaches that are beyond the core of the product. Levy (1959) 
redirected the question and introduced “new whys for buys” (Levy, 1959: 118) by 
the differentiation of symbolic and functional orientation of customers. At the same 
time Boulding (1961) presented the first comprehensive analysis of the image con-
struct from a psychological behaviouristic standpoint. On the practical side the credit 
for introducing the image concept in the world of marketing communication is usu-
ally given to the advertiser David Ogilvy and his work in the 1950s, demanding an 
ad’s contribution to a brand’s image as a central criterion (Biel, 1993: 67). From here 
the concept quickly spread through marketing practise and seems inevitable nowa-
days.  
 
The power of the term mainly springs from the human need to simplify decisions by 
creating symbolic representations in a knowledge network of meanings. With in-
creasing complexity in the world of goods and services, consumers want to rely on 
general impressions in times of uncertainty while forming preferences. So, their deci-
sions rest less upon physical or objective benefits, but rather relate to symbolic asso-
ciations and intangible attributes of an object or an entity. In this, the entire market-
place undergoes redefinition. Consumption based on symbolic meaning of objects as 
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an additional and complementary dimension to consumption based on functional 
meaning enriches the market perspective of a rational economy by the one of a sym-
bolic economy (Askegaard/Firat, 1996). 
 
 
4.1 Theoretical Confusion  
 
There seems clearly an agreement on the importance of image constructs in market-
ing theory. However, “the term is used so inconsistently that no two researchers are 
necessarily talking about the same phenomenon” (Stern/Zinkhan/Jaju, 2001: 202). 
 
A long history of ambiguous usage has given rise to vague and blurry meanings. A 
commonly accepted definition does not seem in sight. “Over time and through over-
use, or misuse, the meaning of ‘brand image’ has evaporated and has lost much of its 
richness and value” (Dobni/Zinkhan, 1990: 110).  
 
There are numerous reasons for this confusion, forming a vicious circle of vague-
ness: 
· A theoretically clear and unambiguous construct definition is missing.  
· Being occupied in science and non-science domains, a consistent theoretical 
development can not be observed 
· The lack of theory background leads to a range of methodological procedures 
applied in image research that tends to even blur the theory further. 
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Two interesting meta-analyses outline an overview of the usage of the image con-
struct in management literature. Looking at the definitions of brand image in 40-50 
years of research history, Dobni/Zinkhan (1990) try to detect the ‘hard core’ of the 
image research program. A follow-up project by Stern/Zinkhan/Jaju (2001) relied on 
the same parameters, but broadened the image spectrum when examining another 
decade of research. Both projects identify four distinct categories emphasised by 
scientists approaching the image concept:  
· Symbolism 
· Meanings and messages  
· Personification 
· Cognitive or psychological dimensions 
 
Analyzing these categories, at least three areas seem unclear and constantly reappear 
throughout the “semantic muddle” in the literature (Stern/Zinkhan/Jaju, 2001: 204): 
· Ontological: Is an image an object in the external world such as a product, a 
company or a country (sender determines image), is it a perception in the 
mind of the consumer (receiver determines image), or is it a textual/semiotic 
intermediary between these two institutions (sender and receiver participate 
in image formation)? 
· Nature: Following from the ontological state, is an image a state (a static en-
tity in the external world or the consumer’s mind) or is it a process (a transac-
tion between sender and receiver)? 
· Dimensionality: Is an image a multi-sided and multidimensional construct or 
a particular, uni-dimensional entity? 
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4.1.1 Ontological problems 
For the ontological question, aspects of perspective and agency are discussed. There 
seems some mainstream agreement developing that image is a category of brand per-
ception. In models such as the one from Kapferer (1997, see below), basically shared 
by other well-published marketing scholars like David Aaker (1996) or Kevin Lane 
Keller (2003a), image is understood as the perception of a brand (a product message) 
by the receivers of the brand signal.  
“Brand image is on the receiver’s side. Image research focuses on the way in 
which certain groups perceive a product, a brand, a politician, a company or a 
country. The image refers to the way in which these groups decode all of the 
signals emanating from the products, services and communication covered by 
the brand. Identity is on the sender’s side. The purpose, in this case, is to 
specify the brand’s meaning, aim and self-image3. In terms of brand man-
agement, identity precedes image” (Kapferer, 1997: 94). 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Identity and Image (Kapferer, 1997: 95) 
“An image results from decoding a message, extracting meaning, interpreting 
signs. Where do all these signs come from? There are two possible sources: 
brand identity, of course, but also extraneous factors (‘noise’) which speak in 
the brand’s name and thus produce meaning, however disconnected they may 
actually be from it.” (Kapferer 1997, S. 94) 
 
The sender side is referred to as the producer of the brand identity, differentiated 
from brand image, which is not fully in the sphere of influence by the company: 
“strictly speaking, a company cannot create an image. Only a public can ‘create’ an 
                                                 
3 As we will analyse later especially for the case of a nation brand, the self-image as part of the iden-
tity building is quite relevant.  
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image in that it consciously or unconsciously selects the thoughts and impressions on 
which that image is based. [...] The company cannot create the image. It can create 
the elements of the identity for the company (and all the identity for the brand)” 
(Bernstein, 1984: 56).  
 
Throughout marketing history, however, there are numerous examples where this 
interpretation is blurred and image is presented as producible brand message: “The 
image is a perception created by the marketer’s management of the brand. Any prod-
uct theoretically can be positioned with a functional, symbolic or experiential image” 
(Park/Jaworski/MacInnis, 1986: 143). This approach is also often found in practical 
marketing parlance referring to shaping and managing images etc, like in advertising: 
“in positioning and repositioning products, advertisers often work to create a gender 
image for a brand…” (Debevec/Iyer, 1986: 12). Similarly in some place marketing 
literature, authors like Langer (1999) or Papadopoulos/Heslop (2002) speak explic-
itly of controlling or managing the image of a nation. In marketing theory, the influ-
ence of such a management-centred image construct seems currently to decline in the 
light of the numerous disturbance variables in the communication process.  
 
As a third direction, there are definitions emphasising the negotiation process be-
tween sender and receiver: “A brand image is not simply an attribute or set of attrib-
utes describing a product. It is a statement about what the product or service means 
to the consumer” (Stern/Zinkhan/Jaju, 2001: 208; quoting Bromley, 1993). Products 
and brands are seen as messages transmitted between owner and user, and attached to 
these messages is the image.  
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In this context, lately the rigidity of the distinction between sender and receiver has 
been criticised from semiotic and organisational culture-related perspectives 
(Hatch/Schultz, 1997; Christensen/Askegaard, 2001). These positions underline that 
for complex commercial enterprises like corporations it does not seem to make sense 
to maintain a hermetic division line between internal and external affairs of an or-
ganisation (thus they propose not to keep up the distinction of image and identity). 
These constraints should also hold for the analysis of nation brands.  
 
Overlapping areas where senders become receivers and vice versa (who is insider, 
who is outsider of a brand?) prevent a clear-cut demarcation. Furthermore, a unidi-
rectional sender-receiver model does not correspond to the current mainstream theo-
ries of communication and meaning-negotiation. For all marketplace activities, con-
sumption is also seen as production, involving “signifying and representing selves or 
identities in the image of the images sought” (Askegaard/Firat. 1996: 8).  
 
According to this theory trait, the dichotomy of the functional and the symbolic in 
the marketplace introduced by Levy (1959) must be questioned, since symbolic ex-
changes of signs are also utility based discourses. Symbolic and functional values of 
objects merge, and necessarily images become interactive entities. Acknowledging 
this expresses the rediscovery of the ability of goods to communicate beyond their 
inscription (Askegaard/Firat. 1996: 14), which is a strong argument against a single-
sided sender- or receiver-perspective. Marketing communication is seen as a way of 
constructing the world and understanding, “but not by way of monologic brainwash-
ing – rather, as a dialogue for negotiated meaning” (Mick, 1988: 2).  
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In these perspectives some lines of theory-development throughout marketing history 
become visible. The clearest examples for a sender-orientated model can be found in 
the 1980s, while an evident shift towards the receiver side occurred in the beginning 
of the 1990s. The turn of the millennium produced literature on the ‘negotiation’ 
perspective. Clearly in this question some of the general paradigm controversies in 
marketing theory are at work (Gummesson, 2002; Davies/Fitchett, 2005).  
 
4.1.2 Nature and dimensions of images  
A notion of negotiation also underlies the understanding of the nature of images. In 
the question of dynamic vs. static qualities of images, product brand images and cor-
porate images are suggested to behave differently. Product brand images are mostly 
seen as progressive interactions between sender and receiver (Stern/Zinhan/ Jaju, 
2001: 218). Corporate brand images, however, in the mainstream of the literature, are 
described as rather static. Definitions of corporate image, other than of product/brand 
or store images, often apply the verb “hold”, for example, image “is the overall im-
pression of the company held by segments of the public” (Stern/Zinhan/Jaju, 2001: 
212).  
 
When referring to the dimensionality of the image construct, the picture gets even 
more complex: While most marketing theorists and practitioners agree that images 
are not one-dimensional, but of multidimensional gestalt, the dimensions themselves 
are quite different: “Corporate image is composed of multiple stakeholder groups’ 
impressions of a firm. [Product] Brand image incorporates but is not limited to con-
sumer dimensions, for it includes brand, corporate, and user segmentation attributes 
as well” (Stern/Zinhan/ Jaju, 2001: 218). 
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Another area of dimensionality stems from intersections or confusions with other 
concepts originating from marketing itself or from sociology and (consumer) psy-
chology, like e.g.  
· brand personality  
· brand character 
· brand knowledge 
· perception 
· association 
· attribute 
· attitude 
 
These and other terms are often found in marketing jargon related with questions of 
image (or are applied as substitutes). While some of these concepts are important 
building blocks or operationalisations of image (like attributes, personality, charac-
ter), others are comparably unspecific umbrella or generic terms (like perception or 
association) or synonyms (this is at least oftentimes suggested for the concept of atti-
tude4). All of them, however, do also get in the way of a clear and unambiguous 
definition, demarcation and application of the concept of brand image.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Also some important measurement conceptualisations for brand image derive from attitude research 
in Psychology and have been basic to many brand image frameworks, like the CBBE-model by K.L. 
Keller (Keller, 2002). 
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4.2 Approximations towards a definition for nation brand images 
 
In the absence of a clear-cut and consensus-shared definition of the construct of im-
age in the field of marketing, as the essentials of the analysis of image research his-
tory the following can be said about brand image at the current state:  
· “Brand image is the concept of a brand that is held by the consumer. 
· Brand image is largely a subjective and perceptual phenomenon that is 
formed through consumer interpretation, whether reasoned or emotional. 
· Brand image is not inherent in the technical, functional or physical concerns 
of the product. Rather, it is affected and molded by marketing activities, by 
context variables, and by the characteristics of the perceiver. 
· Where brand image is concerned, the perception of reality is more important 
that the reality itself” (Dobni/Zinkhan, 1990: 118) 
 
For the concept of corporate image, the attention of analysis has been directed more 
clearly to reception issues doing research on image in the perceiver’s mind, acknowl-
edging the different stakeholders’ impressions or perceptions of the firm 
(Stern/Zinkhan/Jaju, 2001: 211).  
The analysis of corporate image is multidimensional, accounting not only for specif-
ics among different segments of stakeholders, but also the access to information, 
which can be controlled by the firm (advertising, PR) or not (rumour, word-by-
mouth), or which can be negative or positive5. It seems obvious that increasing het-
erogeneity in communication process impede one-dimensional modelling 
(Stern/Zinkhan/Jaju, 2001: 203). 
                                                 
5 Barich and Kotler (1991: 97) differentiate 11 different factors influencing a corporate image, with 
each image factor being made up of a number of attributes 
 52 
 
The analysis of corporate image: image is an impression or perception located in the 
minds of a stakeholder, and different groups form different images. A corporate 
brand image might be less concrete than a product, less physical, so it cannot as 
much display physical attributes but should be conceptualized rather as an abstrac-
tion in the minds.  
 
In most modern marketing literature, the concept of brand identity is still closely 
linked to brand management and brand positioning issues. In the understanding of 
brands as management tools many authors focus on the perspective of the brand 
owner (Aaker, 1996) and tend to neglect the perspective of the receiver/consumer of 
brand messages. “The consumer is treated as the background on which the great va-
riety of tactical and strategic brand management tools can be tried and tested, but 
rarely is the consumers’ response to or relation to the brand in focus per se” (Aske-
gaard, 2005: 159). 
 
To maintain a clear-cut distinction between insiders as producers of brand messages 
and outsiders as receivers, as indicated in Kapferer’s model above, seems unrealistic 
for a nation brand. The identity aspects of a nation brand, as touched upon earlier, are 
non-negligible:  
“The image of a country as projected to the world at large will have its effects 
on the population of the country itself: just as corporate branding campaigns, 
if properly done, can have a dramatic effect on the morale, team spirit and 
sense of purpose of the company’s own employees, so a proper national 
branding campaign can unite a nation into a common sense of purpose and 
national pride” (Florek, 2005: 206). 
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It is therefore obvious that a boundary line can not be held up: “This division be-
tween in- and outward direction appears to be problematic, as the construction of a 
‘we’ always includes the drawing of boundaries to the others and ‘them’ and as it is 
not exclusively based on constructing similarity, but differences as well” (Langer, 
2002: 5).  
 
The troubles with the distinction of inside and outside of a nation brand become evi-
dent for the case of Turkey: Christensen/Askegaard’s (2001) indications on inter-
meshing of inside and outside of a corporate brand seems perfectly adequate to de-
scribe one main challenge for the nation brand Turkey, which will be discussed in 
much greater detail later: how can more than 3,5 million Turks living abroad in EU 
Europe be categorised when we look at Turkey’s accession process: are they insiders 
of Turkey’s nation brand or outsiders, receiver or sender of brand messages? A con-
struct like (national/brand) identity, as discussed before in Chapter 2, enters this pic-
ture rather as the self-image (Kapferer, 1997: 94), which is intertwined with an out-
side image. The internal branding history of a country, which is its identity work 
sometimes over centuries, cannot be separated from the outward oriented brand.  
 
4.2.1 Stereotypes and (nation brand) images 
The concept of stereotypes is often discussed in the context of nation brands (e.g. 
Askegaard/Ger, 1996). In a sociological definition, stereotype means a “biased (usu-
ally prejudicial) view of a group or class of people – a view that is resistant to change 
or correction from countervailing evidence” (O’Shaughnessy/O’Shaughnessy, 2000: 
57).  
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This connotation leads Gardner/Levy 1955 to see the concept of image as a devel-
opment from the level of available stereotypes when explaining consumer behaviour. 
Stereotypical product communication was highly repetitive and preoccupied with 
some quite superficial interpretations of the consumer, but very little differentiated 
and not broadly aware of the social and psychological nature of products (Gard-
ner/Levy, 1955: 34). Similarly, O’Shaughnessy/O’Shaughnessy (2000: 57) see the 
category of stereotype merging and improving into the image concept. “Stereotypes 
can be criticised for being a naïve simplification of reality, because their construction 
is based on a narrow understanding and limited experience of relevant facts. Never-
theless, stereotypes are useful to give order and meaning to a complex and diverse 
world” (Freire, 2005: 348). 
 
This standpoint deserves a deeper differentiation in a contemporary light. As short 
cuts, stereotypes are an important simplification strategy. The concept of categorisa-
tion relates partly to Gardner/Levy’s criticism, as categories/concepts fix pre-existing 
mental representations. Categorisation means organisation of concepts by ordering 
the relations. The perception of new information also occurs with respect to the pre-
existing mental categories as comparison of similarities and differences. In such a 
sense, stereotypes represent mental networks as operationalizations of the interpreta-
tive processes involving previously held information (Askegaard/Ger, 1997: 52).  
“Since they are in the eyes of the beholder, the formation of images relies 
heavily on perception, and both are intertwined with stereotyping, the process 
of generalising to an entire class of objects from a limited number of observa-
tions. Stereotypes develop over time as one classifies repeated observation 
into schemata which are then correlated to form one’s view of the world” 
(Papadopoulos/Heslop, 2002: 296).  
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The fact that stereotypes are culturally defined and shared in groups is an important 
aspect and context becomes therefore an essential condition. Stereotyping happens as 
interaction between the group and the self, thus stereotypes are more than an individ-
ual phenomenon. They are subject to socially organized value-systems, ideologies 
and power-relations.  
 
For the topic of nation brand images the concept of stereotypes might be therefore 
more relevant than for product brands: “Most country images are in fact stereotypes, 
extreme simplifications of the reality that are not necessarily accurate. They might be 
dated, based on exceptions rather than on patterns, on impressions rather than on 
facts, but are nonetheless pervasive.” (Kotler/Gertner, 2002: 251).  
While they had been widely ignored for a good while in COO-research, in the 1990s 
stereotypes entered the arena as an innovative additional conceptualization of Prod-
uct-Country-Images (PCI):  
“Stereotypes are representations of groups, often used to describe, interpret, 
evaluate, and predict actions of individuals. […] Stereotypes effects include 
distortion of perception – bias in selectivity, accentuation of both differences 
between, and similarity within categories (in- and out-groups), perceived ho-
mogeneity of outgroups, confirmatory bias – tendency of stereotypic expecta-
tions to confirm themselves, and evaluative bias – evaluative and behavioural 
discrimination favoring the in-group” (Askegaard/Ger, 1996: 14).  
 
So potentially the main difference between an image and a stereotype can be found 
in the degree of individuality: “A stereotype suggests a widely held image that is 
highly distorted and simplistic and that carries a favorable or unfavorable attitude 
toward the place. An image, on the other hand, is a more personal perception of a 
place that can vary from person to person” (Kotler/Haider/Rein, 1993b: 141).  
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Ger (1991) underlines that perception of others depends on the own position. Stereo-
types develop “in forming of little known outgroups” (Ger, 1991: 393). In that sense, 
stereotyping involves a differentiation between self and group. Perceptions are rela-
tive to the own social and psychological place. Within the context of symbolic con-
sumption the interaction of the self-concept of a consumer with the object is impor-
tant in affecting the so-called self-image/product-image congruity. “If it can be ar-
gued that national images act like the parent company of a brand, the congruency 
between the self-image and that country’s image will shape the decisions related to 
purchasing the country’s products, visiting or not that country and so on” (Altinbasak 
Ebrem, 2004: 35).  
 
For the understanding of nation branding therefore the concept of stereotypes might 
turn out to be helpful. It must be added as a new perspective to the analysis of a na-
tion brand image. The set of connotations and stereotypes for countries can be ex-
pected to be richer and more diverted than it would be for product brands. In doing 
so, attention should be devoted to the contextual setting of images that are the em-
beddings/surroundings of an image producing subject.  
 
The concept of stereotypes underlines furthermore the interactivity of perception 
processes and serves as an important contribution to image theory and research 
methodology; this is especially true for complex entities with such a broad array of 
references like corporations or nations.  
 
Therefore, especially the relationship approach seems to have some potential to de-
velop image theory. “If society is a network of relationships but marketing only rec-
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ognises this in a footnote or subgroup to some other classification, something is fun-
damentally wrong; a paradigm shift is called for” (Gummesson, 2002: 336). Image 
research is rarely accounting for negotiation between consumers and the social dy-
namism underlying images – this is how consumers shape images in interaction and 
by communication: “Image, in this sense, becomes a text, a narrative” (Aske-
gaard/Ger, 1997: 53). In such reading, “the meaning of a brand is fundamentally 
linked, in the consumers mind, to the brand’s relationship to people, places, things 
and other brands” (Keller, 2003b: 597). 
Common models still mostly rely on an isolated human being trying to make sense of 
the world all by him- or herself caught in a narrow form of “stimulus-organism-
response paradigm within a linear associationistic model of behavior” (Mick, 1988: 
2). A broader approach accounting for the social construction of images by the inter-
action between the individual and the society would lead to a more socio-cognitive, 
discourse analysis perspective (Mick, 1988: 2). 
 
The cultural approach to brands and brand image, which has been broadly received 
within the emerging stream of consumer research in the past decade, posits an in-
tense relationship between brand meanings and the surrounding cultural structures 
and processes (Thompson, 2004b: 98). More than just a symbolic source for con-
structing the individual identity, brands are interpreted symbols of cultural ideals, 
shared by like-minded people as foundations of a group identity 
(Holt/Quelch/Taylor, 2004: 71). Popular culture absorbs brands in its various 
spheres; hence the degree of manageability as direct control over brand meanings is 
regarded as rather small in this paradigm. In the cultural reading, successful brands 
are regarded as icons, fulfilling the basic human need for myths (Holt, 2003: 43-44). 
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As entities to which people rely to express their identity, Holt (2004: 5) sees coun-
tries (and places in general, also NGO’s, social movements and politicians) as prime 
candidates for cultural branding embodying socially relevant myths. As culturally 
shared entities stereotypes with regards to nations could be interpreted as a form of 
myth.6  
 
All in all, the inclusion of stereotypes in the brand image model calls for a broadly 
contextualized approach to nation brand images.  
 
4.2.2 Structures of brand images 
According to general image theory, attitudes and images must be regarded as holistic 
impressions consisting of three different components, which are linked to the essen-
tial spheres of human psyche: think, feel, act (Koch, 1997: 170; Koschnik, 1996: 13-
14):  
· Cognitive component: referring to the subject’s awareness of and knowledge 
about an object or a phenomenon (also called belief component) 
· Affective component: the subject’s linking and preference for some object or 
phenomenon (feeling component) 
· Behavioural/conative: component: the subject’s intention to act and the re-
sulting actual behaviour.  
 
In approaches to stereotypes, sometimes a fourth dimension/structure is added: the 
sensory link, including (mental) pictorial imagery of entities (Askegaard/Ger, 1997: 
52).  
                                                 
6 My interpretation; it should be stated that Holt does not explicitly account for stereotypes in his 
approach.  
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A proper image research design should therefore account for the coverage of all four 
components to represent a decent measurement accounting also for all potential con-
texts of the image.  
 
While these aspects are often regarded as microstructures, some authors also speak of 
macrostructures of images, which deal with the embedding of images in the psyche 
of a person. Here they differentiate a vertical and horizontal location. Vertically im-
age and attitudes can be related to the more general constructs of “values” and “per-
sonality”: From a horizontal perspective of analysis, sometimes sub-images are nego-
tiated between different mental states of the self (resolving cognitive dissonances), 
e.g. when expressing varying attitudes towards the same object depending on the 
respective social roles (Franke, 1997: 14-15). 
 
As indicated in the discussion of the stereotypes and cultural branding conducted 
before, not only such a personal level of macrostructures analysed at the level of in-
dividuals, but also a collective/social level of image macrostructures will need to be 
considered when investigating nation brand images. The variation of individual sub-
images will not only be explained by the resolution of cognitive dissonances, but also 
largely depend on the social negotiation process of images and the pre-existing col-
lective knowledge structures expressed in stereotypes.  
The different mental states of ‘the self’ (Franke, 1997) will furthermore depend on 
the level of involvement. As we will see in composing a nation brand related theo-
retical image framework, micro- and macro-levels of images are highly intertwined.  
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It is important to also be aware of a temporal and dynamic structure of images:  
“An image is constructed at any one time into a single whole from more ele-
mental parts so that the image recalled will vary with context and orientation. 
An image is not something static but has elements that fade in and out while 
only the vaguest image is retained without sustained effort” (O’Shaugh-
nessy/O’Shaughnessy, 2000: 57).  
Clearly, images should be seen as processes with considerable time dynamics rather 
than static structures.  
 
 
4.3 Nation brand image in a contextualized approach  
 
Many earlier studies focussing on COO/PCI-effects or tourism promotion employed 
a narrow understanding of a nation image (Ger, 1991: 391). Studies in the field until 
the mid 1990s have largely been descriptive and a-theoretical, and focussed on prac-
tical usability (Askegaard/Ger, 1997: 50).  
 
The discussion of brand theory showed: a brand is not equal to its messages, but 
largely dependent on the context within which it is received (Anholt, 2005c: 225) – 
an important reason why images are so persistent and hard to change.  
 
The understanding of the nation image should not be reduced to an intangible prod-
uct quality. It should account for the broad and comprehensive concept of the nation 
brand which we have introduced earlier: “Country image expresses personalized 
feelings of what people know and think about a country and it is developed by repre-
sentative products, national characteristics, economic and political background, his-
tory, tradition etc” (Ger, 1991: 391). In other words, a nation image should be ana-
lyzed in its context.  
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Image should be considered as the meaning system that we attach to phenomena. In a 
network world, meaning systems will be interrelated and images interdependent 
(Askegaard/Ger, 1997: 51). This implies that the different facets of a nation brand 
image not only contribute to an overall image, but also interdepend to each other. 
Image is a multidimensional summary construct embedded in individual and cul-
tural/societal contexts.  
The context of the nation brand image can be analyzed in two regards, accounting for 
the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of an image, but also for the ‘so what’:  
· Which individual and cultural factors/antecedents (cognitive and affective) 
influence the constitution of a nation brand image?  
· Which consequences (results or actions) will a certain nation brand image 
have (behavioural component) for an individual as part of a social environ-
ment relating to that nation?  
 
As discussed for commercial brands, images as knowledge structures relating to na-
tions (Ger, 1991: 390) are used as short cuts for more complex information; they are 
heuristics for decision making. Especially in so-called low-involvement situations, 
humans are inattentive information processors (Kotler/Gertner, 2002: 251). Cogni-
tive dissonances, which occur when reality does not overlap with existing mental 
representations, tend to be solved by ignoring the challenging information in order 
not to undergo the effort of reconstruct the cognition. Only in high-involvement 
situations, that is when misinterpretations would entail costs or the mental recon-
struction would provide utility or benefits, the revision of the schemes is considered 
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(Kotler/Gertner, 2002: 251). The heuristic function will therefore have to be differen-
tiated according to contextual factors like familiarity or involvement. 
In other words, the stored structures, which are initial opinions or expectations, de-
termine not only processing and interpretation of new information, but also judge-
ments based on the old information (Ger, 1991: 390). In addition, the willingness of a 
person to deal with or search for new information, connected to involvement with a 
subject, will depend on the fundamental (mainly affective) components of the im-
ages. 
 
On the other hand, pre-existing cognitive knowledge structures about a country, or 
familiarity with the object (in the case of a nation as the result of knowledge of e.g. 
historical facts, geographical information, political and economic structures or cul-
ture-related issues, but also deriving from personal experiences like visits or interac-
tions with the inhabitants, see more below), will determine an individual’s level of 
involvement and thus the extent of his or her readiness to relate to the object. Collec-
tively stored knowledge will be significant sources of insight into nation brands 
stereotypes.  
 
Following from this I will use the actual image content as a mediating-moderating 
construct between the factors and the consequences. In one perspective (step I), the 
image content should be analyzed as a consequence from the antecedents, and in a 
second perspective (step II) it will serve as an output/behavioral construct for the 
political implications/consequences.  
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Figure 4-3: Relationships between constructs within nation brand image contexts 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
POLITICAL CONTEXTS OF NATION BRAND IMAGES 
 
 
 
Political marketing is either a very old discipline closely linked to the development 
of the idea of democracy itself, or it is a rather infant theory evolving before the 
background of broadenings of the marketing paradigm and progressions in symbolic 
societies (Egan, 1999; Maarek, 1995).  
 
If we, with Egan (1999), leave aside the historical roots of political marketing, e.g. 
the rhetoric and symbolism displayed by early masters such as Pericles and Cicero, 
and label them pre-modern “an art form existing even prior to the general notion of 
democracy” (Egan, 1999: 496), we should locate the birth of modern political mar-
keting between 1930 and 1950 in the USA (Maarek, 1995: 7). Based on the early 
development of mass media, well-established traditions of elections and a very com-
petitive electoral system, the first attempts to systematically to market and mediate 
politics can be identified in the election campaigns employing political commercials 
and televised decisive debates (Maarek, 1995: 11-13).  
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It took until the 1990s however for political marketing to be fully discovered as an 
integral element of the political process (Egan, 1999: 496) in the USA and Europe, 
resembling more than just media strategy, but a contemporary understanding of ho-
listic mainstream marketing approaches.  
“Political marketing can be defined as ‘...the application of marketing princi-
ples and procedures in political campaigns by various individuals and organi-
zations. The procedures involved include the analysis, development, execu-
tion, and management of strategic campaigns by candidates, political parties, 
governments, lobbyists and interest groups that seek to drive public opinion, 
advance their own ideologies, win elections, and pass legislation and refer-
enda in response to the needs and wants of selected people and groups in a 
society’” (Newman/Perloff, 2004: 18, quoting Newman, 1999b: xiii). 
 
While practise of political marketing evolved significantly, theory is sometimes ac-
cused to not have fully followed this way to succeed: “Political marketing is still 
somewhat of an ‘academic parvenu’” (Henneberg ,2004: 238). O’Shaughnessy 
(2002) criticises that the prescriptive potential of the discipline developed very 
quickly (“has political marketing been over-marketed?” (O’Shaughnessy, 2002: 
209)), the descriptive part however was largely overseen. Very essential differences 
between commercial and political marketing had received almost no attention before 
the midst of the 1990s (Lock/Harris, 1996: 14); all in all, theory building in political 
marketing is clearly still infant and many conditions are yet not specified. 
 
 
5.1 Changing environments of politics 
 
Many of the social trends influencing the context of brands and marketing communi-
cation (at least for the Western world) in the last two decades, leading to the broader 
understanding of cultural or iconic brands, similarly apply to the political stage.  
 66 
In short what is oftentimes referred to as post-modernity7 is not only a philosophical 
category, but also an important aesthetic strategy and an epochal cultural shift that 
has reached politics. Political debates adapt to the vanishing of reference points in 
post-modern identity, which becomes a meandering category, more and more at the 
choice of the individual (Axford/Huggins, 2002). In the field of politics we find e.g. 
increasing evidence of electoral volatility (Butler/Collins, 1999: 58; Bartle, 2000a), 
paired with a constant decline in loyalty and psychological attachment towards par-
ties (Lock/Harris, 1996: 18; Bartle, 2000a: 33). At the same time there is a growing 
relevance of group activities with a high degree of mobilization across traditional 
political (party) structures focussing individual fields like e.g. ecology/energy, con-
sumer protection or fair trade; these activity groups are often organized cross- or 
trans-nationally within global infrastructures. The formal boundaries of politics are 
dissolving in the context of the meltdown of the nation-state. Historical events like 
the fall of the iron curtain lead to substantial challenges to grand narratives of politics 
like the left vs. right scheme (Bartle, 2000a: 17). Accordingly, we witness a frag-
mented political discourse, transmitted through increasingly individualized media 
and information systems.  
Evolving centrality of signs over words8 and the intense aesthetisation of every day 
life (Axford/Huggins, 2002) largely influences the postmodern style of politics. The 
production of the correct imagery becomes “politically more significant than the 
creation and execution of policy, the old concept of governing” (O’Shaughnessy, 
2003: 297). 
Practical political marketing under these circumstances tries to optimize the presenta-
tion of politics for transforming media environments. Important aspects are the in-
                                                 
7 See discussion of the concept e.g. by Axford/Huggins (2002), Firat (1995) or Giddens (2001). 
8 In line with Baudrillard’s reading of modern societies as symbolic entities, see Axford/Huggins, 
2002: 192  
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creasing personalisation of political campaigning or adoption of promotional tech-
niques; the difficulties in ‘managing’ contemporary political discourses due to the 
growing prominence of spin and buzz; and the upcoming influence of new technolo-
gies such as the Interne (Dermody/Wring, 2001: 198).  
 
 
5.2 Managerial approaches to political marketing: voting as consumption 
 
Most of the mainstream models of political marketing assume a transferability of 
marketing strategies and tactics to the domain of politics. Discovering large similari-
ties between the act of voting and consumption, they much resemble classical mar-
keting management approaches.  
Understanding the nature of an electorate is regarded as a necessary condition to 
grasp the potential role and scope of an approach like political marketing 
(Bartle/Griffiths, 2002: 19). As indicated, a number of authors claim that voting deci-
sions are in principle consumption decisions.  
“It appears that researchers no longer draw a major distinction between voting 
behavior and consumer behavior [...]. Various explanations have been given 
for that trend, including the increased expenditures for advertising in political 
campaigns [...]. A more important factor for those doing research on voting 
behavior is the widely accepted but untested assumption that voting and buy-
ing are governed by similar behavioral practices” (Crosby/Taylor, 1985: 72). 
 
The roles of consumers and citizens as individual decision makers are claimed to be 
virtually identical: “In each case, choice implies some degree of commitment to the 
alternative selected. Moreover, the same basic psychological and sociological proc-
esses (e.g. perception, decision making, diffusion of information, and socialization) 
occur in both domains” (Mauser, 1989: 27). 
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Voting decisions are seen as “an integral part of the household investment-
consumption process” (Chapman/Palda, 1981: 530); they can be studied from a con-
sumer behavior perspective (Crosby/Gill/Taylor, 1981; Crosby/Taylor, 1985). Voting 
is viewed as a complex decision-making process including activities preceding and 
following that action: “Both the voter and the consumer are viewed as individuals 
receiving information - possibly seeking it out, then processing it to reach predisposi-
tions to respond, and finally responding towards the goal object” (Schweiger/Adami, 
1999: 350). 
 
The appeal of these analogies to marketing theory lies at hand when revisiting previ-
ously dominant models for the electorate stemming from psychology or economics.  
· Classical social-psychological models of voting like e.g. the Michigan model 
assume a high relevance of social group memberships or party loyalty ex-
plaining voting decisions (Bartle/Griffiths, 2002: 22-25).  
· Most economical models of voting presupposed fully rational decision ma k-
ing between alternatives in the light of their benefits and costs in order to 
maximize expected utility (Chapman/Palda, 1981: 530).  
Obviously both classic approaches cannot deliver satisfactory explanations in the 
light of new political contexts. It seems therefore understandable that marketing 
models, which e.g. rejected the assumptions of the homo oeconomicus and devel-
oped much broader theories of demand acknowledging other explanatory variables 
like lifestyle, find some recognition. In a way, the marketing model combines both 
the psychological approach of voting behavior as an expression of (social) identity 
with the rational-decision making process suggested by the economic model.  
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According to Bartle/Griffiths (2002: 29-30) one important link can be found in the 
concept of brand image, which is downplayed by the earlier explanations. In elder 
models, voting decisions had been looked at as substantive affairs and seemed reluc-
tant to account for something like vague impressions. However: “Why should we 
assume that the public readily buys into the seductive meanings of consumer capital-
ism but remains rational and objective when making political decisions?” (van Ham, 
2001: 3). By introducing marketing models, it was emphasized that “voters are un-
able to unbundle the electoral product offering, the vast majority therefore choose on 
the basis of the overall political package, concept or image” (Lock/Harris, 1996: 17). 
Consequently some practises and positions have developed according to which im-
age (as a potential status benefit) will be more influential than policy issues standing 
for effective product specifications (Egan, 1999: 496).  
 
For the supply side of political marketing from this understanding almost automati-
cally follows that “political parties, either wittingly or unwittingly, produce a politi-
cal product for the consumption of voters” (Hayes/McAllister, 1996: 127 citing Reid, 
1988) to survive in the market environments outlined before: “The battle for ‘share 
of mind’ among floating voters is as ferocious as any which is sought by consumer 
good manufacturers for space on supermarket shelves” (Hayes/McAllister, 1996: 128 
referring to Reid, 1988).  
 
It should be underlined however, that the equation of voting with consumption is also 
one main starting point for the critique of political marketing, mainly relating to the 
lacking a solid theoretical foundation:  
“[The] key differences between electoral choice and conventional purchase 
choice settings have received little if any coverage to date. It is suggested 
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here that they present distinct marketing challenges, both in theory and in 
practice [...]. As a consequence political marketing is at a ‘craft’-stage, with-
out the formal underpinnings required for the development of an applicable 
technology” (Lock/Harris, 1996: 16).  
It appears that “the political science of voting behavior still has a long way to go to 
catch up with the practise of political campaigners” (Bartle, 2000a: 34).  
 
 
5.3 Theoretical conditions and constraints for the marketing of politics  
 
There seem to be two layers of criticism. The first layer deals with fundamental ideo-
logical resistances towards the marketing of politics. The second layer consists of 
substantial, systematic critique analyzing differences and similarities between the 
two systems meeting.  
 
Some authors explain the principal unease with marketing in politics with the fact 
that marketing oftentimes suffers from the stigma to be non-substantial and just 
trendy (Lees-Marshment, 2001). Others blame a general lack of skill or willingness 
(like e.g. protection of academic territory, Bartle/Griffiths, 2002: 34) on the side of 
political scientists to integrate image into their models:  
“Curiously, however, political science voting models seem reluctant to build 
in image/reputation as a major element. […] Perhaps, like Popkin’s drunkard, 
political science continues to search, not where the lost keys are most likely 
to be, but under the street lamps where it is easiest to see. Image is a soft vari-
able tangled up with emotional attachments. It is less easily modelled that 
policy and issue perceptions or party identification” (Scammell, 1999: 728). 
 
Within the marketing approach, also the concept of image itself might not convince: 
“Perhaps the largest obstacle to the incorporation of marketing models within 
mainstream political-science approaches is the perception that marketing em-
phasises peripheral or non-substantive issues such a party image and underes-
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timates the importance of substantive issues such as policy choices and ac-
countability for performance” (Bartle/Griffiths, 2002: 34). 
 
Such a position could be embedded in the more general question of how public opin-
ion, “the general views of the majority of individuals about some idea, person, pol-
icy, or action” (Neack, 2003: 229), should be treated within the political arena. Some 
authors blame public opinion to have caused a bias in politics, which entered as a 
piggy-bag of marketing: “the political adoption of the marketing orientation makes 
politicians deferential to public opinion” (O’Shaughnessy, 1989: 252).9 
On the other hand stands a noteworthy research tradition with party or candidate im-
ages (e.g. Boulding, 1961; Bromley, 1993; Nimmo, 1970; Smith, 2001). And the 
substantial occupation of political scientists with the phenomenon of public opinion 
(e.g. Neack, 2003; Bennett, 1989; Margolis/Mauser 1989b) also indicates how politi-
cal theory on democracies necessarily contains questions of image and reputation. 
Realizing practical conduct of politics finally unmasks principal positions against 
marketing politics as shadow-boxing. Some general objections towards marketing in 
politics reflect (partly aged) ideological and opinion-laden standpoints.  
 
A more differentiated investigation of the main areas of theoretical discussion shows 
that some of the critique attached to comparing political and commercial marketing 
can be well-founded.  
                                                 
9 Attached to this argument is a quite beneficial discussion about overlaps and conflict zones between 
marketing and democracy (e.g. Collins/Butler 2002, Langer, 2002), which clearly lies beyond the core 
of my research question and can therefore not be covered at this point.  
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5.3.1 Politics as product 
One of the most fundamental concerns relates to the question if politics can be com-
pared to products. Frost (2004b) remarks accordingly that in politics an intention or a 
promise is chosen rather than a finished product. Introducing the argument of service 
products might do away with this point: “Many characteristics are similar: both are 
promise- and experience-based, non-tangible, perishable, partly public goods, pro-
sumptive etc.” (Henneberg, 2004: 232). In that, the challenges even turn out to be 
quite similar: “Many marketing techniques are situation specific. Not only is it im-
possible to sell political candidates like toothpaste, but one cannot sell used cars or 
banking services like tooth paste” (Mauser, 1989: 28). 
 
Lock/Harris (1996: 15) qualify political products as a “complex […] product which 
the voter can not unbundle”. This is clearly a weak argument, since it could be easily 
brought up for many products such as cars or computers mostly purchased as a 
‘package’ without specific knowledge on the side of the consumer. Similarly weak is 
Palmer’s point that product positioning cannot be so clear in politics because of 
event-driven uncertainties (Palmer, 2002: 350-351). I can not see any difference to 
commercial products e.g. turning out to contain risks in researches or consumer tests, 
or an essential testimonial for a product being convicted as a drug-user; event-driven 
uncertainties can hit commercial products similarly severe.  
 
5.3.2 Price of politics 
Furthermore the issue is raised that there is no price of politics (Lock/Harris, 1996: 
15). In a narrow understanding of price this might be correct. Egan (1999: 498), 
however, draws the attention to a broader reading in terms of costs attached to a vote. 
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Especially his example of the choice between lower or higher taxes shows convinc-
ingly that there are not only comparable cost indicators in political choices, but 
probably also budget constraints on the side of the voter activated in the decision 
making process.  
It is sometimes claimed that the cost-benefit ratios of decisions are mostly more 
transparent and easier to calculate for consumer of product brands than for voting 
decisions (Frost, 2004b). Again the truth of this argument largely depends on the 
choice of products. For a fast-moving consumer good (fmcg) this is surely true, how-
ever for life insurance or other complex service products this claim will be hard to 
maintain.  
 
5.3.3 Conditions of purchase and distribution 
Lock/Harris (1996: 14) claim that the fact of all voters making their choice on the 
same day marks a unique difference to the commercial realm touching upon the con-
ditions of the purchasing decisions. Egan (1999: 498) points out against that even if 
there are no identical analogies in the commercial realm there are yet purchase deci-
sions with great formal similarities: e.g. annual insurances with particular renewal 
dates will also depend on the previous ‘product quality’ and there are comparable 
time distances between purchase decisions. There are situations in both the commer-
cial and the political domain where consumers/voters might change their attitude 
towards an object quickly but will have to wait significantly before being able to 
correct their earlier decision making.  
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5.3.4 Promotion of politics 
Authors like Mauser (1989: 29) and O’Shaughnessy (2002: 218) argue that cam-
paigners in political marketing have much less control while reaching their audi-
ences, because news media filter the information for the general public. The impor-
tance of ‘free media’ exposure is much higher than paid promotion. Following from 
that, the media are supposed to exercise a greater power to shape the perception than 
they would in commercial markets.  
Yet, especially in crisis situations news media can just as well take over the public 
discourse of products or firms; also quite generally promotional categories like cor-
porate PR, programming or product placement indicate the level of intersection be-
tween public media and commercial entities outside declared advertising spaces al-
ready today; getting on the news agenda is a key issue for both political and com-
mercial brands (Kleppe/Mosberg, 2002: 45). Claims projecting these overlaps to in-
crease are probably reasonable.  
 
5.3.5 Market structures 
Some arguments relate to the structures of political market. To choose one politician 
over the other means making the other a loser – in this sense votes are all-or-nothing 
decisions, while purchase decisions are made between a large range of alternatives 
(Frost 2004b). Clearly this rationale will fail facing strong duopolistic or oligarchic 
market structures like e.g. the Coke-market in most countries.  
A stronger issue is the question of majority. Lock/Harris (1996: 15) show that not 
only the winner (of the majority) takes it all, but also that a huge minority will have 
to live with consequences resulting from a product they did not chose. These argu-
ments are hardly disprovable for modern democratic societies employing majority 
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vote systems. However there are other conceivable systems like for example propor-
tional electoral systems (Egan, 1999: 499), which would better resemble competitive 
structures known from free-enterprise market economies. Therefore it is questionable 
if this argument must necessarily stand in the way of generally comparing politics to 
market environments since it is related only to a specific electorate system.  
 
All in all, convincing theoretical evidence that analogies are generally and systemati-
cally impossible has not been found in the previous analysis. However, it has also 
been shown that “the direct transference of [marketing] concepts and tools to the 
political arena” (Lock/Harris, 1996: 14) cannot be successful either:  
“Attempts to merge two diverse research areas are replete with problems of 
context, understanding and approach. Whereas political scientists tend to fo-
cus on institutional relationships, the legislative process and public policy, the 
concern of marketing researchers is with campaign strategies and manage-
ment” (Butler/Collins 1996, S. 33). 
 
O’Cass (1996) comprehensibly analyzed how a conceptual understanding of market-
ing beyond the mere selling orientation subsisting in mainly promoting political 
products has not been perceived in the political domains. He argues “the central pur-
pose of political marketing is to enable political parties and voters to make the most 
appropriate and satisfactory decisions” (O’Cass, 1996: 52).  
 
Marketing requires a specifically contextualized approach to turn out to be a helpful 
framework explaining politics: “Political marketing borrows from marketing but in-
tegrates lessons from political science to produce new directions” (Lees-Marshment, 
2001: 709). The question about the brands of politics guides us towards such a new 
direction. 
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5.3.6 Brands of politics 
The product brand analogy, which dominates most discussions about the legitimacy 
of transferring marketing to politics outlined before, will hold best for the single po-
litical idea, as an isolable concept. Corporate brands in politics like candidates, par-
ties, governments, nations and supra-national organisations10 will possibly better be 
analyzed as umbrella brands comprising a wide array of political product brands such 
as political ideas or concepts. To my knowledge such a brand architecture model of 
politics has not yet entered the common knowledge canon in the political marketing 
discourse.  
Clearly with such structural distinction of brand levels within political marketing the 
discussion about similarities and differences between politics and commercial mar-
keting would be more fruitful. And the mainstream scenario of political marketing 
covering a candidate in an election competition would also be broadened with more 
long-term orientated issues like corporate image management, issue management etc. 
as they are discussed in current research and publications on corporate brands 
(Schultz/Antorini/Csaba, 2005).  
 
In such a sense it has to be agreed that “political scientists have defined marketing 
too narrowly; the marketing discipline has not engaged the political arena with 
enough conviction. There is no established paradigm or agreed focus of study” (But-
ler/Collins, 1996: 33). 
 
In a reorientation, political marketing will therefore need to expand to a broader, 
stronger contextualizing approach. Lock/Harris’ working definition of political mar-
                                                 
10 Van Ham (2001; 2005) extends the branding approach even to supra-national entities like EU or 
NATO.  
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keting widens the field to a strategic discipline covering more than just advertising of 
politics. They understand political marketing as:  
“The study of the processes of exchanges between political entities and their 
environment and among themselves, with particular reference to the position-
ing of those entities and their communications. [...] As an activity, it is con-
cerned with strategies for positioning and communications, and the methods 
through which these strategies may be realized, including the search for in-
formation into attitudes, awareness and response of target audiences” 
(Lock/Harris, 1996: 22). 
 
Substantial differences to conventional concepts are obvious. The aspect of exchange 
and negotiation aligns this definition especially close to the findings of corporate 
branding. This reading underlines that branding is, also in the political arena, not 
equal to advertising or other forms of controlled dissemination of messages, but 
rather a two-sided model of interaction between stakeholding parties. Politics have 
arrived at the level of symbols; they have become a narrative. As such politics are 
comparable to brands: both entities react to their changing sociological setting by 
becoming symbolic entities.  
 
 
5.4 Role and relevance of image in politics  
 
In principle, image has taken a similar path into the political marketing domain as it 
has entered mainstream commercial marketing. It is broadly discussed in recent years 
(e.g. Locke/Harris, 1996; Scammell, 1999; Smith, 2001; Bartle/Griffiths, 2002) and 
gained acceptance in the analysis of voting behavior (or other expressions of political 
preferences): “of all the major approaches to voting, political marketing puts image 
at the centre of explanations” (Scammell, 1999: 729).  
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The parallels continue also in the different paradigmatic readings imported from the 
marketing domain. As shown for the management-centred paradigm in marketing, 
also in political marketing the notion of creating, constructing or managing or an 
image sustains (Falkowski/Cwalina, 1999; Maarek, 1995; Schweiger/Adami, 1999).  
On the other hand stands a growing awareness of the receivers’ control of marketing 
images (Lock/Harris, 1996; Smith, 2001). 
 
These clashes between a perception-orientated style of politics with a management-
orientated elitist concept of politics lead to a categorical confusion in the terminol-
ogy. An established and broadly shared definition of political image cannot be elic-
ited.  
 
The literature shows different models conceptualize image in politics. All incorporate 
image of a candidate or a party as important explanatory variables. They differ on the 
contextual positioning of image within the models as independent or dependent con-
structs.  
 
5.4.1 The Newman/Sheth model (1985) 
In the model of Newman/Sheth (1985) the image of a candidate is an independent 
construct in line with six other influential measures determining the voter’s choice11.  
The category ‘Candidate Image’ refers to “the image of the candidate based on sali-
ent personality traits that are thought to be characteristic of the candidate” (New-
man/Sheth, 1985: 62).  
 
                                                 
11 The voting purposes (here: primaries in the U.S.) of the models are different. However, there seems 
no clear reason why the models should not be compared. The specific election was rather the occa-
sion, but not a meaningful context for the models.  
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Figure 5-4: Model of primary voter behavior (Newman/Sheth, 1985: 63) 
 
Also interesting is the category ‘Social Imagery’. Hereby Newman/Sheth refer to “all 
relevant primary and secondary reference groups likely to be supportive of the can-
didates being studied. Candidates acquire positive or negative stereotypes based on 
their associations with varied demographic (age, sex, religion), socioeconomic (in-
come, occupation), cultural/ethnic (race/lifestyle), or political/ideological (Democ-
ratic, Republican) segments of society” (Newman/Sheth, 1985: 62). Within this cate-
gory two components of brand images hide: the key terms ‘stereotype’ and ‘group’ 
relegate to the social network embedding of brands.  
Thirdly, the category “Emotional Feelings’ is worth an inspection. It represents “the 
emotional dimension of voting” and refers “to affective feelings such as hope, re-
sponsibility, patriotism etc. aroused by the candidate. The voter’s feelings might be 
independent of the personality of the candidate, having been established on the basis 
of the issues the candidate advocates, or a voter may be aware of a candidate’s per-
sonality but may not have any feelings to it” (Newman/Sheth, 1985: 62). Here ‘affec-
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tive structures’ of images, the importance of which was also underlined earlier, shine 
through. 
 
Newman/Sheth (1985) represent a very narrow and rationalized approach to image in 
the explicit category; a closer look at the other categories provides more insight into 
other dimensions or components of image that are also implied in the model. The 
narrow approach to the image construct seems in line with a management-centred 
paradigm of political marketing. Other important components of images are implied 
in the model; they are yet not related and contextualized.  
Accordingly, the employment of image as an independent construct can be inter-
preted. The contextual dimension, i.e. the interplay of e.g. outside events, individual 
emotions or social configuration of images with the construct of image, is not cov-
ered or analyzed in the managerial approach to (brand) images. Therefore the appli-
cation is limited. 
 
5.4.2 The Smith model (2001) 
Gareth Smith designed a quite simple, yet insightful model for the research into fac-
tors influencing the brand image of political parties. By the formulation of the re-
search question he acknowledges image to be a dependent construct in the context of 
politics. His approach to image is also management-centred while he looks at mainly 
the promotional instruments under control of the sender to be image shaping. Some 
moderating factors such as media bias and spin are unfortunately only “identified but 
not developed in this article” (Smith, 2001: 996).  
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As already discerned in the Newman/Sheth model above, the impact of events onto 
image in politics (or on voting decisions directly) should be carved out as an impor-
tant variable in the framework of political marketing. They are largely not under con-
trol of the political brand, but can be highly influential.  
 
 
Figure 5-5: Simple voting model (Smith, 2001: 996) 
 
A second important insight should be granted to Smith for considering both sides of 
images, their antecedents and the consequences. The operationalisation of conse-
quences here is expressed in the resulting party loyalty. Thus Smith’s model is 
strictly speaking not a voting model. Yet we can see how it could turn into a voting 
model by covering the relationship between ‘Partisan Allegiance’ and ‘Voting Be-
havior’.  
 
Despite the simplification and many shortcomings resulting from a very narrow per-
spective on possible factors and components constituting the image construct (due to 
far-reaching equation of image with the result of promotional activities), Smith’s 
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emphasizing the intermediate role of images as dependent and in a way independent 
variable at the same time should be credited.  
 
5.4.3 The Bartle model (2000) 
Of all models under consideration most elaborated seems to be the voting model by 
John Bartle developed to analyse changing voter behavior. His comprehensive un-
derstanding of image reflects the multidimensional construct:  
“Voters also judge parties according to generalized attitudes or beliefs about 
the parties that are usually referred to as ‘party images’. Some of these im-
ages exist in a ‘twilight zone between intellect and emotions’ and appear to be 
based on recent impressions. Others appear to be the result of impressions ac-
cumulated by voters over a long period of time” (Bartle, 2000a: 25). 
 
Insight into the interplay of attitudes and beliefs as different levels of determination 
is part of his reading as is the distinction of affective and cognitive components. Fur-
ther remarkable is the time dimension Bartle assumes for images.  
 
 
Figure 5-6:  vote model by Bartle (Bartle, 2000a: 19) 
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Although the graphic realisation seems somewhat confusing at first, it is obvious that 
Bartle accounts for the intermediary role of images as moderating constructs at the 
same time.  
 
Bartle considers an extensive range of factors influencing the image construct. Ac-
cording to this model, image is shaped by individual determinants like values, ideo-
logical positions, policy preferences or identification patterns, but also induced by 
the embedding social network and group loyalties. The differentiation of – in time-
dimensions – more substantial and long-termed categories like values and identifica-
tion versus current, short-termed measures such as policy preferences or the evalua-
tion of contemporary conditions is helpful.  
 
The phrasing “Evaluation of party images” furthermore indicates a perception-
orientated understanding of image and aligns Bartle’s model with more current, re-
ceiver-focussed concepts of (brand) image in marketing theory.  
 
In addition, Bartle’s visualisation of the consequences of images in political contexts 
is quite interesting. The evaluation of an ima ge can, but does not have to influence 
vote decisions. Deeper-rooted motifs like core values or party identification can also 
directly impact an elector. I tend to sympathize with this interpretation. It resembles a 
realistic assumption in the so-called ‘post-modern’ environments we discussed ear-
lier. Post-modernity does not necessarily imply the complete erosion of traditional 
patterns, but the alignment of most different approaches. Bartle (2000: 28) manages 
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to show how partisan alignment in certain social settings (e.g. where class distinction 
is still at work) has a direct impact on political behavior.  
In an attempt to take findings from party to nation level, the case of Turkey points 
out an important sub-domain of political marketing and political image: public di-
plomacy.  
 
 
5.5 Public diplomacy  
 
Public diplomacy is a very interesting application of political marketing that well 
resembles the central role images can play outside the narrow borders of political 
advertising in the context of election campaigns.  
 
In the public diplomacy approach the theoretical cornerstones, of nation branding 
and political marketing discussed so far merge towards an evolving academic subject 
and practical task: how can complex political entities like nations systematically and 
strategically operate as a brand to the public of foreign nations?  
 
Although the relevance of this approach within the field of political marketing in-
creased significantly in the past 5-10 years12, indications for an elevated role of im-
ages in international relations can be found more than 40 years ago:  
“The symbolic image of the nation is of extraordinary importance. Indeed, it 
can be argued that it has developed to the point where it has become seriously 
pathological in its extreme form. The national symbol becomes the object of a 
kind of totem-worship” (Boulding, 1961: 110-111). 
 
                                                 
12 It is sometimes indicated that visibility especially grew with the only remaining superpower USA 
trying to systematically improve its image in countries of the Near and Middle East. The incidents of 
9/11 are marked as an important starting point (Ross, 2002; Gumbel, 2005; Johansson, 2005).  
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Diplomacy traditionally takes place in closed circles between the governing elites of 
countries. However, the increasing insight into the necessities of public policies in 
general and a growing demand for transparency and bottom-up processes also in in-
ternational politics (Neack, 200313) leads to a growing impact of national images for 
the broad publics.  
 
Some facts and numbers illustrate the relevance approaches to influence the public 
image of a nation has gained: 
· It is estimated that the USA spend more than 1,2 billion US$ annually for 
measures relating to correct their spoiled image around the globe (Mettke, 
2006: 87). 
· To administer the budget, the first Bush Jr. administration in 2001 even 
brought an undersecretary for public diplomacy into the White House; she 
was a former high-ranked advertising CEO. (Kleppe/Mosberg, 2002: 11). 
Today Karen Hughes runs this office.  
· Even an apparently comparably less ‘pressured’ nation like Russia is claimed 
to budget around € 100 million p.a. for public diplomacy purposes (Mettke, 
2006: 87). 
 
                                                 
13 Neack sharply outlines the lines of conflict between a traditional and a rival paradigm in governance 
theory: "It is valuable to discuss how scholars envision the impact of public opinion on foreign policy 
making. There are two basic views on this: the first suggests a strong impact and the second denies 
any real impact. The first view derives from the pluralist model of policy making. This view is a 'bot-
tom-up' approach, which assumes that the general public has a measurable and distinct impact on the 
foreign policy making process. In sum, leaders follow masses. The second view representing the con-
ventional wisdom in literature suggests a 'top-down' process, according to which popular consensus is 
a function of the elite consensus and elite cleavages trickle down to mass public opinion. This view is 
consistent with realism, as it envisions a persistent national interest pursued by elites and a passive, 
acquiescent, or inconsequential mass public." (Neack, 2003: 104-105) 
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It is repeatedly postulated by image consultants that “politicians should become 
brand managers and prime ministers and governments should manage the nation as a 
brand” (Henneberg, 2004: 230).  
“To do their jobs well in the future, politicians will have to train themselves 
in brand asset management. Their tasks will include finding a brand niche for 
their state, engaging in competitive marketing, assuring customer satisfaction, 
and most of all, creating brand loyalty. Brand states will compete not only 
among themselves, but also with superbrands such as the EU, CNN, Micro-
soft, and the Roman Catholic Church […]. In this crowded arena, states that 
lack relevant brand equity will not survive. The state, in short, will have be-
come the State®” (van Ham, 2001: 4). 
 
The quote underlines the relevance devoted to the issue in today’s politics. Govern-
ments will have to remodel their diplomatic structures to adapt to this changed envi-
ronment: “diplomats must transform themselves from reporters and lobbyists who 
react to issues into shapers of public debates around the world” (Leonard, 2002: 50). 
 
In this modern understanding, public diplomacy means displaying the (cultural) mul-
titude of a nation brand. It should therefore be accentuated that this reputation man-
agement task is not solely a diplomatic task. Within the controlled communication of 
a country, for example also mass media (like BBC World or Radio Free Europe), 
institutions (e.g. Institute Française, Goethe-Institut) and event marketing (Olympic 
Games, World Exhibitions) play a significant role (Langer, 2002: 6).  
 
The public diplomat will avoid to be the only channel of news (Leonard, 2002) and 
look for effective messengers of the political nation brand, like e.g. NGO’s, diaspo-
ras (citizens settled in other countries and foreign residents in the own country) or 
political parties bridging in different countries.  
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In the evolving nation brand theory, along with Signitzer (1995) two different kinds 
of definitions and purposes can be distinguished: 
· The intercourse approach, aiming at understanding following communication, 
is represented e.g. by Tuch (1990: 3): “Public diplomacy is a government’s 
process of communicating with foreign publics as an attempt to bring about 
understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and cultures, as 
well as its national goals and current policies”. 
· Persuasion by the means of public diplomacy instrumentalizes the foreign 
publics for own politics. It aims “to influence the behavior of foreign gov-
ernments by influencing the attitudes of their citizens” (Malone, 1988: 3). 
 
Accordingly, Leonard (2002: 50-51) distinguishes three relevant dimensions within 
which public diplomacy should operate: 
· Communication on day-to-day issues (= “aligning traditional diplomacy with 
the news cycle” (Leonard, 2002: 50)) 
· Strategic communication on particular issues (similar to political issue cam-
paigns) 
· Developing lasting relationships with key individuals (not between diplomats, 
but between peers).  
 
In this context it should be repeated that nation brands are complex entities and si-
multaneous awareness of many heterogeneous fields will be required. “The consum-
ers’ views of the nation as a brand will be a composite of beliefs based on experience 
(where it occurs) and/or emanate from the imagery of its people and the social, po-
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litical and economic conditions prevailing at the time” 
(O’Shaughnessy/O’Shaughnessy, 2000: 57). 
 
 
5.6 Theoretical framework for nation brand images in political contexts  
 
Within this setting, public diplomacy can achieve a hierarchy of objectives (Leonard, 
2002: 50): 
· Increase familiarity (making people think about the nation and updating their 
images of it). 
· Increase appreciation (creating positive perceptions of the nation and getting 
others to see issues from its perspective). 
· Engage people (encouraging people to see the nation as an attractive destina-
tion for tourism or study, to buy its products and to subscribe to its values). 
· Influence people's behaviour (getting companies to invest, encouraging pub-
lic support for the nation’s positions, and convincing politicians to turn to it 
as an ally). 
 
This hierarchy contains the basic variables of a nation brand image model: familiar-
ity (level of knowledge), perception (image dimensions), engagement (experiences of 
the nation) and behavior (intentions to act towards the nation).  
 
5.6.1 Involvement and commitment  
The familiarity and especially the engagement with an entity (e.g. a nation brand) 
will largely influence perceptions of an issue:  
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“When an issue is personally engaging to voters (because it taps either self-
interest or symbolic politics), people can become more committed to their 
viewpoints. When voters are moderately politically aware, they may change 
attitudes, especially when communications are somewhat intense and partisan 
attitudes are activated” (Newman/Perloff, 2004: 32). 
 
A different approximation of the variable “familiarity” by the involvement-construct 
might be worth the consideration. “Involvement results from the facts that important 
values or the person’s self-image are engaged or made salient by a decision situa-
tion” (Crosby/Taylor, 1985: 74). In marketing theory generally high- and low-
involvement states of an individual towards an entity are differentiated. For the inter-
play of attitudes/images and voting behaviour, considering the involvement state, the 
following claim can be ventilated:  
“In sum, the involvement model postulates that neither all voters not all vot-
ing situations are alike. Highly involved voters will not be greatly affected by 
a stream of messages, because they will put up perceptual defences either to 
evaluate or screen out the message. Less involved voters will be more easily 
influenced by a stream of messages, because they may be more concerned 
with the behavior itself than with developing a stand” (Rothschild, 1985: 
145). 
 
If we accept attitude as an approximation of image, the shaping of images must be 
seen in a strong relationship to the involvement level:  
“In the low involvement case, there is no or little attitudinal development spe-
cifically toward the candidates prior to behavior, although there is a positive 
attitude toward the general notion of voting in the particular electoral race. 
With high involvement, however, there are attitudes toward the candidates 
themselves. As a result, very different types of prebehavioral processes are 
developing, even though they may not be outwardly apparent to the layper-
son” (Rothschild, 1985: 144-145). 
 
Involvement itself could precede and condition the stronger concept of commitment 
(rather deterministic, resembling the belief structures influencing images), which 
Crosby/Taylor (1985) refer to as position involvement: “a person may be involved 
with an issue without yet having taken a stand. This might imply that involvement 
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often precedes commitment” (Crosby/Taylor, 1985: 74). The resulting belief set 
plays an important role in a person’s judgements about issues: “A belief set is a more 
or less integrated set of images held by an individual about a particular universe. This 
set of images acts as a screen, letting in information that fits the belief and keeping 
out information that does not” (Neack, 2003: 58). 
 
Put differently, developme nt and especially retention of positions and preferences in 
a political context could be closely linked to the extent of the individual commit-
ment:  
“Psychological commitment refers to a tendency to resist change in prefer-
ence in response to conflicting information or experience. Psychological 
commitment is maximized when (1) the individual is motivated by a need to 
maintain consistent relationships between preference and salient aspects of 
cognitive structures, and (2) important values and self-images are linked to 
the preference, leading to a state of position involvement” (Crosby/Taylor 
,1985: 73). 
 
Within this rationale, commitment and the persistence or volatility (influenceabil-
ity14) of political standpoints could be partly explained; the processes will be based 
on familiarity and involvement with entities and issues. This finding provides addi-
tional evidence to treat familiarity, involvement and commitment as important ante-
cedents for a nation brand image in political contexts.  
 
 
5.6.2 Stereotypes and public opinion  
Perception of nation brands and potential preference building in the context of e.g. an 
election situation will furthermore be influenced by socially held positions such as 
stereotypes: “Images of other international actors can be categorized according to 
                                                 
14 The role of the media environment in this inducement process should be accentuated (Scammell, 
1999).  
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stereotyped views of the motivations of the subject and the behaviors that result from 
such” (Neack, 2003: 58).  
Stereotypes can amplify individually held position commitments and beliefs: “Be-
liefs that are firmly held and supported by one’s society and culture are more rigid 
and unlikely to change” (Neack, 2003: 59).  
We categorized stereotypes as mental shortcuts. The shortcuts not only exert the 
shield function for existing beliefs, they also serve as the interpretation folio for new 
information (Neack, 2003: 59-60). This point additionally underlines the importance 
to also understand images in their social embedding and interaction. Commitments 
(as potential explanatory variables of behaviour) and belief sets rely greatly on the 
interplay of the individual with the surrounding social network.  
 
Stereotypes can be regarded as a specific form of public opinion. Therefore we 
should also be aware how public opinion is shaped. As we will see, this question also 
touches upon the question of treating image (as a potential cause of opinion at the 
interplay between individual and society, see Blythe, 1997: 72) as a dependent or as 
an independent construct (or as a mediator between causes and effects).  
Within political marketing there is an intense discussion about the relationships be-
tween elites and the broad public in their formation of and reaction to public opinion 
(Margolis/Mauser 1989b). Who is dependent and who is independent? “A major task 
for empirical political science is to specify those circumstances when public opinion 
leads or circumscribes elite initiatives, when it is driven by such initiatives, and when 
it is marginalized, or simply ignored by political elites” (Margolis/Mauser 1989b: 3). 
Clearly, the media play a key role in this power game and in the formation of stereo-
types; the power access to the media is therefore a central issue in discussing the de-
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pendence or independence of public opinion. Margolis/Mauser (1989b) see public 
opinion as both, dependent on circumstances and power relations, and independent in 
influencing political behavior. It will be also of critical importance not only to trace 
existing stereotypes, but also to try to understand the conditions of their formation. 
As suggested by Altinbasak Ebrem (2004), the analysis of the information and media 
environments as independent variables of image formation will be crucial for the 
explanatory power of the framework.  
 
We mentioned the relevance of the awareness of the own position within a group vis 
a vis an outside group for the formation of stereotypes. Such a mechanism can also 
be elevated to the collective level and thus maintained for the general process of po-
litical nation branding: “National self-images consist, at least in part, of idealized 
stereotypes of the ‘in-nation’ which are culturally shaped and perpetuated” (Neack, 
2003: 80). As an in-group construct, national self-image contains a message (implicit 
or explicit) about those outside the nation (Neack, 2003: 83). “The classification of 
another ethnic group can be seen as structural opposition to a classification of one’s 
own where the characterization of the self and the own group seems to be a silent 
assumption. This is something that needs to be borne in mind in all ima ge studies” 
(Tahir/Türker, 2000: 70). 
 
Therefore the self-image of a nation will clearly have an impact on the outside image 
of a nation brand. The practical institutional pursue of public diplomacy will largely 
consist of literally turning a nation inside-out: 
“Culturally maintained national self-image does more than just influence the 
broad notions and directions of a country's foreign policy. National self-
image and the culture that supports it also influence the types of institutions 
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constructed within a state and the foreign policy decision-making authority 
allotted to those institutions” (Neack, 2003: 84). 
 
For the purpose of my research this aspect suggests to also analyze the self-image of 
a nation brand as a possibly insightful explanatory variable of the outside perception.  
 
5.6.3 Political images and behaviors  
Finally, also the inspection of voting models supported the basic assumption of po-
litical image being dependent on most different antecedents as well as influential to 
behaviors such as voting.  
To analyze antecedents of a political image, the following requirements can be sum-
marized:  
· The impact of (uncontrolled) events on political image formation is high and 
should be considered in the framework.  
· It probably makes sense to generally distinguish controllable (communica-
tion) and not-controllable sources of images from the point of view of the 
sender.  
· Long-term measures like values or identification should be differentiated 
from short-term attitudes or opinions.  
· Consideration of both the individual level of preference formation and image 
building and the collective, social environment, and especially of the inter-
plays of individual and social/group at the level e.g. of stereotypes should be 
ensured.  
· Both affective and cognitive structures are relevant at the level of political 
images and should therefore be included.  
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The output /consequence of image could be the measurement of the (referenda) vot-
ing intention (as it is influenced by the image). A realistic scenario will foresee refer-
enda in EU countries on Turkey’s accession. Since I will not be able to observe ac-
tual elections or referenda within the setting of this thesis, voting intentions should 
serve as an approximation. Neither the literature on referenda voting or marketing of 
political ideas (e.g. Griffiths, 2000; Allington/Morgan/O'Shaughnessy, 1999; 
Magleby, 1989)15 nor previous research on polls and the measurement of voting in-
tentions (e.g. Bartle, 2000b; Bennett, 1989; Ginsberg, 1989)16 suggest fundamental 
deviations caused by integrating polls to political marketing models.  
 
Summing up, review of main theory areas puts together a list of factors/antecedents 
influencing a nation brand’s image in political contexts. The revision of political 
marketing theory models of voting specified also the consequence dimension for a 
nation brand image.  
                                                 
15 Griffiths (2000) underlines that some brand clues, e.g. in election campaigns disseminated by a 
candidate, are missing and the ideological orientations of the voter might therefore have more rele-
vance, but does not question basic assumptions of the models presented. Magleby (1989) shows that 
the party alignment decreases and that the formulation/definition of the question itself gains high 
relevance, even becomes a balloon d'essai between rivalling interest groups.  
16 Most discussion is devoted to the impact of polls, as they are either suspected to be distorted by 
political elites and thus instrumentalized for public policy (Bennett, 1989; Ginsberg, 1989; Neack, 
2003), or characterised as turning politics into a short-sighted, opportunistic and tactical affair (Mar-
golis/Mauser, 1989b). This discussion could possibly be read as general discomfort with the impact of 
images and public opinion within politics, but does not influence the research design any further.  
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Figure 5-7: Advanced framework of relationships within nation brand image contexts  
 
A more detailed introspection of the specific conditions of the nation brand Turkey 
will allow a more precise determination of the relevant dimensions, especially of the 
image content.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
TURKEY’S NATION BRAND AND THE EU ACCESSION PROC-
ESS 
 
 
 
The nation brand Turkey in the political context of the EU accession process repre-
sents an insightful case of public diplomacy worth further investigation. The demand 
for innovative diplomatic action has popped up in the debate about and in Turkey 
throughout the eventful year 2005: “What we need is a professional public diplo-
macy institution that will formulate, package and communicate Turkey’s image, 
policies and objectives to a large and diversified audience abroad” (Kiniklioglu, 
2005a: 2).  
 
At a conference on Turkey’s public diplomacy in February 2006, foreign minister 
Abdullah Gül granted this need:  
“Diplomacy is one of the oldest and most esteemed professions. It is, how-
ever, undergoing profound changes. For a number of reasons, including great 
advances in information technology, foreign policy is no longer executed 
solely by means of traditional diplomacy. We need to employ public diplo-
macy more than ever in the execution of our foreign policy objectives” (Gül, 
2006: 4). 
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The following examination of the political context of Turkey’s EU accession, the 
outline of different dimension of Turkey’s nation brand and the analysis of public 
opinion on Turkey’s EU accession in the current EU member states will further 
elaborate the country’s need for a concerted public diplomacy approach; in addition, 
the research question on Turkey’s nation brand image in the EU context will be 
sketched more precisely based on the literature review.  
 
 
6.1 Turkey’s EU accession process  
 
After the decision by the EU council to open accession talks with Turkey and to pos-
sibly have Turkey join17, for the first time in a quite long history of EU-Turkey rela-
tionships the process has arrived at a point where for the coming years comparably 
stable conditions can be assumed. This opportunity should be used to provide a com-
prehensive overview on the historical background of Turkey’s European ambitions 
and to analyze the broad spectrum of related contemporary policy issues with regard 
to how they can be expected to be influential for the negotiation process during the 
next 10 years.  
 
6.1.1 History of European -Turkish relationships 
The rich European-Turkish history is largely influenced by bellicose conflicts. Al-
though a significant extent of the cradle of European civilization can be located in 
                                                 
17 on October 3, 2005 
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the Greek and Roman Classical Antiquity in Asia Minor, the later A.D. history is 
dominated by mutual threat of Orient and Occident.  
Back in the 8th century the expanding Saracens were defeated in today’s France. The 
three crusades by European Christians trying to recover the Holy Land from the 
Muslims during the high Middle Ages did all pass through what we now refer to as 
Turkey with great consequences and significant costs. It took until the 14th century 
for the Turkish Ottomans to reappear in Europe establishing their hegemony on the 
Balkan Peninsula after their victory over the Serbs on the blackbird field close to 
today’s Pristina (Oswald, 2004: 1). 
A momentous caesura in world’s history was the takeover of Constantinople on May 
29, 1453 by Sultan Mehmet II.18 For Western Europe this event marked the begin-
ning of the end of mediaeval ages19 and the notion of the Turk as a threat was intro-
duced to common European history (Oswald, 2004). Constantinople became the 
capital of one of the largest and most powerful empires in history.  
The second important set of European-Turkish incidents representing a dominant 
break in Europe’s cultural identity until today was the sieges of Vienna by the Otto-
man armies in 1529 and 1683. While the narration of the 1529 defeat highlights the 
clever and tricky self-defence of the – in numerical terms – clearly disadvantaged 
Habsburg army, in 1683 it needed tremendous cooperation within the scattered po-
litical structures of Europe20 to finally strike back against the attackers and thus once 
                                                 
18 The fact that central European historiography to this day refers to this event as “the fall of Constan-
tinople” indicates the dramatic impact this event had on the later history of the Occident (Nas, 2002).  
19 Following this event a true paradigm shift rocked Europe. One previously rather homogeneous 
cultural area split up into three: the Greek-Roman heritage found its continuation in West-Europe, 
from the Balkans deep into the Near East Islamic culture dominated, and East-Europe developed a 
singular Slavic cultural area, which was itself influenced largely by Byzantine, Islamic and Occidental 
impacts. (Oswald, 2004: 1).   
20 It was the Polish king Johann Sobieski leading an army of Austrian, Saxon, Bavarian, Franco-
Swabian and Polish troops to finally successfully set Vienna free from the besiegement (Oswald, 
2004: 2). 
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more save the Occident from the Orient Ottoman threat, as it has been culturally 
coded in the Western hemisphere ever since (Nas, 2002: 223).  
It is occasionally said that from this point on the cultural and territorial descent of the 
Ottoman Empire in Europe began. Since the early 19th century, the Ottomans dis-
played special eagerness to adopt European culture, science and technology and try-
ing to catch up with the European project of modernity (Nas, 2002: 222-223). By the 
late 19th century with Serbs, Romania, Montenegro and Bulgaria gaining independ-
ence, Bosnia-Herzegovina being overtaken by Habsburg Austria-Hungary, France 
occupying Tunisia and England taking on Egypt the Ottoman Empire lost almost all 
property on the European mainland (Oswald, 2004). 
WW I then finally put the Empire to its end. Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) estab-
lished the modern Turkish republic in 1923, turning the country to the West by rig-
idly separating religion and state and installing largely French and Swiss style ad-
ministration and bureaucracy.  
Neutrality during WW II protected the development of the infant Turkish republic; it 
turned to the West in the Cold War age by becoming NATO member21 in 1951. As a 
result of Turkey’s Western integration a peaceful coexistence has lasted for more 
than 80 years between the European countries and Turkey until today 22 and possibly 
finds a positive end in the Turkey’s EU accession. Oswald (2004: 2) concludes that 
in that case only a few decades of politics might be able to attain a goal that many 
centuries of war were unable to reach. It would also represent, as the Turkish chief of 
EU accession negotiation, Ali Babacan, put it, the final stage of almost two centuries 
                                                 
21 Turkey became also member of practically all other relevant (Western) international and European 
organizations like OECD, Council of Europe etc. except EEC/EC/EU (Independent Commission, 
2004: 12-13).  
22 The only exception is the case of Cyprus, which was dismissed into independence by UK in 1960 
and has been (at the latest after the Turkish occupation of the Northern part in 1974) a center of con-
flict between Greece and Turkey ever since. As we will see later, this issue is also a heavy burden to 
Turkey’s EU accession at the moment.  
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of Turkish modernization efforts and maybe even the “culmination of the Kemalist 
civilization project” (Glyptis, 2005: 40).  
 
In the meantime, EU had progressed from its founding project of pooling together 
coal and steel among six central European countries to its current state where it is on 
the verge of becoming an integrated geographical space covering most of the Euro-
pean mainland (Nas, 2002: 219). The economic network was propelled forward by 
the Single European Market and the Maastricht treaty to the European Union of to-
day realizing the economic and monetary union with a common currency for most of 
the 25 member states and with a policy scope covering foreign politics, justice and 
home affairs. The last round of enlargement in 2004 including 10 former East Block 
nations into the EU challenged the Union with the task of adopting more diverse 
countries: “Western Europe is about to integrate with Orthodox Europe” (Nas, 2002: 
219). 
As the eldest accession candidate, Turkey has served as a more or less faithful fellow 
to the European Union waiting for more than 45 years and witnessed this develop-
ment from an outsider position (Glyptis, 2005). It was as early as September 1959 
that Turkey applied for a membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) 
for the first time. In 1963, the contractual framework known as the Ankara Agree-
ment was signed outlining the accession perspective of Turkey. It foresaw the reali-
zation of a customs union between the two partners within 22 years. The hesitant 
implementation of the Ankara Agreement started a long story of unfulfilled obliga-
tions on both sides because of a missing will: ”one can easily come to the conclusion 
that the EU and its member-states did not undertake strong efforts to make the An-
kara Agreement and the Additional Protocol a success” (Kramer, 1996: 207). Politi-
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cal instabilities in Turkey followed by protectionist policies and military coups fur-
ther damaged the aim of integration with EC (Nas, 2002: 227). The agreement was 
paused until 1986. Due to a change of policies after the 1980 coup in Turkey a stra-
tegic shift back towards the EU occurred, interestingly initially rather against the 
interests of the Özal government (which favored near East and US-linked policies) 
and mainly driven by Istanbul commerce (Kramer, 1996). This shift resulted in a 
premature attempt to gain membership to the EU in 1987, which was denied by EU 
commission in December 1989 mainly because of economical and political instabili-
ties (Leggewie, 2004a).  
On their summit in June 1993 in Copenhagen, EU member states defined the condi-
tions that must be fulfilled for the start of accession talks, nowadays referred to as the 
Copenhagen criteria.23 The Customs Union finally became effective in 1996; with 
Turkey being the only non-EU member state. In December 1997 during the Luxem-
burg summit it was evinced that Turkey might be considered as a candidate, yet it 
took until the Helsinki summit in December 1999 that Turkey was officially awarded 
the candidate status.  
After the decision of extensive reforms (among others the abolishment of capital 
punishment and the permission of the Kurdish language) in August 2002 and the 
victory of the AKP with the new prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which 
                                                 
23 Copenhagen Criteria are the political criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, 
later enshrined in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union and proclaimed in the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights. 
· the stability of institutions, guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and re-
spect for and protection of minorities. 
· the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive 
pressure and market forces within the Union.  
· the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of po-
litical, economic and monetary union and the administrative capacity to effectively apply and 
implement the acquis communautaire.  
· the Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of the Euro-
pean integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union 
and the candidate countries." (Briefing 2005e, S. 8) 
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clearly confessed to the Western orientation of Turkey and to the EU accession, in 
December 2002 during the Copenhagen summit the EU Commission was ordered to 
prepare a report by October 2004 with a recommendation about a start of accession 
talks (Der Spiegel, 2004b). On the basis of a positive report by the commission as of 
Oct. 6, 2004 (Kramer/Krauss, 2004) and acknowledging for the tremendous progress 
achieved in Turkey (Rehn, 2005: 54), accordingly in December 2004 EU heads of 
state declared Turkey’s fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria and decided to have 
negotiations started by October 3, 2005 with an accession scenario after 2014 
(Hagelüken, 2004). After some heated debates throughout 2005 both in the EU coun-
tries and in Turkey especially on issues not directly linked to technicalities24 of the 
accession like e.g. the Cyprus question, on October 3, 2005 finally the accession 
talks were opened.  
 
6.1.2 EU-Europe in search of its identity  
Turkey knocks at EU’s door during the times of one of the deepest crisis of the exis-
tence of the community (Glyptis, 2005). After the last enlargement by 10 new me m-
bers the newly stretched European Union finds itself in a very fundamental search of 
its identity, which would provide the groundwork of the future direction. The lost 
referenda in France and Netherlands in May/June 2005 on the European Constitution 
brought to light a massive distrust and discontent by the European public about the 
course of the EU25, which was anticipated for long and turned out to be dominantly a 
matter of exchange between political elites and the European citizenry: “European 
                                                 
24 The most important technicality is the assimilation of Turkey’s national laws to the so called acquis 
communitaire of the EU, which, organized in 35 chapters and containing more than 85.000 pages, 
represents the common set of rules, laws and directives of the community (Hagelüken, 2004: 2).  
25: Even if they didn’t touch on Turkey’s issue, the lost referenda in France and Netherlands were also 
interpreted as an indicator for membership fortunes in Turkey. (Schlötzer, 2005b; Briefing, 2005e; 
Stelzenmüller, 2005: 33).  
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countries have dramatically lacked communication about the EU, its progress, and its 
advantages. This void in public communication has left public opinion overwhelmed 
and to a greater extent, behind” (Guérot, 2004: 96).  
 
The failure of the Nice summit in spring 2005 and the troublesome compromise dur-
ing the summit in Brussels in December 2005 also showed that there is no consensus 
on financing of EU and subsidy politics of the Union at the moment (Ögütçü, 2005). 
Together with the forced halt to the European Constitution process, which was de-
signed to outline the future of the EU, not only have the EU politics apparently lost 
contact to the citizens, but also are the member states divided among each other 
(Giannakopoulos/Maras 2005a). In sum, there are a number of signs that indicate that 
the EU has entered into a substantial identity crisis (Islam, 2005: 28).  
 
The community is separated between the two strategic directions of further deepen-
ing or widening the relationships of the Union. Deepening embodies the vision of a 
pan-European state federation and is oftentimes exemplary connected to the question 
of a common European foreign policy covering questions of security and defence26; 
in general, advocates of this position see the EU as an inward-oriented entity 
(Müftüler-Baç, 2002: 50; Önis, 2004: 19). Widening the European project favors a 
more loosely knit intergovernmental Union, which could imply to further enlarge the 
EU towards an even larger common market, at the same time developing the union as 
a relevant geostrategic group and outward-orientated global actor. (Wernicke, 2005; 
                                                 
26 One of the most intensely debated projects in this context is the Common Foreign and Security 
Polity (CFSP) (Hatipoglu, 2005: 48). 
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Önis, 2004: 19; Müftüler-Baç, 2002: 50). 27 The decision among these alternatives 
will bear enormous implications; if the organization for example moves into the lat-
ter, intergovernmentalistic direction, “then the EU would be not so much a ‘civiliza-
tional club’ based on shared culture and values as a more business-like organizsation 
which is being regulated by a set of purely technical norms” (Hatipoglu, 2005: 52)28.  
 
At least the following five different concepts of a European identity can be spotted 
(Leggewie, 2004a: 13-14). Depending on the position towards these identity con-
cepts, pragmatic or ideological stands towards the entire project of Europe can be 
developed. As the objections in brackets indicate, all of these identity concepts are 
easily attackable due to contemporary contexts:  
· Europe as a geographical area (versus the idea of an eccentric identity of 
Europe and its exterritorial effects) 
· Europe as a historical community joined by fate and memory (in danger in 
the context of generally fading historical consciousness)  
· Europe as heir of the Christian Occident (more difficult to maintain vis à vis a 
swift decline in Christianity and growing religious pluralism) 
· Europe as a capitalistic market community with elements of a welfare state 
(partly relativized by neo-liberal globalization process) 
· Europe as hoard of democracy and human rights (hard to keep up facing a 
universal understanding of these values, which can not be exclusively 
claimed by Europe).  
 
                                                 
27 Members of the deepening camp are France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the Benelux states, while 
Britain and a number of new EU states from Central, North and East Europe represent the widening 
camp (Islam, 2005: 28).  
28 As we will see later, this scenario would be definitely favourable for Turkey’s accession, and most 
proponents of such a widening perspective are supporting Turkey’s membership (Ögütçü, 2005).  
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Europe’s identity crisis has probably not much to do with Turkey per se but it seems 
to be amplified or accentuated by the prospect of Turkey’s EU membership (Glyptis, 
2005); the impact of the question of Turkey’s accession on Europe’s rethinking of its 
identity is evident. Representing a very drastic position, the former French president 
Giscard d'Estaing was quoted in his famous Le Monde interview: “Turkey's acces-
sion would mean the end of Europe” (Anastasakis, 2004: 40). The Independent 
Commission analysing Turkey’s situation in 2004 chides such utterances:  
“Clichés or sweeping statements abound, purporting that Turkey is not a 
European country or that its membership would mean the end of the Euro-
pean Union. Some raise the spectre of a Muslim invasion of Europe destroy-
ing its culture and civilisation. To facilitate constructive discourse on this 
complex issue, such approaches should be avoided." (Independent Commis-
sion, 2004: 7).  
However, ‘too big’, ‘too poor’ and ‘too different’ (Wernicke, 2004) are catchy head-
lines that are often used to stereotype the discourse on Turkey. With reference to the 
identity discussion within EU, it can be concluded that “the EU’s conflicting atti-
tudes towards Turkey [are also] a sign of its lack of clarity about its own future status 
in international affairs. Or indeed a lack of clarity about its present identity and func-
tion” (Glyptis, 2005: 39).  
 
It should yet not be overlooked that Turkey itself has undergone a substantial and 
courageous reform process since 2002 that is primarily responsible for EU’s readi-
ness to deliberate Turkey’s membership at all (Stelzenmüller, 2005). Before looking 
at the general discourse on Turkey a little closer, therefore a short summary of recent 
developments in Turkey should be given, also hinting at some identity questions the 
European project in turn necessarily brings along for Turkey.  
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6.1.3 Turkey’s recent reform process  
EU’s opening towards Turkey was possible after a remarkable reform process fol-
lowing the profound economic crisis in 2001. Especially with the AKP government 
lead by Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
taking over power in late 2002, the accomplishments in turning the country towards 
the expectation pattern of the EU have been significant: “It can be fairly said that 
Turkey has achieved more reform in just over two years than in the whole of the pre-
vious decade” (Independent Commission, 2004: 20).  
 
Structural changes in the penal code, in the power structures or related to the market 
economy such as the abolishment of capital punishment, legal changes facilitating 
foreign direct investments, independence of the central bank, restriction of military 
powers or a massive privatization have earned Turkey extensive international respect 
(Rosenkranz, 2004b: 80; Schlötzer, 2004a: 30; Lange, 2005: 2).  
 
The relationship with the EU has acted as an important catalyst during the impressive 
transformation and is expected to do so even more in the near future during the forth-
coming negotiations. (Grabbe, 2004).  
 
Especially the country’s economic recovery has drawn international attention. Tur-
key’s economy was traditionally caught in a vicious circle (Leibfritz, 2004):  
· Lack of trust in political and economic stability and high budget deficits led 
interest rates jump up high and lead to continuous devaluations and high in-
flation. 
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· Flaws in the administrative/governmental apparatus including the judicial 
system caused insufficient infrastructures, uncertainties about legal affairs 
and corruption.  
· Shifts to the black economy and the attempt by the state to compensate reve-
nue losses by higher taxes and increased welfare contributions, again drove 
up the burden for registered companies and employees. This actions even 
more increased black economy tendencies.  
 
The reforms by the Erdogan administration opened a way out. The inflation rate has 
reached single digits for the first time in generations (Tudor, 2004: 6), annual growth 
rates of approx. 9% (2004) and 5% (2005) (Lange, 2005) have Turkey established as 
the 6th fastest growing economy worldwide between 2002 and 2005 (Zaman, 2006), 
and the public budget deficit will probably be less than 3% by 2006 (Lange, 2005). 
“Turkey is already outperforming most of the European member states [in 
growth]. Rapid economic growth can change Turkey’s image by diminishing 
fears of instability and migration. Individuals in the EU would start to see 
Turkey as an asset for the European economy rather than the current climate 
which embodies the notion of placing the begging bowl out for EU transfer” 
(Guérot, 2004: 99). 
 
The annual progress report by the EU commission on Turkey in 2005 was rather 
positive in terms of the economic situation of the country. For the first time the coun-
try was formally referred to as ‘productive market economy’ (Hürriyet, 2005a).  
 
Looking ahead, the high speed of innovation and productivity gains probably cannot 
be upheld at such levels; yet there is still a broad array of economical challenges 
waiting. Official estimations suggest in 2004 every second job was located in the 
black economy. The tax system needs urgent renovation and progress in law en-
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forcement will be highly appreciated (Strittmatter, 2005: 21). The trade deficit has 
even increased throughout the last couple of years (as did however also capital im-
ports to potentially balance the deficit). At the moment, a good portion of the capital 
inflows is still rent and portfolio capital (so called ‘hot money’) and not meant to 
remain in the country. With the beginning of EU accession talks, however, long-
termed FDIs are expected (Leibfritz, 2004: 24). Reforms concerning transparency, a 
stronger regionalization and decentralization of budgets or increased governmental 
control of the black economy disseminate more positive signals related to the Turk-
ish economy (Lange, 2005).  
 
Outside the economic domain (and outside the formal process fulfilling the ‘aquis’) 
Turkey has a considerable agenda that needs to be worked through on its way to-
wards EU. The progress report by the EU commission for 2005 mentions necessary 
improvements of religious freedom, struggle against torture, freedom of expression, 
women’s rights, and the right to form organizations and labor unions; furthermore 
the report sent out a general call for Turkey to speed up its reform process (Hürriyet, 
2005a).  
Moreover, the Cyprus problem is still unsolved. Also views on the question of how 
to assess the mass murder of Armenians in 1915 are still divergent between Europe 
and Turkey. Finally, despite some improvement in the minority rights areas, the 
Kurdish issue still needs a general strategic perspective in the light of the develop-
ment of the entire Middle East region.  
All these topics (and more to come) momentarily drive together a quite heterogene-
ous Anti-EU coalition in Turkey of right-wingers, hard-line patriots, conservative 
bureaucrats, military men and ultra-left wingers warning of a substantial disintegra-
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tion of the country resulting from the EU-induced discussions (Burke, 2005: 1). The 
historical identity of the Turkish Republic putting the unity of the nation above all is 
regarded endangered by some fractions within the society. 
With Giannakopoulos/Maras (2005a: 32) we can conclude for the more recent devel-
opment that – mainly thanks to the remarkable reform process – no fundamental stra-
tegic or formal reasons seem to be in the way of an open-ended negotiation of Tur-
key’s EU membership29, but the road towards accession will be long and challeng-
ing.  
 
6.1.4 EU-Positions towards Turkey’s accession 
Resulting from these fundamental debates in both EU and Turkey, without doubt 
Turkey will represent an extreme scenario for the EU; negotiations will be different 
from all previous (Guérot, 2004; Kramer, 2005) bringing along many fundamental 
challenges for the European question and identity. 
“Turkey is, indeed, a special case – and a rather difficult one at that. Numer-
ous hurdles have yet to be defeated on the Turkish side as well as on the 
European side in hopes of turning these negotiations into a lasting success. 
Europe will need to start a broad public discussion regarding the many facets 
of integration, such as sharing their life and space with an increasing Muslim 
community. The European Union must successfully merge democracy and Is-
lam - an innovative and unprecedented political endeavour in shaping the 
foundations of international relations in the 21st century” (Guérot, 2004: 94).  
 
Accordingly the discussion in Europe is quite broad in scope and depth; within the 
range of positions claimed we find mere technicalities as well as fundamental issues 
of peoples’ co-existence. Thus the following heterogeneous collection of ‘Pros’ and 
                                                 
29 This was also documented by the mere fact of opening the negotiations on October 3, 2005, which 
formally requires that a candidate country has met or approached the Copenhagen Criteria (see above, 
and also Briefing, 2005e). “To join the EU, Turkey must fulfil the EU’s ‘Copenhagen criteria’ for 
membership. It must convince European politicians that it has met the three conditions - that it has a 
well-functioning market economy robust enough to cope with international competition; that it is 
committed not to use force or the threat of force in intra-European disputes, including disputes with 
Greece and Cyprus; and that is has a well-functioning democracy that subordinates the military to 
civilian authorities and respects the human rights of all citizens” (Tezel, 2001: 50). 
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‘Cons’ of Turkey’s EU accession was constructed based on a model by Leggewie 
(2004b: 8) and expanded by the author’s observations from the public debate30 as a 
rough introduction into a complex public discourse. 
PROs CONs 
There has been a historical partnership 
between Ottoman Empire and Europe  
Considering geographical location, his-
tory, religion, culture and mentality, Tur-
key is not a part of Europe. 
Great parts of Classical Antique culture 
was historically transmitted by Ottomans 
and Arabs 
Turkish culture is lacking display of ma-
jor European cultural cornerstones like 
Reformation, Renaissance or Enlighten-
ment 
The early roots of Christianity (eg first 
councils) took place in Asia minor 
Muslims can not be integrated into West-
ern societies, but tend to found parallel 
societies 
Geo-strategic value in energy (oil- and 
gas-pipelines) and defence matters (Tur-
key’s role in NATO for regional stabil-
ity) 
Costs of Turkey’s accession estimated 
(under current EU subsidy system31) be-
tween € 20-28 billion p.a. 
Turkey’s membership would contribute 
to the appeasement of a troublesome re-
gion 
Bordering Iran, Iraq or Syria could mean 
a security risk for the EU.   
EU’s identity would be significantly 
broadened 
Threat of reinforcing identity ruptures in 
the EU (deepening vs. broadening) 
Very important trade partner, dynamic 
new markets; Turkey could become EU 
power horse  
EU would be overstretched and eco-
nomically overloaded; the current inte-
gration level could not be kept up. 
Turkey’s very young population will 
bring in desperately needed refreshment 
to Europe’s aging population and will 
provide a welcome labor force.  
In 2015, 80 mio. Turks will be ‘ante por-
tas’, with the country becoming the larg-
est in the EU, and a large and poor popu-
lation seeking jobs will profit from free 
labor migration.  
Turkey serves as an important strategic 
bridge between Europe and the Near and 
Middle East 
Doctrine of national unity being prior to 
individual rights is incompatible with EU 
values 
                                                 
30 For the purpose of this thesis, the author has been observing the following media continuously from 
fall 2004 to 2006 on issues related to Turkey’s EU accession, which serve as the fund for this analysis: 
Zaman, Turkish Daily News, Hürriyet, Briefing (publications from Turkey in English), Der Spiegel, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung (publications from Germany – in addition the author had access to the media 
analysis of the German foreign ministry team on Turkey covering German, French and English media 
–) and The Economist, Time and Newsweek as international publications.  
31 EU’s finance and subsidy system however will definitely be reformed by the time of Turkey’s ac-
cession in the course of the Nice process. 
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PROs CONs 
Turkey’s membership would positively 
influence integration processes of Turk-
ish or generally Muslim migrants in EU 
countries 
The Political Islamism could infringe on 
to Turkish diasporas in EU countries 
EU accession as a motor for the reform 
politics, approximation towards EU sys-
tems of value (e.g. progress in the areas 
of minority rights, capital punishment, 
torture etc.).  
Principle doubts about Turkey’s ability 
to establish a working liberal democracy 
following the European pattern. Islam 
sets the borders 
Implementation of the reform steps has 
been slow, but steady. The reform steps 
solidify Turkish democracy and EU ac-
cession works as a reform catalyst 
Turkish military is a non-legitimate 
power (Kemalistic philosophy of state: 
politics serves the state and not the other 
way = pre-democratic, authoritarian idea 
of the state) 
Turkey as political role model unifying 
Islam and democracy for other countries 
in the region 
Turkey witnesses a creeping Islamism (in 
army, schools, media); Islamic culture 
relies on obedience, not on individuality. 
Rapid growth of NGOs who are outspo-
kenly in favor of EU accession 
Underdeveloped constitutional state: pri-
ority of state over the individual, protec-
tion from ‘dangerous’ developments 
(cultural rights for Kurds, religious mi-
norities, homosexuality) 
A “no” would stop Europeanization in 
Turkey and could be initial boost for a 
spiral downward of the country. 
Is AKP hiding the true intentions or are 
the steps towards more religious rights 
steps into the direction of a religious 
state? 
Table 6-5: Pros and cons of Turkish accession raised in the public discourse 
 
In sum, the arguments relate to historical and cultural roots vs. fundamental cultural 
differences between EU-Europe and Turkey, to different (strategic) views and out-
looks on the EU as a whole and to the inner constitution of Turkey in the light of 
current political developments or tendencies.  
 
6.1.5 Determining role of public opinion 
Birand (2005a) reminds of the crucial steps Turkey’s membership after the end of the 
negotiations:  
· Approval of the European Parliament 
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· Approval by the Austrian and French public in referendums 32 
· Approval by each Parliament of the 25 member countries 
 
A particular scenario therefore threatens Turkey’s accession: “Theoretically, Turkey 
could meet all criteria, negotiate successfully for a decade or so but then be vetoed 
by one or more of the EU countries via a referendum” (Kiniklioglu, 2005a: 1). Bi-
rand (2005a:1) concludes: “herein lies the real obstacle to Turkey’s membership – 
the European public”.  
 
Referenda will probably not be the only determining factor as it is sometimes sug-
gested in the media discussion33. Yet it will be quite improbable that the parliaments 
of the member states or the European Parliament would ratify an accession treaty 
despite broad rejection by EU’s population (Kramer, 2005: 13). In general terms: the 
process is not fully in Turkey’s and EU governments’ hands: “There will be exoge-
nous variables, which are factors that cannot be controlled, for example, the votes of 
people who take an ideological approach to the issue. No matter how well Turkey 
does, this may not eliminate enmity towards Turks” (Kalaycioglu, 2005: 1). In other 
words, “in the next 10 or 15 years however, when all is set for membership what may 
matter most is the European public opinion against Turkey” (Briefing, 2005f: 8).  
 
                                                 
32 At least these referendums have been announced by the time of this thesis being conducted. Kramer 
(2005: 12-13) considers that e.g. the French decision to hold a referendum on Turkey after the end of 
the negotiations has been less the product of fundamental principles, but rather derived from current 
tactical-political deliberations. It can therefore not be excluded that this decision could be revised in 
the context of a different opportunity regarding domestic policies, although the constitutional changes 
necessary for such a revision would require considerable political effort. However, Kramer maintains 
that referenda on the Turkish accession in ten years time are far from being certain events (Kramer, 
2005: 13, in a footnote). On the other hand there are also other member-states conceivable to hold a 
referendum once Turkey’s accession negotiation has come to a successful end; rumours about the 
Baltic states considering such constitutional changes have been around.  
33 Former German chancellor Schröder was similarly quoted that Turkey’s accession could not fully 
depend on the outcome of referenda (Schlötzer, 2005a: 7).  
 113 
At the moment this public opinion is definitely not backing Turkey’s accession. A 
number of surveys clearly indicate a substantial opposition towards Turkey joining 
the EU in almost all countries of the organization:  
· For the question QA 44.1234 in the Eurobarometer 64 (Eurobarometer, 
2005b) with closed to 30.000 citizens interviewed in all member states plus 
candidate countries in October and November 2005, on average across all 25 
EU countries 31% answered in favour and 55% against Turkey’s accession to 
the community. We will analyze the data in more detail when considering the 
individual nations’ positions.  
· 28% of the interviewees of the Transatlantic Trends, collected in July 2005 in 
10 European countries35 and the USA (sample sizes ca. 1.000 per country) 
generally speaking thought of Turkey’s membership to the European Union 
(Q 18) as being a good thing; another 28% thought it would be a bad thing, 
and 38% thought it would be neither good not bad (Transatlantic Trends, 
2005: 52).  
· In a survey conducted by IFOP in December 2004 researching little less than 
5.000 participants in 5 EU countries, the diverse opinions towards Turkey’s 
accession are confirmed. 67% of the French and 55% of the Germans disap-
prove Turkish membership. However, 65% of the Spanish people, 49% of the 
Italians and 41% of Brits (versus 30% disapproval) appreciate Turkey’s ac-
cession (Der Spiegel, 2004a). 
· A survey by TNS Sofres among 6.000 people in the EU’s six largest coun-
tries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Britain and Poland) in March 2005 de-
                                                 
34 Question wording: “For each of the following countries, would you be in favour or against it be-
coming part of the European Union in the future – Turkey” 
35 Countries: France, Germany, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia and Turkey.  
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tected a competitive environment for Turkey. The survey compared the ap-
proval of a potential Ukrainian membership to the Turkish membership in the 
EU and found on average 55% support for Ukraine over 45% for Turkey. 
Main reason for this priority is the fact that Ukraine is geographically fully 
situated in Europe. Other interesting numbers from this survey: Germany 
36% pro Turkey and 60% against, French 37% – 59%, Poland 55% pro and 
Brits 50% pro to 32% contra (Watt, 2005). 
· A similar survey, again by TNS Sofres and again covering these six countries 
in November 2005 confirmed the preference for Ukraine (51% pro and 34% 
against) over Turkey (40% and 46% against). Newly Russia was added to the 
list and with 45% (41% opposing) approval also outscored Turkey. Morocco 
was also tested and received 31% approval and 51% denial. The overall de-
cline of the values compared to the March 2005 survey was explained by the 
Europe wide measurable “enlargement blues”, which refers to a generally de-
creasing support for enlargement, whatever the country might be. (Beunder-
man, 2005),  
 
The overall trend throughout all these recent surveys is unmistakable: The majority 
of EU-Europeans currently have considerably reservations towards Turkey’s me m-
bership36. It is presumed that this apparent rift between governmental policies, which 
opened Turkey the way to EU-Europe, and public opinion could even deepen during 
the course of negotiation (Independent Commission, 2004: 29). And at the end, as 
projected before, the accession process could fail due to the public opinion.  
                                                 
36 The partly significant variation among the numbers will not only be due to technical differences 
between the surveys or sampling errors. Formulation of questions will also be quite influential with 
regard to which conditions are assumed for the status of Turkey before the interviewees are asked to 
respond. The condition “let’s assume Turkey meets all formal conditions (acquis communitaire etc.) 
for accession” is such an example. 
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Quite interestingly, such a development has been foreseen as long as more than 10 
years: “Europe’s basically reluctant or hostile approach towards Turkey, consciously 
or subconsciously, tends negatively to influence the evaluation of other issues that 
are of political and economic relevance to the question of Turkey’s eventual me m-
bership in the EU” (Kramer, 1996: 226), and yet no visible action has been under-
taken ever since.  
 
A need for action seems currently irrefutable. In the declaration of the President of 
the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, on the opening of accession nego-
tiations with Turkey the aspect of Europe’s public opinion on Turkey was under-
lined: “Europe must learn more about Turkey. And Turkey must win the hearts and 
minds of European citizens. They are the ones who at the end of the day will decide 
about Turkey’s membership” (European Commission, 2005a: 1). 
 
There seems to be an EU-European consensus that “in the intervening time, consid-
erable effort should be applied by the governments concerned, the European Com-
mission and Turkey itself to address legitimate concerns but also misconceptions and 
anxieties, so as to turn public opinion around” (Independent Commission, 2004: 29). 
 
In the Turkish perception, the tone has become slightly rougher most recently, but 
the challenge is pinpointed in a similar manner:  
“Turkey will not have much time left when the accession talks start […]. As-
suming that we have still 10 years ahead of us, how can we be sure that there 
will not be other political leaders who would not agitate their public on an off 
again when full accession date gets nearer? 
Instead of fatalistic inertia and remaining at the mercy of ruthless and careless 
whimsical European politicians, what Turkey's diplomatic machinery and 
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NGO’s have to focus on is the education of the European public opinion by 
an all out mobilization of resources to overcome their misconceptions dating 
back to centuries old prejudices, primordial fears and medieval tales” (Brief-
ing, 2005f: 8). 
 
6.1.6 Public opinion and course of accession negotiations 
It has to be kept in mind that the decision of Turkey’s accession will not be made 
today; therefore, also the current picture of the public opinion must be taken serious 
as a trend-setting indicator, but not fatalistically anticipated and projected as already 
determined. Most experts agree that Turkey’s accession process will at least take 10 
years from now on (Hatipoglu, 2005: 48)37. Prolonging from the current speed of 
changes in Turkey and considering the massive tasks ahead of the supranational or-
ganization, both Turkey and EU-Europe will look entirely different by the time Tur-
key entering and both sides will have plenty of opportunities to get to know and ac-
customed to each other:  
“It will not be the Turkey of today that will join, nor will it be the same EU – 
it will join an EU that has changed dramatically. For the moment, Turkey 
needs the process more than the results to keep its reform path on track. And 
Europe's public need time to get accustomed to the idea of an Islamic state 
within its borders” (Guérot, 2004: 97). 
 
Facing the massive rejection from Europe’s public, the reactions in Turkey – even 
acknowledging this time horizon – seems sometimes slightly defiant: “If Turkey 
adopts the EU acquis in the negotiation process, the EU won’t have too much to say 
against Turkey. Objects of public opinion will then seem unrealistic and ideologi-
cally rooted. As it is sometimes criticised, prejudice against Turkey will turn into a 
racist reaction” (Kalaycioglu, 2005: 1). On the other hand, it is sometimes com-
plained that Turkey is lacking a good PR gene: “Prickly, proud and fiercely national-
                                                 
37 Negotiations can not be concluded before 2014 because of budgetary necessities: Since the acces-
sion of such a big country like Turkey comes at a substantial cost, first an agreement by the bloc on its 
next seven year budget after 2014 seems conditional (Ögütçü, 2005: 95).  
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istic, the Turks are decidedly bad at public relations” (Economist, 2005c: 29). As 
indicated above the Turkish nation seems to have no alternative as to try its best to 
attack the public resistance. And at the same time it is the task of the European poli-
ticians convinced of the project to woo around the EU voters for favor: “Leading 
politicians should make the case why negotiations are important for the security and 
stability of Europe” (Dombey, 2005: 8). We will discuss some of the managerial im-
plications later, on the basis of the more detailed analysis.  
 
For the progress of accession talks on the governmental/diplomatic level, the ques-
tion of public opinion cannot be saved to the very last day when parliaments and vot-
ers decide. As long as the public perception of Turkey does not change, politicians 
will not be able to make brave decisions on Turkey (Dogan, 2005a: 34).Clearly the 
question of the European disfavor will not only affect the political negotiation, but 
also impact the important reform process and the development of a European identity 
in Turkey itself. Olli Rehn, EU enlargement commissioner and a champion of open-
ing the talks, was quoted accordingly:  
“’We have a vicious circle at the moment, so that negative public opinion in 
Europe has an impact on political leaders, […] that in turn erodes the credibil-
ity of the accession perspective in the eyes of the Turks and has a negative 
impact on the reform process’” (Dombey, 2005: 8). 
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6.1.7 Turkey’s internal debate   
As touched upon earlier, not the entire Turkish society is backing AKP’s strict course 
towards EU-Europe. Public opinion might therefore turn out to be of high relevance 
inside of Turkey, as well.  
 
The framework for Turkey’s EU negotiations was received critically mainly by the 
opposition parties in Turkey. Complaints touched upon too many sacrifices for Tur-
key and it was suspected that AKP was hiding some relevant facts behind the acces-
sion (TDN, 2005b).  
 
Despite the tough diplomatic progress leading to the start of the accession talks by 
October 3, 2005, the EU enthusiasm in Turkey – long time understood also as one 
main driver of economic progress –significantly dropped. Support for EU accession 
expressed in polls fell from 75% in December 2004 to 60% in October 2005 and ar-
rived at 55% in March 2006 (Burke, 2005: 1, Zaman, 2006b). At the same time the 
hopes diminished: In a poll of 2.500 urban citizens in Turkey in December 2005, 
55% (compared to 61% in December 2004) expressed their belief that Turkey’s EU 
aspirations would become reality (TDN, 2005i).  
 
Also, a survey conducted among 1.776 Turkish university students on their outlooks 
on Turkey's EU accession (TDN, 2005c) showed significant scepticism. Only 38% 
think the European dream will come true for Turkey. They bewail double standards 
imposed on Turkey by the EU in comparison to earlier new member’s accession 
process; at the same time they also critically discuss the European-ness of Turkey.  
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The AKP administration will not only have to deal with the European resistance, but 
will also have to defend its reform politics in the homeland facing the next election in 
2007. The successful reform process has kept opposition parties and military rather 
quiet, but the more critical targets are brought to light, the more severe the resistance 
within the country can be expected (TDN Defense Desk, 2005).  
 
In a meta-study Pusch (2004) analyzed a broad range of Turkish or EU-European 
surveys and opinion polls conducted in Turkey since 1993 and found the following 
interesting positions related to Turkey’s EU membership. 
· Compared to other international data, global or European dimensions are only 
weakly articulated in the Turkish self-image. According to the 2003 Euro-
barometer, 52% of the Turkish population sees themselves as only Turks, 
41% as Turks and European, 3% as Europeans and Turks, and 3% as only 
Europeans (Pusch, 2003: 118).  
· In general, the data over the past 10 years shows a high approval for member-
ship across most surveys. The numbers are even better than for most other 
candidate countries and consistently amount to over 50% across all strata 
(Pusch, 2004: 122). 
· At the first sight disturbing, the greatest approval rate for EU membership can 
be found in both groups with the highest and the lowest socio-economic 
status (Pusch, 2004: 122). The apparent discrepancy can be explained by 
looking at the different motives: Very high EU approval is found in the Kurd-
ish population in the rural South-East, hoping for a massive improvement of 
human rights, and also in the well-educated, wealthy urban milieu, suppos-
edly the most Western-minded social group. 
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· Substantial knowledge about the EU is quite low in Turkey compared to all 
other member- and candidate states38. It can be inferred therefore that the ma-
jority of Turkey’s population is highly positively minded about EU without 
exact knowledge of the details. Pusch (2004: 128) concludes that the euphoria 
is not unconditional and predicts a lower approval rate with more information 
around.39 
 
This last finding was backed by the University student survey in Turkey 2005 re-
ferred to before (TDN, 2005c): the informants complain about the information deficit 
of their fellow countrymen about the implications of the EU accession negotiation 
and the consequences of the potential actual membership for Turkey. 
Facing a huge load of disinformation about EU-Europe in all relevant media chan-
nels, government and NGOs are called upon to cooperate in this information task:  
“We cannot proceed with our membership negotiations with public sentiment 
dominated by misinformation and misperception. No one can convince them 
of the need of the importance of the reforms. In other words, the country will 
not be able to carry out the negotiations under current conditions. […] Every 
institution and group that supports Turkey’s relations with the EU should take 
action to initiate an information campaign” (Birand, 2005b: 1).  
 
This position is largely backed by Ümit Boyner, spokesperson of an emerging EU 
campaign by the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSIAD): 
“There is no room for populism in the EU project. The government has to make the 
EU project the Turkish people’s common project” (Briefing, 2006a: 2).40 
                                                 
38 Remarkably these differences were shown also for members of the Turkish parliament (Pusch, 
2004; quoting a research project by McLaren and Müftüler-Baç in 2003).  
39 A prognosis gained some significance looking at the decline in the approval rate between 2004 and 
2005 quoted earlier; in a way, Turkey’s population got to know EU better between the first 9 months 
of 2005 by having to deal with a broad range of turns the public debate on Turkey took.  
40 Peter van Ham (van Ham, 2005) is probably right when he – facing such scenarios and in-line with 
the communication deficits diagnosed earlier – also reminds the institution EU to rethink and improve 
its branding activities. The identity and communication crisis of the Union in the sense applied in the 
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In this discussion we again see hints of the strong interrelatedness of a nation brand’s 
identity and the perceived image. ‘Inside’ and ‘outside’ of a nation brand, as found 
out in Chapter 4, can hardly be separated. There can be no doubt that the perception 
of the nation brand in the specific political context by the ‘insiders’ will be influen-
tial on the accession process, which – at the end – will be determined by presumable 
brand outsiders.  
 
 
6.2 The nation brand Turkey  
 
In the founding days of the modern Turkish republic in 1923, branding efforts were 
large. Wally Olins, owner of a leading brand consultancy, lists the Turkish Republic 
as one of the most prominent examples of nation branding as an important strategy in 
the nationalistic repertoire:  
“Atatürk’s branding operations in the defeated Ottoman Empire after the First 
World War rivalled those of the first French Revolution in scope and scale; 
they involved a new alphabet, new clothing (all men had to wear smart West-
ern headgear or at least a Turkish version of it), ethnic cleansing, a new name 
for the nation and new names for all inhabitants, and perhaps most impor-
tantly in view of recent developments, a secular rather than a religious state” 
(Olins, 2002: 245).  
 
Similar to the categories introduced in Chapter 3, in the following a closer look at 
Turkey’s current nation brand by analyzing the possible different components should 
provide groundwork for the further analysis. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
thesis this far might also be read as a crisis of brand identity and brand image. This topic will however 
go beyond the scope of this thesis and must be left as an interesting subject for further research. 
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6.2.1 Components of Turkey’s nation brand  
A project called TÜ®KIYE, backed by most significant NGOs41 in Turkey in the 
areas of industry and commerce, advertising/marketing and tourism, and initially 
kicked off by the Ministry of Tourism and Culture, developed in a concerted ap-
proach a framework of the nation brand Turkey between 2002-2003 (TÜ®KIYE, 
2003). The project was supported by external nation/place branding experts42 and 
employed more than 200 voluntary experts from most different fields in general and 
special search group conferences. This initiative managed to dissect the nation brand 
Turkey carefully into its basic components; they subdivided the brand into the eight 
components (TÜ®KIYE, 2003: 23):  
· Tourism 
· Istanbul  
· Foreign trade 
· Foreign capital  
· Culture and art  
· Popular culture  
· Fashion/folklore  
· European integration  
 
                                                 
41 Among the project partners: TOBB, TÜSIAD, TÜRSAB, TÜRSAV, TIM, REKLAMVERENLER 
DENERGI; TV YAYINCILARI DENERGI, REKLAMCILAR DENERGI, ULUSLARARASI REK-
LAMCILIK DENERGI, TURIZM YATIRIMCILARI DENERGI, HALKLA ILISKILER DENERGI 
and ARASTIRMACILAR DENERGI. Former TÜSIAD president Erkut Yücaoglu headed the execu-
tion of the project. The Prime Minister’s chief consultant of communications, Prof. Nabi Avci, sup-
ported the project. 
42 like e.g. Noel Toolan as the former mastermind behind the rebranding project of Ireland (see Chap-
ter 5) 
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Tourism is a very strong asset of the nation brand of Turkey. Turkey’s tourism in-
come exceeded US$ 15 billion in 2004 with more than 17 million foreigners (and 
more than 3 million Turkish Expatriates) visiting the country (Briefing, 2005g).  
 
Turkey’s tourism assets are threefold: ‘Sun and beach’, as discussed before, is Tur-
key’s ‘bread and butter’-domain; the antique heritage containing sites like Troy, 
Ephesus or Pergamon, traces of Hittite civilization and memories of the Ottoman 
Empire and earlier societies in Turkey make up the ‘historical culture’ domain, and 
landscapes like Cappadocia, Pamukkale or the sailing districts of the Marmaris mark 
the ‘unique geography’ of the country (Baloglu/McCleary, 1999).  
As special case within Turkey’s tourism brand dimensions TÜ®KIYE (2003: 28) 
highlights Istanbul. As the charming and chaotic gate to the East with a rich history, 
but also as the business capital43 of Turkey it is positioned somehow across the other 
tourism categories.  
 
The classical export products from Turkey are clothes/textiles, ceramics and food 
(Artok, 2002). The example of Mavi Jeans, which have become an important export 
product to the US (Lange, 2005), shows that these categories not always refer to only 
raw goods. But Turkey has also become a significant site for the production of home 
electronics and household goods. Arcelik, for example, has become a Top 5 player in 
Europe in this domain (Lange, 2005). Seven percent of the White goods market in 
Europe is controlled by this label of Turkey’s biggest conglomerate, the Koc Group 
(Economist, 2005c: 32).  
                                                 
43 Istanbul accounts for roughly 45% of Turkey’s industry, for 55% of the GDP and for 60% of the 
nation’s exports (Matthews/Foroohar, 2005: 34).  
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Together with the general economic upturn (as described in 5.1.3), also a remarkable 
growth in exports from US$ 36 billion in 2002 to US$ 73,4 billion in 2005 (Yilmaz, 
2006) can be observed. Farming accounts for 11% and services for 55% of the Turk-
ish GDP (Lange, 2005). 
 
Between 1990 and 2000 foreign direct investments dramatically stagnated at the 
level of US$ 1 billion annually while China, for example, expanded from US$ 3,5 
billion to US$ 103 billion in the same period of time (Schlötzer, 2004a: 30). But the 
current economic reform progress is also reflected in a new heat of foreign direct 
investments flowing into Turkey. Mostly motivated by privatizing public assets, 
FDIs start to flow in. Only in 2005 Turkish state earned approx. US$ 25 billion from 
privatizing formerly owned state organisations such as Turk Telekom or cell phone 
provider Telsim (Strittmatter, 2005: 21).  
 
The subdivision of the categories ‘culture and art’, ‘popular culture’ and ‘fash-
ion/folklore’ (TÜ®KIYE, 2003: 33-35) seems over-precise. Past and current cultural 
practises of course largely shape Turkey’s nation brand, starting from the Antique to 
today’s pop and fashion exports from Turkey. In addition, history in general is a cen-
tral branding dimension of Turkey (Zaman, 2004), with classical heritage of Asia 
Minor in ancient Greek and Roman times, the Ottoman empire and the comparably 
short history of the new Turkish republic (Oswald, 2004). Closely linked to cultural 
patterns is surely the question of religion. The perception of Turkey as a Muslim 
country is another very important dimension of the nation brand.  
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Carriers and representatives of a nation’s culture are of course also the people, repre-
senting an essential cornerstone of a nation brand. For the case of Turkey, this pic-
ture is slightly fuzzy, partly due to the intensive labor migration of former residents 
to other countries. Approximately 4 percent of Turkish citizens live within the board-
ers of the EU (Sen, 1996: 233). Furthermore, the youth of Turkish society with one 
fifth of the population (2000 = 13 million) in the age-group between 15 and 24, 
which is more than in any other European country (Schlötzer, 2004c), is oftentimes 
mentioned as a characteristic of Turkey’s people.  
 
6.2.2 Nation brand-related aspects of Turkish politics 
Within the political sphere of the nation brand, Brewin (2000) identifies three differ-
ent areas (and also levels) of how Turkish politics and within this context Turkey’s 
EU accession are assessed. Most of the arguments have been introduced earlier and 
are therefore only summarized for the sake of this systematization.  
· The first very general area relates to the concept of “Otherness” and the re-
cent update of the thesis of the “Clash of Civilisation” by Samuel Hunting-
ton44: Is Turkey essentially different mainly because of the predominant Is-
lamic religion and will these cultural gaps between the two parties prevent 
Turkey’s EU accession (Gresh, 2005), or is not only the secular Western con-
stitution of Turkey, but also the multicultural reality of EU-Europe with more 
than 10 million Muslims proving such an argument wrong (Guérot, 2004)? 
The discussion of how Islamist terror incidents can influence Turkey’s EU 
bid and limit chances to enter is framed within this context (Demirelli, 2005).  
                                                 
44 Samuel Huntington is Professor in political science at Harvard University. His well-known thesis of 
the “Clash of civilisations” was first published in “Foreign Affairs” in the summer edition 1993.  
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· A more specific area deals rather neutrally with concrete political issues and 
related actions to be taken like: trust in democratic institutions, human rights, 
torture and minorities, Kurdish autonomy, absence of welfare state, accep-
tance of international law, Cyprus crisis, property rights, agricultural politics, 
or nationalism. “On this view Turks are accepted as European, but aspects of 
their policy or institutions are criticised as requiring correction” (Brewin, 
2000: 95). In this context also some extreme opinions warn about an Islamic 
backslash. The EU accession might just be a means to a conservative end. 
With EU’s help the military can be disempowered and secular cornerstones of 
the country overthrown (Zand, 2004). 
· A third area of the political nation brand Turkey focuses on instrumental val-
ues or dangers of Turkey’s EU membership, different in depth and quality ac-
cording to national interests. In this, EU politicians seem partly ahead of their 
publics; some hopes expressed by particular states that might provide reasons 
for potential support refer to the geostrategic role or to economical factors 
such as labor costs or market and production capacities (Brewin, 2000). It 
will be interesting to observe if “Turkey’s new geopolitical and strategic posi-
tion, together with general uncertainty about the future development of the 
Eurasian political landscape, will in themselves generate enough momentum 
to change the negatively biased European perception of Turkey and the 
Turks” (Kramer, 1996: 226). 
 
Turkey’s EU accession is far from being only a question of foreign politics. Domes-
ticquestions in the EU nations like e.g. integration issues or unemployment will have 
a great impact on the way Turkey is seen from abroad.  
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6.2.3 Turkey’s national identity   
Many issues related to Turkey’s EU accession largely affect the ongoing process 
within the country seeking its identity. Doing so, they will again reflect back to and 
influence the brand knowledge people in Europe will gain about Turkey.  
 
The negotiation of its identity has been a long-term existential challenge for the 
country geographically and mentally located between Orient and Occident: “Turks 
historically faced many disruptions in identity as they transformed from Central 
Asian nomads, to Muslim soldiers, to multicultural Ottomans, and finally to modern 
Turks” (Ger/Askegaard/Christensen, 1999: 168). In this way, traditionally the Turks 
adopted an Orientalist imagery, while a broad range of positive attributes like reason, 
productivity or freedom/democracy was identified as Western and Occidental 
(Ger/Askegaard/Christensen, 1999). 
 
Turkey’s so called modernisation culminated in the foundation of the Turkish Repub-
lic under Kemal Atatürk in 1923, which meant a massive structural transformation 
towards a Western oriented nation: “At the historical juncture, Islam was replaced 
with other ideals and universals such as Turkism, modernity and étatism. The sudden 
and large-scale shift away from religion followed by vigorous ethnic assimilation 
efforts created a contradictory context between the state and ethnic/religious seg-
ments of the population” (Saatci, 2002: 549). As one of the sources for Turkey’s his-
toric lack of identity, the installation of the new republic was not a result of votes, 
but of heroic figures “with almost transcendental properties” (Tezel, 2001: 49). The 
nation would have never voted to choose such a way: “No consensus-building proc-
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ess of representative democracy was involved. Indeed, a project that entailed such a 
radical dismantling of Islam in the public sphere would surely have been rejected by 
the Muslim populace if it had been tested in the ballot box” (Tezel, 2001: 49).  
Many of the complex problems and contradictions puzzling today’s contemporary 
Turkey’s society can be traced back to these redefinition processes of the Turkish 
identity. The dualism between urban and rural Turkey and between the religious and 
secular powers seems planted in the constellation in 1923 (Tezel, 2001).  
“Modern Turkey of the 21st century is still an enigmatic country. This enigma 
emanates from the complications if not contradictions of the prolonged Jaco-
bin attempt to change the political culture of a society which exists on a cul-
tural/civilizational tradition asking men and women to be obedient ‘slaves’ in 
front of God's revelation” (Tezel, 2005: 152).  
And also, the tension resulting of ethnical problems remaining to the very day like 
the Turkish-Kurdish discord can be traced back to the founding of the republic 
(Saatci, 2002).  
 
To many of these questions, a couple of new developments, which are more or less 
connected to the context of the EU accession, can be observed within contemporary 
Turkey.  
There is first a historic irony that it takes a comparably Islamist-rooted government 
to redirect the country towards the EU, partly heavily opposed by the heirs of 
Atatürk’s political legacy:  
“It is indeed puzzling to note that present Turkish politicians who are, with all 
their power and skill, working on Turkey’s accession to the European Union 
constitute a cadre who have emerged from Islamic communitarian move-
ments feeling alienated by the ‘reformist’ officialdom, while an important 
section of the so called ‘secular’ officialdom is trying desperately to stop the 
process of Turkey’s formal integration with Europe” (Tezel, 2005: 152). 
There are some indications that the lines of conflict between Westernization, Islam 
and Secularism are shifting. 
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Furthermore, Turkey recently witnessed interesting turns in the identity question. 
Prime Minister Erdogan stated in fall 2005 that religion should be the backbone of 
Turkish society. While the upper identity is first and foremost to be a citizen of the 
Republic, the bonding cement of the Turkish society would be religion (Zaman, 
2005b). In light of earlier Turkish policies vis à vis the Kurdish minority, this inno-
vative approach of Erdogan further developed a hierarchy of the Turkish identity. 
Under the roof of the upper identity as a Turkish citizen, sub identities like e.g. a 
Kurdish identity will have a legitimate place (Hacaoglu, 2005: 1). 
The reactions towards these positions were sceptical about the priority put on reli-
gious issues, but generally supportive for a future multi-ethnical, pluralistic concept 
of Turkey:  
“Totalitarian ideologies always find ways of creeping in into the minds of 
young people of Turkey under the guise of patriotism due to the insufficient 
democratic culture of the Turkish society. Religion alone cannot be a unifying 
bond of this nation. The cultivation of a modern pluralistic democratic society 
can be precipitated if the youth is made part of this vision.” (Briefing, 2006a: 
2)  
 
These discourses will eventually become visible to the EU-Europeans and shape the 
Turkish nation brand. Identity questions will become key ingredients of Turkey’s 
communication: “It is highly likely that we will be engaging in an intense domestic 
debate on how our public diplomacy efforts should be conducted. That is inevitable 
but also necessary as we are still in the process of defining our modern identity” (Ki-
niklioglu 2005a: 1).  
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6.2.4 Relevance of Turkey’s image 
After the analysis of the different dimensions of Turkey’s nation brand, in the fol-
lowing we shall shortly focus exclusively at the brand perception side outside of 
Turkey.  
Significant problems resulting from a bad Turkish image are nothing but new. As 
early as 1987, Kotler pinpointed the issue from the perspective of a Turkish expatri-
ate:  
“Here is what a Turkish woman experienced in travelling outside of Turkey: 
‘I left Turkey at the age of twenty and travelled in Europe before settling in 
the United States. When people learned that I was from Turkey, they were 
always surprised. I did not fit their image of a Turk. I was too nice, too gentle, 
too fun-loving. They thought I should be six feet tall, unshaven, sullen, and 
menacing. This struck me as doubly strange because most of the people in 
Turkey are more like me than like the foreigners' image of the Turk. Clearly, 
we Turks at some point in history acquired a bad international image and this 
has stuck’” (Kotler, 1987: 9). 
 
The image of Turkey as a factor for the nation’s EU accession has popped up in 
many recent quotes and instances.  
· The brutal intervention by the police on world women’s day in Istanbul 2005 
was remarked to have harmed the image of the Turkish government signifi-
cantly (Fried, 2005: 6; ABC, 2005) 
· In the aftermath of the violent incidents during the World Cup Qualifier be-
tween Switzerland and Turkey in Istanbul in November 2005, deputy Prime 
Minister Sahin stated that no one had the right to taint Turkey’s image 
(Dogan, 2005b). The government expressed that it doesn’t view any 
achievement in sports as being more important than the country’s image. 
“Those who are responsible for promoting our country through sport cannot 
behave in a way that belittles Turkey” (TDN, 2005h: 1).  
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· New nationalistic gestures by different fractions in Turkish society were 
judged to generally harm the nation’s image (Kalnoky 2005; Zand, 2004).  
· “Turkey’s image in Europe has been marred”, European Parliament rappor-
teur for Turkey Camiel Eurlings was quoted in the context of the Pamuk case 
and other repressive legal action against academics and writers in December 
2005 (Economist, 2005c: 32). Foreign minister Abdullah Gül said these legal 
actions filed on the grounds of the Turkish Criminal Code’s Article 301 – 
blaming the accused of denigrating the Turkish identity – could have a simi-
lar harming effect on Turkey’s national image abroad as did the movie “Mid-
night Express”45. (Zaman, 2005a: 1). Another comment about the same inci-
dents: “The world witnessed […] the most dramatic reversal in Turkey's in-
ternational image, by the very actors who had the chance to embarrass Tur-
key's prejudiced critics by a cool and deft hand of impartial judiciary and re-
move doubts on its determined adherence to freedom of expression and con-
science” (Briefing, 2005h: 2). 
· Prime Minister Erdogan’s attacks towards Danish media and his standpoints 
on the issue of “freedom of expression” while visiting Denmark in December 
2005 lead the Economist to title an article “Turkey and the European Union. 
An image problem” (Economist, 2005c: 29-32).  
· Prime Minister Erdogan’s Pro-Islamic standpoints especially related to the 
headscarf issue were sharply criticized in a memorandum by the Turkish mili-
tary as “damaging the country’s image and its European aspirations” (TDN, 
2005g: 1).  
                                                 
45 The 1978 film „Midnight Express“, directed by Oliver Stone, levelled severe criticism at the Turk-
ish judiciary system and the conditions in its prisons. The play was adapted from a book by William 
Hayes, written after he managed to escape from Imrali Prison in Istanbul in 1975 where he was locked 
up for several years for a drug delict. This movie left indelible images of the Turks especially in North 
American people’s minds. (Boland, 2005; Kotler/Haider/Rein, 1993b: 139) 
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· When Turkey was not considered for organizing the European football cham-
pionships 2012, former Turkish Football Federation (TFF) president Levent 
Biçakci argued that missing liking for Turkey by the executive committee 
was the main reason for the application to be turned down (Süddeutsche Zei-
tung, 2005b: 31).  
· Demands to reopen the Orthodox Christian seminary at Halki near Istanbul, 
as requested by Bartholomew I, the patriarch of the small Greek Orthodox 
community in Istanbul who did massive lobbying work for Turkey’s EU ac-
cession, are continuously resisted by Turkish government, which is blamed to 
be turning down the opportunity of a massive PR boost such a positive treat-
ment of minorities would disseminate into the Christian world (Economist, 
2005c: 32). Patriarch Bartholomew I was quoted in 2004: “For primarily it is 
the image of our country that is thereby injured in the eyes of those who […] 
will be called upon to pronounce in respect of (Turkey’s) European pros-
pects” (TDN, 2004b: 5). 
· With all negative image-related news in mind, some positive international tail 
wind reaching Istanbul should not be forgotten. The international magazine 
Newsweek, for example, titled that Istanbul was “Europe’s hippest city” in 
summer 2005 (Matthews/Foroohar, 2005).  
· In a survey called Nation Brand Index, also Turkey was investigated. It is 
concluded there that Turkey “has a very weak international brand image, and 
brand image plays a more fundamental role in questions of international rela-
tions and regional integration than many people imagine” (Anholt/GMI, 
2005c: 19).  
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· Foreign minister Abdullah Gül acknowledged at a conference on public di-
plomacy in February 2006 in Ankara the overall image problems of Turkey: 
“It seems we have an image problem abroad” (Gül, 2006: 2). 
 
The claim of Turkey and the nation’s EU application suffering from a bad interna-
tional reputation seems to be largely substantiated with by the evidence presented.  
 
6.2.5 Distribution of public opinion of Turkey’s EU membership  
This negative public image however is quite heterogeneously distributed. Further 
analysis of the case of Turkey will show that – despite all common European back-
grounds – “it is impossible to talk about a single, one-sided image of the Turk. [...] 
Images of the Turk travel between the East and the West, between showing Turkey 
as a confused child of modernism and westernisation to presenting it as a regular 
violator of human rights” (Tahir/Türker, 2000: 70). 
 
There has not been a systematic research of images across the EU countries so far. 
The Eurobarometer studies, ordered by the European Commission on a semi-annual 
basis, measure regularly the public opinion on Turkey’s EU membership across all 
25 member-states. In consumer research, opinion is not regarded as a very substantial 
category of explanation. Opinions are looked at as rather unstable and depending on 
momentary circumstances (Blythe, 1997). More stable explanations of behavior are 
assumed possible at the level of attitudes, which is moreover learned and a less in-
stinctive category (Blythe, 1997: 69-70). Attitudes were detected earlier as important 
components and were sometimes synonymous with the image construct. In the ab-
sence of well-founded studies on attitudes on Turkey however, the distribution of 
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public opinion on Turkey is regarded as a decent approximation for the sake of fur-
ther outlining the research problem.  
 
Public opinion of Turkey’s EU membership covers a range from strict opposition to 
rather favorable positions; a consistent logic to the distribution of public opinion on 
Turkey cannot be found in Europe. The following different representations are meas-
ured in the different member-states or regions of the EU.  
 
Country In favor Against Don’t 
Know 
Austria 11 80 9 
Belgium 36 60 4 
Czech Republic 30 57 13 
Denmark 33 59 8 
Estonia 27 53 20 
Finland  31 64 5 
France 21 68 12 
Germany 21 74 5 
Greece 20 79 1 
Hungary  41 43 16 
Ireland 33 40 27 
Italy 27 57 16 
Latvia 31 51 18 
Lithuania 27 50 23 
Luxembourg 19 74 7 
Malta 39 40 21 
Poland 42 37 22 
Portugal 40 38 22 
Republic of Cyprus 16 80 4 
Slovakia 28 56 15 
Slovenia 49 45 6 
Spain 40 33 27 
Sweden  48 41 11 
The Netherlands 41 52 7 
United Kingdom 38 42 20 
Table 6-6: Public opinion on Turkey's EU membership (European Commission, 2005b) 
To complete the picture, a look is recommended at the other candidate countries 
Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria. Also the self-opinion of Turks and Cypriot Turks is 
provided:  
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Country In favor Against Don’t 
Know 
Bulgaria 44 35 21 
Croatia  62 24 14 
Romania  63 11 25 
Turkey 75 12 13 
Turkish Cypriot Comm. 86 8 6 
Table 6-7: Public opinion in non-EU countries (European Commission, 2005b)  
Obviously the picture on opinions and discourses on Turkey is quite colorful. Offi-
cial governmental positions are, expressed by the political action taken when opening 
negotiations, in favor of developing an accession perspective. The diverse public 
opinion suggests that a common European public in the sense of a consensual devel-
opment of an informed opinion within a European civil society is – at least with re-
gard to the perception of Turkey – not in sight (Giannakopoulos/Maras, 2005b: 216-
217).  
 
For the course of this thesis, in line with the nation brand image theory presented in 
Chapter 4, it can be concluded that Turkey’s image in Europe will not be a simple 
and uni-dimensional entity, but a complex construct. 
 
6.2.6 Implications for the research question 
In a first general analytical approach of the presented positions, some typical quali-
ties of countries potentially influencing opinion formation and political discourses 
can be deducted. They seem to resemble structural characteristics represented among 
the EU nations with some impact on Turkey’s perception:  
· Size, wealth, and relevance of the country within the EU 
· The country’s general vision of EU’s development 
· Level of involvement with Turkey (by migration, throughout history, by 
trade) 
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· Religious orientation and intensity of exertion  
 
I understand these characteristics as additional factors/antecedents of Turkey’s nation 
brand image and will utilize some of them for the sample design later on. However, a 
closer look at the distribution of positions towards Turkey largely blurs the cleanness 
of such a structural explanation. The following table summarizes the tendency of 
public opinion in the EU nations on Turkey and its EU membership.  
Rather in favour Mixed Rather against  
· Poland  
· Spain  
· Sweden  
· Slovenia 
· Hungary  
· Malta  
· UK  
· Portugal  
· France 
· Netherlands 
· Belgium  
· Germany 
· Denmark  
· Ireland 
· Austria 
· Czech Republic  
· Italy 
· Greece  
· Estonia 
· Republic of Cy-
prus 
· Latvia 
· Lithuania 
· Luxembourg 
· Slovakia 
· Finland  
Table 6-8: public opinion and political discourses on Turkey's EU membership 
Önis (2004) tried to make some sense of this distribution by a schematic comparison 
between different EU nation states. She – mostly unsuccessful – tried to find lines of 
division between parties and orientations such as visions of Europe's future, left and 
right axes, small vs. big, elite vs. individual citizens etc. A great number of easy-at-
hand-explanations fail:  
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· A large Turkish community might have some explanation in Germany, but 
does not provide reason for the comparably mild public opinion in the Neth-
erlands.  
· In the light of the repeatedly raised “Christian club” argument, strong Chris-
tian orientations as they are known for Spain should therefore potentially con-
tradict a strong backing for Turkey. However, Spain is rather in favor and a 
moreover secular country like the Czech Republic is rather against Turkey’s 
membership to the EU.  
· Also, while Austria and Hungary or Slovenia will probably share similar his-
torical experiences with Turks/Ottomans, in Austria Turkish membership is 
seen much more critical than in Hungary, while Slovenes are even welcoming 
Turkey’s membership by the majority.  
· And a large Muslim immigration history as the reason for rejecting Turkey’s 
request might hold for France but is contravened by the British position to-
wards Turkey.  
· Finally, not even acts of solidarity towards Turkey, as could be assumed for 
example from Mediterranean countries like Spain, Italy and Greece or from 
either newly joint member-states like Poland or Slovakia or remaining candi-
date countries like Romania, Bulgaria or Croatia, serve as a motive in ab-
sence of consistent patterns among such subgroups.  
· Only the strong support of Turkish citizens in Turkey and on the northern part 
of Cyprus do not surprise in the light of the hopes connected to EU Turkish 
membership.  
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It can be concluded that neither public opinion nor structural characteristics alone 
can be a satisfactory explanation of images held on Turkey’s EU accession. Both are 
important, but not sufficient in their explanatory value. They should therefore enter 
into the explanation of the more complex framework of the contextualized image as 
antecedents or consequences.  
 
It should be emphasized that images were identified to be dynamic over time. It 
therefore needs to be underlined that expressions of public opinion like e.g. the 
Eurobarometer need to be classified as temporary snapshots; they can not reveal any 
time dynamics and are limited in their explanatory value. 
 
For the further development of the theoretical framework for Turkey’s nation brand 
image the following new findings from the literature can be added. For the factors/ 
antecedents some new items were discovered and some previously known were re-
phrased. Some of them might be accounted for by the selected sampling strategy. As 
image content, for now the nation brand dimensions as they were found for Turkey in 
the literature shall be assumed. As consequences, potential voting behaviour in refer-
enda and general opinion formation towards the case of Turkey’s EU accession are 
proposed as output variables.  
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Figure 6-8: Contextual framework of Turkey’s nation brand image in EU contexts 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
 
The case of Turkey can not plea to stand pro toto for other nation brands, but it 
should be helpful to provide some more in-depth insights into the detailed settings 
and mechanisms of a nation brand in political contexts. In general the case method 
should be applied in such a way that specific understanding of the individual contexts 
is supplied providing the ground for subsequent wider interference. The first task of a 
case analysis consists of a deep description of all relevant aspects and facts, as shown 
in the previous chapter. The following data analysis comprises the steps of data col-
lection, categorical aggregation, identification of patterns and some generalizations 
from the findings, as suggested by Creswell (1998).  
In the following I will explain and reason the choice of the research, outline impor-
tant methodological decisions and introduce the conduct of data collection and data 
analysis.  
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7.1 Explorative approach  
 
This research project is in many regards surrounded by novel contexts. A general 
theory of nation brand image and public diplomacy is just evolving. Literature has 
mostly no theoretical depth, but rather practical value. Apart from the theoretical 
underdevelopment of the general research topic, also the case of Turkey’s nation 
brand image in the political context of the EU accession and the country trying to 
establish a sound public diplomacy concept has little sound foundation and just 
started to preoccupy some experts. Accordingly, previous activities displayed signifi-
cant limitations in the light of my approach, like  
· exploring broadly the general nation image of Turkey as groundwork (Ger, 
1991; Altinbasak Ebrem, 2004) 
· focussing on other dimensions of Turkey’s nation brand and ignoring the po-
litical context (Sönmez/Sirakaya, 2002; Baloglu/McCleary, 1999; 
Ger/Askegaard/Christensen, 1999) 
· centering on managerial questions, leaving aside outside perception 
(TÜ®KIYE, 2003) 
· containing methodological shortages in research design and execution in 
measures of quality science, paired with a lack in theoretical depth (An-
holt/GMI 2005a, b, c, d) 
· differently conceptualizing image constructs in non-managerial disciplinary 
backgrounds (Burçoglu, 2000) 
· employing neighboring concepts like public opinion or discourse analysis 
(Giannakopoulos/ Maras, 2005c; Eurobarometer, 2005a, b) 
· aiming only at practical, executional purposes (TÜSIAD, 2005) 
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· emphasizing tactical brand communication measures (Cha-
ban/Stats/Bain/Machin, 2005; Thompson, 2004b).  
 
The dominant goal of this research project is therefore the development of nation 
brand image theory for political contexts or the discipline of public diplomacy by 
applying it to the case of Turkey. Such an approach was not found in the literature 
before, and also at the practical end public diplomacy action in Turkey turned out to 
be in an infant state by the time the purpose of this research was developed.  
 
The novelty as well as the complex and multi-dimensional nature of the topic in my 
view not only justified the extensive literature analysis performed earlier, but also 
called for largely exploratory work in the case study with a corresponding qualitative 
research design.  
Existing quantitative data like Eurobarometer and other surveys provided behavioral 
data in a broad sense by collecting opinions that can be regarded as indicators of po-
tential voting behavior. However, they contained no information on motifs beyond 
opinion. Herein lays another reason to deeply explore the field and search for under-
lying patterns, constructs and motifs. The contextualized approach to the construct of 
image, emerging from the theoretical analysis, turned out to be eligible to provide 
such a broad account in order to understand and discover this area of Turkey’s EU 
accession process better.  
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7.2 Sampling decisions 
 
With the scope of this academic work being subject to certain time and budget condi-
tions, a primary research on Turkey’s nation brand image for all 25 EU member na-
tions seemed not feasible. The logistic efforts to investigate the entire population of 
all EU nations could not be dealt with in any available methodological setting.  
 
Consequently, drawing a purposeful sample based on the theoretical analysis was 
inevitable. Although this attempt can be easily criticized facing the tremendous com-
plexity of the analytical unit nation, it was assumed that especially the explorative 
setting would justify some unusual approaches. Therefore to allow for some transfer-
ability, not in the sense of generalizations for large-scale quantitative designs, but for 
the purpose of some wider inferences relating to the general questions under investi-
gations (Peräkylä, 2004), an operational manageable amount of in some regard proto-
typical countries out of the total of all present EU member countries was chosen. The 
sampling of the countries occurred along straight-forward macro-criteria derived 
from the theoretical discussion. From the 6 selected EU countries and Turkey 33 
informants were chosen as experts on Turkey’s image in their respective home coun-
tries.  
 
7.2.1 Sampling unit countries  
The current situation of the EU should be represented adequately in the sample. Ac-
cording to a report on the enlargement process “the three dominant axes in the EU 
[are] large versus small states, poor versus rich and federalists versus intergovern-
mentalists” (Independent Commission, 2004: 3). Media discourses suggested fur-
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thermore a general North-(Middle)-South divide throughout the EU (Altinbasak-
Ebrem, 2004) and differences in EU’s perception depending on the duration of the 
own country’s membership. These EU-related aspects should be applied in the sam-
pling procedure. 
 
For the specific case of Turkey, presence of Turkish immigrants, trade- and tourism-
relations between the countries and the dominant religion in the country in line with 
the literature promised to provide some explanatory power and were differentiated in 
the sampling grid.  
 
Leading to the choice of sampling criteria, a set of different guiding questions about 
the perception of Turkey’s EU accession in different types of EU countries was con-
sidered:  
· Turkey as a comparably large potential member-state might be perceived dif-
ferently in larger nations than in smaller nations. Large nations might see a 
rival, while smaller nations might fear being overwhelmed.  
· Inhabitants of economically potent countries might have different attitudes 
towards Turkey than inhabitants of economically weak countries. Turkey will 
mean a financial burden to the community, and the ones who have to carry 
the main burden might feel more effected.  
· People from countries belonging to the intergovermentalist wing might per-
ceive EU enlargement (broadening) different than citizens from nations being 
proponents of federalist standpoint (in favour of deepening).  
· Attitudes towards Turkey might vary by the general geographic position of 
the country in Europe. Closeness to Turkey or a similar Mediterranean setting 
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could lead to different perceptions than in a distant and largely different na-
tion.  
· Citizens from an established country in the EU might think differently about 
Turkey as a potential member state than a new member from the most recent 
enlargement round. The elder members have more to lose, while the new 
members still enjoy the “honeymoon” of being associated with EU.  
· The dominant religion of the nations might influence the perception of Tur-
key and the EU accession. People from mainly protestant nations might de-
velop different standpoints than citizens of dominantly catholic member-
states.  
· People from an EU country with a significant group of immigrants of Turkish 
descent within its citizenry will develop different perceptions of Turkey than 
people from a country that has no established links in such a sense to Turkey. 
Knowledge shapes perception.  
· Similarly, citizens from countries maintaining intense trade- or tourism rela-
tions to Turkey might hold different images of Turkey with regard to its EU 
accession than inhabitants of countries with only few such contact points to 
Turkey.  
 
Across these categories, a balanced choice of nations should facilitate an analysis of 
Turkey’s image in the EU as detailed as necessary and as complex as possible.  
 
A sample of 6 countries out of all 25 EU countries was taken. This sample size 
seemed feasible, but at the same time allowed for enough variation to potentially 
detect common patterns. The guiding questions discussed above were operational-
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ized by the nine criteria size46, wealth47, EURO-acceptance48, geographical region49, 
main religious orientation50, lasting of the nation’s EU membership51, share of popu-
lation with Turkish migration background52, and trade53- and tourism54-involvement 
with Turkey. The sample of Netherlands, Germany, UK, Spain, Sweden and Slove-
nia showed decent distribution across the chosen criteria.  
 
Country  Size Wealth Euro Region EU mem-
bership  
Religion Turkish 
population 
Trade Tourism 
Netherlands  Small Rich Yes Central Old Mixed Large Middle Middle 
Germany Large Rich Yes Central Old Mixed Large High High 
UK Large  Rich No North Medium Mixed Small High High 
Spain Large Poor Yes South Medium Cath. Small Middle Low 
Sweden Small Rich  No  North Medium Prot.  Small Low Middle 
Slovenia  Small  Poor No  South New  Cath. Small Low Low 
Table 7-9: Sample of EU member-states  
 
The literature review furthermore suggested paying attention to the self-image of a 
nation as one possible explanation for its perception. The overlaps between inside 
and outside of a nation brand had been underlined. Turkey was therefore also in-
cluded in the sample, serving as a control group and providing additional compara-
tive indicators.  
                                                 
46 measured in number of inhabitants, above 35 Mio=”large”, below 35 Mio=”small”, source: EURO-
STAT 
47 in GDP per capita, according to the EUROSTAT index of EU 25=100 (above 100 =”rich” or below 
100 =”poor”) 
48 since no adequate means to comparably assess the “intergovernmentalist vs. federalist”-distinction 
are available, EURO membership (which was mostly the result of referenda in the EU member states) 
is taken as rough indicator of the general EU perspective in the nations.  
49 Differentiated in North, (Scandinavia, Great Britain, Ireland and the Baltic States), Central (Conti-
nental Europe north of the Alps) and South (Mediterranean countries or countries with similar lati-
tudes).   
50 Indicated by more than 50% of the population sharing one dominant religion, source: CIA factbook. 
51 The six founding members of EU in 1957 were referred to as “old”, successive accessions in the 
enlargement rounds before the opening to former East Block countries as “middle”, and “new” refers 
to the 10 member states entering in 2004.  
52 Percentage of country’s population with Turkish nationality or first generation EU naturalized 
population with Turkish roots, with >0,5% indicating large Turkish population and < 0,5% indicating 
small Turkish population, sources: EUROSTAT, ZfT 
53 Related to the country’s rank in Turkey’s foreign trade (imports and exports) balance, “high” = Top 
5; “middle” = 6-20; “low”= below 20; source: DIE 
54 Expressed by the rank of the country in the number of Tourists visiting Turkey;  high” = Top 5; 
“middle” = 6-20; “low”= below 20; source: DIE 
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7.2.2 Sampling unit experts  
General units of analysis were the nations in the EU. Within these, specific interest 
was directed towards the knowledge structures to be found in the public.  
Which sub-units of analysis could generate successful learning about the publics of 
these chosen countries? The alternatives were to either asking the publics directly or 
inquiring about them. Both approaches were considered. Asking them directly would 
require enormous resources, especially if done in a manner that would allow for de-
cent statistical inference. Putting aside the criteria developed for generalization in the 
quantitative research domain, the approach to have knowledgeable others refer to the 
respective countries’ publics especially aroused some interest.  
 
The sources needed to provide very intensely bundled and highly aggregated sub-
stance information. For the exploratory purposes of this thesis, it was therefore de-
cided to commence with collecting data from especially knowledgeable informants. 
The goal was to generate and analyze the main discourses underlying the opinion 
formation expressed in surveys. As sources of information, experts from different 
fields like politics, marketing or media were chosen.  
 
The theoretical review clearly pointed out the multidisciplinary background of the 
issue. Most obviously, the areas where marketing and politics meet and should be 
taken into account in the sample design. But, in the light of current sociological theo-
ries, the relevant domains should be considered broader than that.  
 
Modern societies have carefully separated different domains under the cultural 
sphere. Specifically, culture was separated into the social, the political and the eco-
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nomic. “Each domain or sphere of cultural activity […] developed its own norms and 
institutions through which affairs were regulated and performed within that sphere” 
(Askegaard/Firat, 1996: 3). 
 
The economic domain, holding strong stakes not only in modern marketing practises, 
but also covering issues of trade, labour migration, economical and monetary stabil-
ity etc. without doubt is an important angle to look at Turkey’s EU accession.  
Obviously, standpoints from the political domain needed to be included in the sam-
ple. Ideally, these political informants would not be fully constrained by dominant 
party blinders. Experts from think tanks, consultancies or from governmental institu-
tions beyond the competitive daily political routines like embassies appeared quali-
fied. 
 
Finally, one must pay heed to the social domain. Media representatives such as 
broadly knowledgeable correspondents could take on the role of informants in this 
domain. But also, even if those interviews were referred to as expert interviews, the 
representation of “everyday-life” explaining the social implications of Turkey’s EU 
accession in the respective countries should be ensured by having some rather unre-
flected voices in the sample. These expatriates will be interesting as long as they still 
fulfil a bridge function between the cultures; that means they still need to be in con-
tact with both home and host countries.  
 
It was furthermore intended to distribute some brand professionals like advertisers 
and marketing communication experts, entrepreneurs, PR-experts and political mar-
keters among the sample, not necessarily for every country, but generally among the 
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entire group of experts. Apart from their knowledge on Turkey they served as source 
of information about the practical pursuit of brand management for nations in politi-
cal contexts.  
 
7.2.3 Accession of informants  
Access to the informants was reached through both systematic inquiry and snowball 
effects. In the systematic part, informants from the domains were researched who 
could refer to the mainstream discourses (typical and normal) in their home countries 
(Cresswell, 1998). Entering the field with the help of the embassies in Ankara turned 
out quite helpful.  
The snowball sampling effect occurred when some special information-rich infor-
mants were recommended. Two very helpful key informants served as main gate-
keepers to the different domains in Turkey and the EU countries. They not only drew 
the researcher’s attention to important sources, but also oftentimes helped to con-
nect.55 
 
The following sample of informants was finally accessed. The goal was to represent 
at least 3 of the 4 distinguished domains of every country in the sample.56 Short por-
traits of the experts are found in the appendix.  
 
 
                                                 
55 Dr. Thomas Bagger, head of PR and communication at the German embassy in Ankara, helped 
greatly to reach experts of the EU countries in Turkey and in Europe, and the general secretary at the 
Turkish Association of Advertising Agencies in Istanbul, Aysegül Molu, linked to important Turkish 
informants. In addition, media observation provided valuable inputs for choosing knowledgeable 
informants.  
56 For Spain and Slovenia this aim could not be accomplished. The community of expatriates in Tur-
key is quite small in both cases and the effort to find and interview a knowledgeable expert in Spain or 
Slovenia was not feasible. In both cases, the interviews with the existing informants were very rich 
and multi-sided, so they were assumed to provide a sufficient data-base for the further analysis, corre-
sponding to recommendations in the in-depth interviewing literature (Creswell, 2003).  
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 Netherlands Germany United 
Kingdom 
Spain Sweden Slovenia  Turkey  Others 
Polit. van Haaften Polenz 
Kramer 
Mc Cor-
mick 
De la 
Pena 
Asp  Grasseli Zapsu 
Sungar 
Özcelik 
Parker 
Econ.   Leoprechting 
Stauss 
Anderson Kärre  Yücaoglu 
Molu 
Boyner  
 
Social  Verhoeven Özbali  
Ligero-
Cofrade  Achouri Kovsc 
Krzan 
Petelinkar 
Arikan  
Media  Nieuwboer Schlötzer Jones    Zaman 
Ural 
Pope 
Table 7-10: Sample of informants 
 
The informants were all reached via e-mail, often after some initial phone calls. In 
the e-mail a short exposition of the research project and the involved institutions was 
given as well as a brief description of the researcher’s background. Letters of rec-
ommendation were attached. Targeting mostly quite occupied professionals, setting a 
date and a venue for the interviews turned out to be the most challenging part.  
 
As not uncommon for interviews with professionals (Legard/Keegan/Ward, 2003: 
166), ideal time conditions for in-depth interviews as postulated in the literature on 
in-depth interviews (e.g. McCracken, 1998) could not be provided. The time-slots of 
the interviews ranged between 20 and 90 minutes. Especially for the very short talks 
(mostly with politicians or high-ranked informants from the economic domain) a 
prioritization within the topic guide and often sacrifice of deep iterative probing was 
indispensable. Rearrangements of the interviews were mostly impossible, since it 
was generally already quite a task to arrange a first date. However, the professional 
experience of most informants often compensated for missing opportunities to longer 
assimilate or deeper probe and turned out as a fair trade-off.  
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7.3 Critical assessment of the research design  
 
The two-step sampling sequence of first choosing countries and then informants can 
be considered heterogeneous and homogeneous at the same time. Heterogeneity, 
aiming at the critical cases providing some explanation of deviant public opinion 
across the EU, was pursued by selecting the countries along the main axes of differ-
ence within the EU. The choice of knowledgeable experts from the field in contrast 
was rather homogeneous; all informants were required to possess an exceptionally 
high knowledge of Turkey. In this, the sampling resembled the claim to develop the-
ory with some application and testing quite well.  
 
Authenticity of expert informants served as one criterion of reliability. Since gener-
ally all of them were highly involved with the research question, authentic data and 
positive influences towards aspects like trustworthiness and other validity questions 
could be assumed (Wallendorf/Belk, 1989). 
 
Triangulation across different domains like social, political, economic and media 
accounted for trustworthiness of the research in terms of credibility. The prolonged 
visit to the field by the researcher, engaging with the issue in its broader context 
(media observation both in Turkey and in some EU-countries provided some sup-
plemental datasets) for more than two years, additionally contributed to the integrity 
of the information (Wallendorf/Belk, 1989).  
The external validity of this study in terms of generalizing to and across populations 
was of course per se limited by the research design, as mostly the case with qualita-
tive approaches.  
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Reactivity by the informants was regarded as a potential threat to the construct valid-
ity (Shadish/Cook/Campbell, 2002); it was presumed to potentially occur resulting 
from a foreigner dealing with more or less national affairs of Turkey. Especially in 
times when recurring waves of nationalism catch hold of this nation, discussing Tur-
key’s reputation in the EU the presence of a foreigner could have been suspected to 
lead to over- or underreporting according to the informant’s position. The EU en-
counters some prejudices from Turkish public and the area of politics, being blamed 
to overrule the country and cutting off national sovereignty. Taking on a neutral, ob-
serving role and avoiding any clear-cut positions in debates was a decidedly appro-
priate behaviour. Also, the expert status of the informants and their experience with 
foreigners turned out to minimize this validity threat.  
 
Language problems were considered as another validity-related threat or limitation. 
The researchers’ knowledge of Turkish was not sufficient to use the language in any 
meaningful way within this research project. Interviews had to be conducted in Eng-
lish and German. By this limitation, of course also the choice of informants was re-
stricted. In Turkish business world, in foreign politics and in the Expatriate commu-
nity, however, English turned out to be wide spread at a proficient level and lead to a 
sufficient population from which to sample.  
 
On the other hand, the fact that a foreign researcher looked at Turkey bore many ad-
vantages. Not only did the situation provide a comfortable outsider position and thus 
ensured an approximation to some ‘natural’ objectivity, it also opened many doors 
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and lead presumably to a substantial advantage compared to the situation a Turkish 
researcher might have experienced. 
 
Finally internal validity was endangered by the topicality of the subject. Analyzing a 
current issue, which is evolving daily, always bears the potential to produce biases 
simply by events influencing the comparability of measurements in time. For this 
research project therefore the announcement to open EU accession talks with Turkey 
in December 17, 2004 and the confirmation on October 3, 2005 served as essential 
conditions and cornerstones; they ensured stable political contexts at least with re-
spect to strategic issues for the time of the research project. Current issues kept pop-
ping up throughout the entire process of data collection, but had no influence since 
the perspective focused on the long-term horizon of 10-15 years of negotiation pe-
riod.  
 
Considering potential ethical challenges from the fact that political opinions were 
uttered during the data collection, informed consent was established by fully display-
ing scope and intention of the research. Experts were not promised anonymity, since 
in many cases it is also their name and their prominent/special position that valued 
the information. However all informants were informed about the usage of the in-
formation and declared their approval for recording, transcription and analysis of the 
interviews.  
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7.4 Interview design  
 
The data-collection was conducted by semi-structured interviews following a guide-
line derived from the literature analysis and resembling the theoretical framework. 
The topic guide contained a sequencing of four different sections, which was in-
tended to ensure motivation and tension throughout the interview. Each section ide-
ally lasted at most 20 min., so that the interview could be finish within 1,5 hrs at max 
while still having a comfortable ‘time buffer’. Due to the special time constraints of 
the informants mentioned above, the guideline also included some prioritization. 
With limited time slots, most important aspects and sections were covered first and 
some deeper elaborations and probing were omitted.  
 
The funnelling design progressed from general to more specific and nicely framed 
the most intense discussion by unthreatening entries and easy exits (Arthur/Nazroo, 
2003). Two playful tasks framed the session, ensuring a nice and fun start and pro-
viding some extra motivation at the possibly tiresome end. The analytic and most 
rational part of the session took place in the two middle sections, so that all in all a 
good balance between analytical and emotional components was accomplished. All 
three structural dimensions of attitudes/images, affective, cognitive and conative 
were integrated successively in the flow of the interview.  
 
7.4.1 Flow of the interview  
In the introduction, a short overview of the research was given to ease the setting of 
the interview, but also to outline the framework of expectation in order to reaffirm 
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the “interview contract” (Legard/Keegan/Ward, 2003: 146-147). At the same time, 
issues concerning confidentiality and recording were discussed.  
 
In section 1 the actual image content of the nation brand Turkey, as held in the in-
formants’ minds, was to be distilled. Applying the image concept in a marketing 
sense was expected to mean a challenge to the participants; it was questionable if 
information could be gathered decently, when the informants would be consciously 
reflecting on it.  
For problems like that, projective methods are often a good solution. This technique 
bears the potential to elicit unconsciously held attributes and encourages both emo-
tional and rational reactions to an issue (Boddy, 2004). They allow the respondent to 
project him- or herself into a context beyond the limitations of a more-direct ques-
tioning; also, the research goal is disguised.  
Two specific objectification techniques seemed quite helpful to approach the image 
dimensions of Turkey perceived by the participants, personification and brand refer-
ence (Levy, 1985). A personification task asked the participants to profile Turkey. 
They had to generate associations and attributes of the brand Turkey by describing 
the personality, the look, the habits or the preferences of a prototypical Mr. or Mrs. 
Turkey. As a back-up strategy, the description of an animal that would typically rep-
resent Turkey was offered.  
A second step, going more concrete into the direction of the notion of seeing Turkey 
as a brand, consisted of drawing a parallel between the country brand market and the 
car brand market. The participants were challenged to express Turkey as a car brand 
within the set of car brands. They were asked to describe the car and elicited their 
own reasoning behind choosing this analogy. In the case of knowledge shortages on 
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car brands, the analogy to fashion brands was prepared to provide a similar effect. 
The projectives were placed at the beginning of the interview to not have them bi-
ased by deeper reflection in other parts of the interview.  
After this introductory stage the interviewee was asked to make assumptions on po-
tential answers by the group he was representing. By doing so the informant not only 
self-evaluated his own representativness or possible biases, but was also tempted to 
articulate stereotypes within this group and to ventilate possible conditions for 
judgements. The range of possible strategies by the informant seemed large – he 
could choose clear-cut distinction from his countrymen as well as identification with 
the group he is representing. All different sorts of probes were applied to ensure 
these distinctions and explanations were made profoundly and some breadth and 
depth of explanation was achieved (Legard/Keegan/Ward, 2003). 
 
From this point, the second section focussed on the analysis of the antecedents of 
Turkey’s nation brand image by concretely assessing and attributing certain facets of 
the brand Turkey like export products, tourist destination, FDI object, science place 
or political image. The participants should differentiate the general image they had 
described before into more detailed aspects. They were also challenged to verbalize 
concretely and directly what they expressed indirectly during the projective methods 
before. In line with brand image theory a balance of presumably rational facets of 
Turkey’s nation brand image like investment opportunities or export products and 
rather emotional areas like tourism or culture/people was intended.  
 
Section 3 was designed to elicit potential consequences of Turkey’s image on the EU 
accession process. Again, the line of thinking was quite straightforward and built up 
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on the findings of earlier sections. The questions dealt with the impact of the image 
on negotiations and on voting behaviour. At the same time, the political image of 
Turkey was intended to be elucidated in this section.  
Although the anticipation of potential voting behaviour seemed quite tricky at first 
sight, the situation itself was not too unusual to the informants. Many surveys ask for 
potential voting behaviour, mostly inquiring party preferences in designs like “if next 
Sunday would be election day”, and provide mostly reliable forecasts.  
 
From these abstract analysis’, in the final section the participants were put again into 
a creative role. They were called upon to sketch very practically potential means or 
instruments that could be employed to positively influence Turkey’s image. As one 
of the most probable answers something like “advertising” was anticipated. As a fun 
part for most informants, the participants therefore were asked to text a slogan or 
choose a key visual for an advertising campaign promoting Turkey’s EU accession. 
It provided a playful opportunity to summarize and weight all issues under discus-
sion (Arthur/Nazroo, 2003). Embedding this task, some implications of managing the 
nation brand Turkey were touched on. 
 
After the interview, apart from profound thanks for the participation, some views on 
the contribution of the interview were provided as important aspects while moving 
away from the interview (Legard/Keegan/Ward, 2003). Also, some queries towards 
the interviewer, which were not answered during the interview itself, could be taking 
care of.  
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7.4.2 topic guide  
An extensive topic guide including the wordings of important questions (and their 
rewording in case of misunderstandings) was prepared and improved continuously 
throughout the interviewing period. The following scheme summarizes the sequence 
of the topics57.  
 
Introduction 
· Research focus 
· Personal situation: involvement in Turkey and home country  
· Discussion of relationship between countries 
Section 1: Projectives (Image content)  
· Personification or animal analogies 
· Brand analogies (fashion, cars)  
· Balancing of stereotypes and individual perception 
Section 2: Analysis of antecedents 
· Image dimensions with rational focus: export products, FDI 
· Image dimensions with emotional focus: tourism, people/culture 
· Reflection of judgements (individual vs. collective) 
Section 3: Consequences for EU accession process 
· Potential referenda voting 
· Impact of political images 
· Harmful and favorable issues 
Section 4: Managerial implications/summary 
· Main messages for Turkey  
                                                 
57 The initial wording of the topic guideline can be found in the appendix.  
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· Creative verbal and visual associations  
· Brand Management tasks  
 
 
7.5 Interview conduction and data analysis  
 
The topic guide was pre-tested with a Turkish journalist and with a German expatri-
ate to ensure the issues are understood and the technicalities of the interview work 
for both professional and non-professional and also insiders and outsiders of the 
brand Turkey. Also, an assessment of the duration of the interview was accomplished 
to be able to negotiate with the largely time-constraint informants (Mar-
shall/Rossman, 1989). One test interview was successful enough to qualify for the 
database of this thesis.  
 
The interviews were conducted between June 2005 and February 2006 in Turkey and 
some European countries. Languages of the interviews were English and German. As 
expected with these sorts of informants, accessibility and scheduling turned out to be 
a challenge. Yet, as indicated, both the status as a foreigner for some Turkish infor-
mants and the significant support by the two key informants helped to accomplish 33 
in-depth interviews, which provides an extensive valid and reliable dataset for the 
further analysis.  
 
All interviews were digitally recorded and fully transcribed. Additionally, field notes 
of the interviews were kept as supplementary data sources in line with recommenda-
tions from the literature (McCracken, 1998; Marshall/Rossman, 1989). Where re-
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quired, the transcripts of the interviews were sent back to the informants asking for 
authorization.  
The following analysis of the data followed most common recommendations for 
qualitative research in social sciences (Janesick, 2004; McCracken, 1998; Creswell, 
1998; Coffey/Atkinson, 1996). 
 
In a first general overview, all transcripts and field notes were read carefully to ob-
tain a sense of the overall data. Misunderstandings and errors in the transcriptions 
were corrected. Irritations relating to the content were solved by confirming the re-
spective statements with the informants where possible.  
 
To reduce the data, categories and codes for the further analysis were developed. The 
coding process occurred in three steps.  
 
First, in an open coding phase the main themes emerging from the data were identi-
fied by labelling the important sections in the transcripts and later harmonising the 
codes over all interviews. Independent of the interview’s language, the coding oc-
curred in English.  
 
Secondly, axial coding organized the connections of the main themes among each 
other and with the concepts in the literature. The codes for every transcribed inter-
view were sorted into one of the following 15 categories covering the most insightful 
patterns as suggested by the data.  
· General image content seen by informant 
· Particularities of Turkey and informant’s background 
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· Stereotypical characteristics of Turkey 
· Explanatory approaches for image content and stereotypes  
· Special conditions/domestic issues debated in the country  
· Tourism image  
· Made in Turkey/FDI 
· Political image 
· Science/People/Culture 
· Remarks about referenda/Voting scenario  
· Positioning of Turkey’s nation brand 
· Tactics/actions to be taken by Turkey 
· Main messages of Turkey’s nation brand 
· Illustrative key visuals/icons 
· Outlook on Turkey’s EU accession  
 
These individual analyses were collected and aggregated on the level of the seven 
countries in the sample to develop some generalizations. The information gathered 
for each category from the informants of each country was summarized in a short 
trend statement. These trend statements were compared country by country, continu-
ously going back to the dataset to confirm meaningful differences or things in com-
mon. 
 
To prepare the write-up, selective coding was employed to generate the most relevant 
aspects for the findings summary. Doing so, the theoretical framework developed in 
the first part of the thesis was applied for the dataset. The aspects suggesting the best 
explanatory values for the research questions were selected. At the same time, most 
 162 
appropriate direct quotes were picked from the data. The chosen German quotes were 
translated to English by the author. Finally the findings were contrasted with results 
of previous research projects in the context of this thesis.  
 
A summary of findings is provided in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
FINDINGS: TURKEY’S NATION BRAND IMAGE IN THE EU AC-
CESSION CONTEXTS 
 
 
 
The analysis of the explorative data from the expert interviews lead to insightful 
findings in all three pillars of the research question: content, antecedents/conditions 
and consequences of Turkey’s nation brand image in the context of the EU accession 
process. Compared the framework developed before, I will shift the order and first 
summarize the generated image content and later explicate potential factors or condi-
tions influencing the image content.  
The results are matched not only with theory, but also with appropriate secondary 
statistical material, the literature and the theoretical framework developed before-
hand.  
 
With regard to the methodological setting, this investigation does not claim to pro-
vide generally valid causations of the phenomena. The goal is moreover to approxi-
mate potential explanations for future theory application and testing approaches.  
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8.1 Image Content and Brand Dimensions  
 
The interviews treated this question twofold. On the one hand, with the help of pro-
jective techniques, overall perceptions of Turkey in the chosen EU countries were 
elicited both for the individual expert and for his home country. On the other hand, 
singular dimensions of the nation brand Turkey were examined in more detail.  
 
8.1.1 General image content of Turkey  
The overall image of Turkey in the eyes of the Dutch experts is not very good; how-
ever the more recent improvements are highlighted. While one expert grants gener-
ally solid quality of the country brand, another opinion finds the look better than the 
substance. With the metaphors “family” or “colourful”, the multidimensionality of 
Turkey is expressed, which makes a general assessment very challenging. The popu-
lation in the Netherlands does not hold a favourable image of Turkey in the assess-
ment of the informants. 
The general image held by the German informants noticeably centres upon Turkey’s 
youth. Also, the multitude of different generations or life-styles under one brand um-
brella is repeatedly mentioned. The posh-ness and vibrancy of Istanbul is a dominant 
picture in the German experts’ opinions. The image in the German population is re-
ported rather negative by the informants.  
The common image of Turkey held by the British experts in the sample is mainly 
economic orientated, at the same time revealing current dynamism of chance and 
focusing on openness and developing tolerance within Turkish society. There is also 
an awareness of problem areas and moreover negative Turkish characteristics like the 
 165 
emotional temper, strong nationalism and threats it causes to neighbours. Generally, 
however, Turkey’s nation brand image seems to be rather good among the British 
population.  
Among the Spanish experts the strength and pride of the Turks and Turkey are held 
as dominant overall images. At the same time also distrust and lying, and the domi-
nance of sly foxes were mentioned. The initial friendliness is unmasked as a façade 
beyond which some doubts concerning reliability are expressed. For the Spanish 
population a rather good image of Turkey was informed. 
The Swedish experts’ general image of Turkey revealed the notion of good looks 
with underlying quality problems, which yet seem fixable. From the political side, 
Turkey was granted good stamina and persistence, whereas the everyday, social per-
spective was rather doubtful about the endurance and speed of changes in Turkey. 
The Swedish population seems rather undecided towards Turkey. Neither a particular 
bad nor a especially good image was reported.  
Turkey’s general image as held in the mind of the Slovenian experts is rather diffuse. 
Common image problems addressed directly are poverty and women issues. Also the 
Slovenes seem to take a rather neutral stance towards Turkey in terms of an overall 
image in the population.  
The self-perception of the Turkish experts underlines the great potential of the coun-
try. It is well-working and reliable, but not very attractive, although it desires to be 
seen as world class. The nation brand is more colourful and complex than it appears 
at first sight.  
 
In spring 2005 the internationally well-known nation brand consultant and researcher 
Simon Anholt introduced a new instrument called the “Nation Brand Index” (NBI). 
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In the four quarterly reports published so far (Anholt/GMI 2005 a, b, c, d) Turkey 
has never left the last rank of the list, which grew from 11 to 35 countries over the 
year.58 In an online panel representative samples59 were asked to judge the other 
countries on six areas of national competence: tourism, exports, governance, invest-
ment and immigration, culture and heritage and people (Anholt/GMI 2005c: 1-2).  
In the Nation Brand Index Q3 (Anholt/NBI, 2005c) Turkey’s perceptions from other 
European countries were dramatically low: “It is a concern that, despite Turkey now 
having started EU accession talks, ordinary consumers in several of its future Euro-
pean partner states put it bottom overall, including Spain, France, Germany, Den-
mark and Italy.” (Anholt/NBI, 2005c: 19).  
Anholt argues that Turkey is more of a “blank canvas” (Anholt, 2005d: 1) due to the 
fact that only few people have any direct experience with the country, its products or 
its people, which means the country is not very relevant to them. This result is not 
necessarily in line with the findings of my research.  
“Turkey is not a white piece. Turkey is a gray piece. That’s the problem if 
you ask me. White piece means there is no perception.” (Molu)60 
 
Anholt’s thesis holds for countries like Spain or Slovenia in my sample, it clearly 
does not hold for Germany, Netherlands, UK or Sweden. The deviation can be ex-
plained that Anholt judges from a global sample, which indeed might be largely low-
involved (if at all) with Turkey.  
 
 
                                                 
58 It must be pointed out that the list applied so far consists of large and presumably well-known coun-
tries; moreover until now Turkey was the only predominantly Muslim country included in the panel 
(Anholt/GMI, 2005c: 19) 
59 1.000 representative samples (3% error margin) based on age, gender and where applicable geo-
graphical region, race and ethnicity were collected from 10 (Anholt/NBI, 2005a,b) to 35 (Anholt/NBI, 
2005d) countries. 
60 Names in brackets after direct quotations without any further specification refer to the interviewee. 
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8.1.2 Tourism  
The tourism image in the Netherlands centres on cheap sun&beach holidays, which 
are seen as accessible luxury even for lower class people. The friendliness of the 
hosts is an important facet for the Dutch targets groups.  
Similarly, good service, top value for money and the friendliness as the people factor 
are often recalled when referring to Turkey’s tourism image in Germany.  
Tourist image of Turkey in the UK is unanimously positive, relating especially to the 
quality of the beaches, the good weather and the service quality.  
For Spaniards, Turkey seems not known as a mass market; in the niche as a cultural 
destination a quite positive image prevails; in the lower segment sun&beach market 
some rivalry to Spain is seen.  
In Sweden, Turkey’s tourism image is again quite positive (explicit attention is di-
rected to the beauty of the country, the hospitability and the affordability of holi-
days).  
In Slovenia, the tourism image sees Turkey competing with Croatia or Spain in 
cheap charter sun&beach league; however there is an interesting positioning of Is-
tanbul as the party capital for young Slovenes to head for. Repeatedly an exotic char-
acter is stated.  
In the self-image of the Turkish informants Tourism image of Turkey is portrayed 
quite positively; especially the combination of culture and sun/beach vacations is 
underlined. 
 
The brand core for the tourism destination theoretically developed by Turkish experts 
during the TÜ®KIYE project in 2003 sees Turkey as a “fair and reasonable choice”; 
the place mainly attracts the 3S-tourists “sun, shore/beach and sea” and the USP is 
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put as: “the cheapest green and blue in the Mediterranean” (TÜ®KIYE, 2003: 27). 
The sun&beach dominance and the low price positioning are similar to my findings.  
Throughout the Nation Brand Index reports of 2005, Turkey’s best scores derived 
from the area of tourism (Anholt/GMI, 2005 a, b, c, d). However Anholt finds that 
this brand dimension cannot out power other messages: “Even in tourism, the area 
where most people must surely have positive associations with Turkey, the message 
is failing to get through” (Anholt, 2005d: 2).  
 
8.1.3 Products 
Apart from Turkish food that encounters a slight boom, not a clear image can be 
connected to exports made in Turkey in the Netherlands. Similarly in the German 
market-place products from Turkey except food and textiles seem not visible, espe-
cially not brands with a clear reference to the country-of-origin which could shape a 
nation’s image.  
Except some growing awareness of Turkey’s exports in the white goods segment, 
products “Made in Turkey” seem also still largely unknown in the UK. In Spain, 
textile products from Turkey enjoy quite a good image, yet the trade relations are 
mostly unbranded;  
Distinct images of the nation brand Turkey as an exporter are not detectable in Swe-
den.  
In Slovenia products from Turkey mainly stand for “cheap”; an illustrative analogy is 
made seeing Turkey as the China of Europe referring to the low quality of the goods 
produced. In general however the trade infrastructures between the two countries are 
not well developed yet with only few contact points. An interesting phenomenon 
currently takes place in the food sector where a Kebab culture from Turkey is just 
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emerging (compared to the overly mature Turkish fast-food markets in other Euro-
pean countries). 
The Turkish experts regard “Made in Turkey” as a great potential, which is currently 
underdeveloped and underestimated by the West 
 
In the corresponding literature, especially complaints from TÜSIAD that economic 
progress of Turkey and the improved quality of export goods is not realized by the 
broad public can be found (Dogan, 2005a: 34). The dominant awareness of Turkey is 
producer of agrarian or simple industrial goods, reliable, but not surprising; in terms 
of export products, this nation brand seems to play in the league of China, Malaysia 
or similar Far Eastern economies and North African nations (TÜ®KIYE 2003: 30). 
My research underlines this underpositioning of Turkey’s nation brand in the area of 
export products; interestingly enough, a Slovenian informant repeated precisely the 
analogy to China. 
My research found that textiles are the dominant product category, a conclusion that 
is backed by Anholt’s data, but in general “none of the Turkish brands […] have yet 
achieved enough fame in Europe, North America or the Asia-Pacific region to have 
improved the reputation of their country of origin” (Anholt, 2005d: 2).  
 
8.1.4 Investments 
In the Netherlands, Turkey slowly gains a reputation as an investment market, nega-
tively biased though by harmful circumstances such as corruption and tenacious bu-
reaucracy. Dutch education system sees the potential of Turkish youth as customers. 
But in general fear of labor migration overshadows images related to any economic 
exchange. German industry and trade quite enthusiastically receive the business plat-
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form of Turkey, apart from some infra-structural problems that seem solvable. The 
image of Turkey as an investment market starts to gain positive profile also in the 
UK, supported by some spectacular successful British showcases. The main draw-
backs pertain to the uncertain legal and administrative framework as well as concerns 
about corruption. In Spain an image as an industry economy seems not in sight for 
Turkey. Similarly in Sweden no specific image of Turkey as an investment market 
seems developed. By the Turkish experts the long-term potential of Turkey attracting 
FDIs is highlighted. As a threat to this encouraging scenario the country’s education 
problem are repeatedly brought up.  
 
TÜ®KIYE (2003: 31) emphasizes the unsteady, uncontrolled and unfocussed charac-
ter of Turkey’s nation brand when regarded as an investment object. Related to the 
unstable economy and the uncontrolled inflation, investors encounter Turkey with 
some scepticism. Although my findings confirm some restraints towards the Turkish 
infrastructure, comparably more enthusiasm about investing in Turkey was found. 
Most probably some of the positive signs Turkey’s economy has been recently dis-
seminating are reflected in this deviation.  
 
8.1.5 People/Culture 
Especially in the UK, the friendliness and open-mindedness of Turkish people was 
mentioned. In countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden the image of the 
Turks was notably volatile between the perceptions of Turkish immigrants and the 
image Turkish people reveal as hosts in holiday regions. In Spain, typical character 
traits like pride were mentioned, while in Slovenia some rather neutral stances to-
wards Turkish people were taken.  
 171 
All in all, the characterization of Turkey’s people delivered quite a diffuse picture.  
 
In particular sport was found in my research to bear the potential source of sustain-
able images for Turkey, both negatively and positively. Soccer events like e.g. the 
hosting of the Champions League final in 2005, but also the lost bid on the Olympics 
2008 in Istanbul contributed to the “cultural image” of Turkey in the broadest sense.  
 
This is partly in line with Dogan who highlights some rather recent events to be iden-
tified with Turkey, “which have helped in eroding the ‘barbarous Turk’ image 
[…and] which have made Turkey seem ‘loveable’ within the EU” (Dogan, 2005b: 
1), like e.g.:  
· Turkey ‘s third place in the 2002 Football World Cup 
· Sertab Erener victory of the Eurovision singing contest in 2003 
· German-Turkish film director Fatih Akin winning major prices.  
 
Current cultural activities and arts were not very obtrusive in my findings. Tradi-
tional culture was detected to interplay with tourism aspects. 
 
Turkish people and the influences of Turkish migration are also discussed in the lit-
erature as an important factor of Turkey’s perception. The author and novelist Orhan 
Pamuk was quoted for the case of Germany: “It seems as if the Germans – by know-
ing the Turks in Germany – have lost any interest related to the Turks in Turkey” 
(Rosenkranz, 2004b: 82). The brand dimension people/culture will have to be differ-
entiated in more detail later on.  
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8.1.6 Politics 
In the Netherlands, human rights issues and recently the Pamuk case were associated 
with the political image of Turkey. In general, a division between the political spec-
trum that fully supports Turkey’s bid across all relevant parties, and the public hold-
ing reservations is visible. The political image of Turkey in Germany is somewhat 
split between fear and support – fear of religious fundamentalism, the size, labor mi-
gration, high national self-esteem, democratic shortcomings and general xenophobia, 
and support on the other hand for the substantial reform process, economic prospects 
and the strategic perspective referring to stability issues.  
In the UK, the political image of Turkey is quite positive. With support for EU ac-
cession across all parties, also the majority of the population holds a good image of 
Turkey. Relationships to Turkey are seen as a chance to engage in the Muslim world. 
Turkey’s political image is also quite good in Spain, and favorable in the context of 
the general EU perspective. The economic points (and Turkey’s consolidation proc-
ess) seem decisive while cultural or religious aspects appear negligible.  
For Sweden, human rights issues and minority treatments occupy the largest space in 
the perception of the political player Turkey.  
In Slovenia, Turkey’s EU accession seems almost not to take place in the political 
discourse. Some issues of matter are labor migration, fear of financial burdens or low 
trust in reform process, but all of them are dealt with at a low-key level and they 
don’t pay into a substantial political image of Turkey held in Slovenia.  
In Turkey itself – analyzing the political image Turkey will enjoy in the EU – the 
negative stories of human rights, Armenia, Cyprus or the Kurdish question are me n-
tioned. Positive effects are suspected from the country’s great relationships to the 
Middle and Far East and the newly developing internal stability.  
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The judgement of political dimensions of Turkey’s nation brand in the literature does 
not contain these positive nuances stemming from recent progressions. TÜ®KIYE 
(2003) emphasizes the threat resulting from a large, military-dominated and change-
resistant Muslim country begging at the threshold of Europe’s door (TÜ®KIYE, 
2003: 25). The three most frequently mentioned attributes by the NBI panellists 
about Turkey’s government’s performance are ‘unpredictable’ (24%), ‘unstable’ 
(14%) and ‘trustworthy’ (13%). While only approx. 17% express trust or strong trust 
towards Turkish government to make responsible decisions that uphold international 
peace and security, 38% tend to distrust or strongly distrust (Anholt/NBI, 2005a).  
Some of these reservations towards Turkey’s political elite and the burden of rather 
unstable recent pasts were similarly represented among my informants. At the same 
time though, a comparably larger degree of confidence in the current government 
was expressed both by Turkish and foreign experts.  
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8.1.7 Summary of Turkey’s nation brand image content 
 General image Tourism image PCI/FDI Politics People/Culture 
NL Not good, but 
improving, 
badly managed, 
strong and 
colourful.  
 
Dominant 
cheap, lower 
class, Sun and 
Beach. 
 
No clear image, 
food growing, 
side aspects are 
youth custom-
ers, trade de-
veloping; labor 
migration fears 
Media-hyped, 
different priori-
ties between 
politics and 
publics; general 
tolerance and 
full party sup-
port 
Positive people 
factor in tourism, 
differences be-
tween Turkish 
and other Mus-
lim immigrants 
GER Young, dy-
namic among 
experts; large 
differences 
across country 
and people. 
Bad across 
German popu-
lation.  
Good service, 
top value for 
money, 
sun&beach 
packages hinder 
substantial 
relationships 
with Turkey.   
Not visible 
except food and 
textiles. Busi-
ness platform 
of Turkey re-
ceived by Ger-
man industry 
and trade insid-
ers 
Split between 
fear (religion, 
labor migra-
tion) and sup-
port for re-
forms. No 
sentimental 
affair for poli-
ticians.  
Mixed between 
immigrants-
impression and 
friendliness 
experienced 
during vacation.  
 
UK Focus on open-
ness and toler-
ance. aware-
ness of problem 
areas like 
nationalism or 
threats to 
neighbours, but 
in general posi-
tive. 
Fully positive 
perception, 
mainly focus-
sing hospitality, 
exotic experi-
ence and quality 
for families.  
Growing 
awareness for 
white goods, 
but unbranded. 
Successful 
private and 
industry in-
vestments, 
problems with 
administration.  
Rift between 
middle- and 
lower-class in 
media and 
society. Wel-
comed for EU 
strategy and 
vision.  
Enthusiastic 
especially about 
friendliness of 
Turkish people. 
ESP Good impres-
sion, Strength, 
pride, but also 
distrust and 
lying, disci-
pline, sly foxes.  
Mass market 
not known in 
Spain, niches 
with positive 
image; some 
rivalry to Spain 
(in the low 
segment sun 
market)  
Good textile 
image, un-
branded trade 
relations, no 
industry image 
Spain in favor 
in the context 
of general EU 
perspective, 
economical 
points decisive. 
Religion not 
important, no 
distinct cultural 
pattern known 
from Turkey. 
Historical Span-
ish links to Arab 
world.  
SWE Good looks, 
but quality and 
stamina prob-
lems.  
 
Cheap and nice, 
positive percep-
tion. 
Only textiles, 
low profile of 
branded prod-
ucts. underde-
veloped image 
as science or 
investment case 
Some percep-
tion of reforms, 
human rights 
issues, minority 
treatment and 
immigrants 
persist.  
Impression nego-
tiated between 
immigrant im-
pressions and 
tolerance values.   
SLOV Diffuse, partly 
good, but 
awareness of 
variation 
throughout  
country and of  
quality prob-
lems. 
Cheap, in 
sun&beach 
league, Istanbul 
as party capital.  
Exotic character  
China analogy, 
low quality; 
bad trade infra-
struc-tures. 
Interesting: 
Turkish food 
has just started 
to become 
visible.  
Almost no 
relevance in the 
political dis-
course. Partly 
fear of labor 
migration or 
financial bur-
dens  
Poverty and 
women issues 
are discussed. 
Ambiguous role 
of Ottoman his-
tory.   
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TR Reliable and 
well-working 
with great 
potential, 
which is not 
realized by the 
outside world.  
Enthusiastic; 
mix of nature 
and culture, low 
awareness of 
dominant cheap 
sun&beach 
positioning. 
Great potential, 
underdevel-
oped, underes-
timated; work-
force valued, 
long-term po-
tential. Partly 
exaggeration. 
Leadership role 
model: man in 
street follows 
political lead-
ers; many 
lobbyists at 
work against 
Turkey 
Education prob-
lems. Role of 
Ottoman history 
overstated.  
Table 8-2: Summary of Turkey’s nation brand image content 
 
The table summarizes main image contents of Turkey’s nation brand as reported in 
the different nations in the sample. The general image of Turkey seems quite good in 
the UK and Spain. The positive aspects and dimensions especially with regard to 
Turkey’s EU bid clearly outweigh the negative attitudes. A mixed picture is found in 
Sweden and Slovenia. More negative issues than in Spain or UK seem spread across 
the population there, yet it can not be claimed that they are decisive for a rejection of 
Turkey; the perceptions seem balanced. A clearly negative public image of Turkey 
was observed in the Netherlands and Germany.  
 
The experts – all recruited with similar knowledge characteristics on Turkey –, seem 
rather homogeneous in their opinion and independent of the nationality. Mainly the 
reports on the fellow countrymen’ perceptions make up for the difference between 
the EU nations. For example the notion of backwardness is present in almost all 
countries; it yet seems decisive if it overpowers other layers. In Germany, Nether-
lands and Sweden backwardness is a starting point for a rather negative discourse of 
Turkey, while in the UK mainly the perceived friendliness of Turkish people seems 
to absorb these disadvantageous readings. Similar holds for the perception of relig-
ion: Muslim religion is a dominant association, but not necessarily leading to a nega-
tive overall judgement. It seems as if especially the perception of the people, the 
Turks, is of influence to the general impression.  
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Within the sample of experts, it was obvious that for every nation the most positive 
image of Turkey stems from the political domain. This leads to some additional 
questions: is this the continuation of the rift between public and politics, or do they 
just have the most reason or better information to believe in a good end? Are they 
gone native by embassy occupation and exercise acts of self-justification? Do they 
feel obliged to their hosts and want to paint the picture as positive as possible? They 
all resemble comparably quite low criticality; but maybe such behavior is also part of 
a reasonable conduct of diplomacy?  
 
Interesting contrasts can be depicted between the Turkish self-image and the images 
held by the foreign experts. While foreigners often draw the picture of a quite attrac-
tive, but not reliable nation brand, which expresses a common overestimation, the 
Turkish image/self-perception is complaining rather underestimation: the nation 
brand is associated to be reliable and well-working with great potential, which is not 
realized by the outside world. This opposition points at an interesting interplay of 
image and reality that should be closely observed later on. 
 
 
8.2 Country Contexts: Conditions of Turkey’s nation brand image  
 
Explanations for the above-discussed contents of Turkey’s nation brand image can be 
generated from two factors within this research design. First, the informants directly 
issued some potential aspects during the interview, mainly when reasoning the dif-
ferences between their perception of Turkey and the one of their average fellow 
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countrymen. Also their reports themselves qualified for some interpretation. Sec-
ondly, some conditions for a favourable or not favourable image of Turkey were in-
tended to be generated by the sampling design.  
 
In the first step, a comprehensive report on the individual situation in the countries to 
explain the reported image content is given. Later, these findings are summarized 
evaluating the potential antecedents of Turkey’s nation brand image in the theoretical 
framework.  
 
The findings in the individual countries are also validated in the light of available 
literature. Here, mainly the analysis of the public discourses in the collections of 
Giannakopoulos/Maras (2005c) and Burçoglu (2000) provided interesting evidence 
at the level of image contents and antecedents. The Eurobarometer data of fall 2005 
(European Commission, 2005b) is employed as quantitative indicator for Turkey’s 
EU accession perception in the respective nation.  
 
8.2.1 Netherlands 
In discussing the Dutch situation, mainly the Turkish immigrants are mentioned to 
shape the perception of the nation brand Turkey as a whole. The lower brackets, 
which have the most contact points with Turkish immigrants since they mostly share 
the same neighbourhoods, display the worst image of the nation brand Turkey.  
The literature similarly mentions how the significant Turkish community is obvi-
ously influencing the debate as part of a general social discourse on the failed inte-
gration policies, which is referred to as the “multicultural drama” (Asbeek Brusse, 
2005: 88). 
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However there is no indication in the interviews that the perception necessarily im-
proves by belonging to higher income brackets. Turkey itself and its Western influ-
ences are rather distant and unknown and there are only few contact points with the 
issues there.  
“The Western face of Turkey is very little known in Western Europe. Every-
body, my personal friends but that goes all the way up to politicians that we 
get here as visitors for the first time, of course especially when they first 
come to Ankara, turn around after the first day in Ankara and say ‘gosh, there 
is much fewer headscarves than we thought there were.’” (van Haaften) 
 
This uncertainty rather enforces the negative perception than encourage curiosity.  
“For the Dutch people Turkey is a different world. I can imagine that for the 
Dutch people, some Dutch people, the difference between, well maybe I 
should say the distance between Greece and Turkey is much more bigger than 
the distance between Greece and Bulgaria.” (Verhoeven) 
 
For elder generations it is mentioned that historical knowledge of Ottoman invasion 
to Central Europe in late medieval and early modern ages is still present, since it was 
taught in school.  
 
Although some general cultural distance to Turkey is indicated, religion seems not to 
play a dominant role in explaining the Dutch stereotypes. Moreover, some findings 
popped up recently that the public image of Muslims in the Netherlands starts to dif-
ferentiate. The negative Muslim discourses tend to sticks to others, mainly the Mo-
roccan immigrants, while the Turkish immigrants are distinguished and for example 
not blamed in the post-Van Gogh-assassination debates.  
“In all these studies, which look specifically at the total immigrant population 
of the Netherlands, the Turks came out much more positive than the Moroc-
cans. So the negative attention inside the Netherlands is shifting slightly to-
wards the Moroccans rather than towards the Turks“. (van Haaften) 
 
 179 
An explanation for the low enthusiasm for Turkey’s EU accession can be found in 
the general fatigue related to EU, also indicated by the negative outcome of EU con-
stitution referendum in May 2005. The experts confirm that EU issues in general 
currently don’t score high in popularity in the Netherlands.  
The literature additionally points out that Turkey’s membership approach also enters 
the general discourses on unemployment, the future of the welfare state and the thus 
the financial consequences of EU’s enlargement (Asbeek Brusse, 2005). 
 
The individual brand dimensions all seem to contribute their share to the overall 
negative perception of Turkey. Tourism, at first sight the most positive and clearest 
outlined image-dimension, is actually a double-edged sword. As mentioned before, 
Turkey facilitates luxury vacations even for lower brackets of society. On the other 
hand, tourism not only confirms a “cheap” attribution of Turkey, it furthermore 
brings along a moment of reinforcement: as soon as the package tourists leave their 
resort on the obligatory excursion, they are confronted with poverty and the presence 
of Islam in the still underdeveloped backlands of the coast strips. This impression 
might align with aspects about Turkey they are potentially afraid of. Products from 
Turkey cannot contribute to a more positive image of the nation brand, nor can news 
from a developing Turkish economy or from attractive investment markets, which do 
not reach the broader Dutch public. As trade partner, Turkey is not dominantly im-
portant for the Netherlands (and vice versa). The products that are in the Dutch mar-
ket are rather unbranded in terms of origin:  
“I think a lot of people don't know that many products come from Turkey, if 
you look at Vestel or these kind of things, so they think of Turkish products it 
would be local which of course not a lot of Turk- Dutch people buy, I think 
there's not really conception, they don't know that products come from Tur-
key, so they don't have a view.” (Nieuwboer) 
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The political image of Turkey is not very relevant. It stands out that the entire politi-
cal spectrum is supportive for Turkey’s EU membership. Asbeek Brusse (2005) me n-
tions a rift between a harsh rejection in the right wing spectrum and a welcome posi-
tion in liberal economic circles are represented, which would be in contrast to my 
findings. An additional reinsurance with the informants from my study clarified that 
the rejection occurs in the extreme right spectrum, which they did not explicitly re-
port since these extreme positions are clear minority positions. The issue itself has 
not too much relevance for the general public, and if Turkey’s EU accession appears 
in public, it seems media-hyped. Still, with 41% approval and 52% refusal the Dutch 
population holds a comparably quite positive view of Turkey’s EU membership 
(Eurobarometer, 2005b), for example when contrasted to Germany with a similar 
Turkish immigration record.  
Summing up my findings, the situation in the Netherlands can be analyzed as a 
strong political will meeting a largely lethargic public, which, although culturally not 
intolerant and not outspoken against Turkey’s EU membership, has no clear reason 
to change the stereotypes of Turkey. The images of Turkey have been acquired in 40 
years of coexistence with an accepted, but not fully integrated Turkish immigrant 
minority.  
 
8.2.2 Germany 
Mainly tourism and immigrants (with regard to their comparably low socio-
economic status and the integration failures) form Turkey’s image in Germany. 
However, these two areas manage to develop almost no touch points.  
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The rather poor social integration of Turkish immigrants, manifested in quite her-
metic Turkish encapsulations inside German society, frames a unique German dis-
course on Turkey. These integration problems are partly due to German negligence at 
the political end, but also partly indebted to the special socio-economic profile of the 
Turkish guest workers:  
“Das Türkeibild [… in Deutschland…] wird im wesentlichen geprägt durch 
die Anschauung, die die Deutschen von ihrer türkischstämmigen Nachbar-
schaft haben und da haben wir eben diese Zahl von türkischstämmigen Men-
schen hier, teilweise eingebürgert, teilweise noch Türken und da ein Grossteil 
von ihnen aus dem Osten des Landes, also auch aus dem Teil des Landes 
kommen, der eher der schwächer entwickelte ist, hätten die, so sag ich das 
immer, wahrscheinlich auch schon Anpassungsprobleme gehabt, wenn sie 
statt nach Gelsenkirchen, Köln, Münster oder Berlin, nach Istanbul oder An-
kara gegangen wären. Weil, in den Dörfern, aus denen Sie kommen, gab es 
keine Verkehrsampel. Gibt’s vielleicht heute auch nicht. Das prägt, denke ich, 
das Türkeibild der breiten Bevölkerung sehr stark.“ [The image of Turkey in 
Germany is largely influenced by the perspective Germans hold on their 
neighborhood of Turkish descent, and we have this number of people with 
Turkish descent, partly naturalized, partly still Turks, and a great part of 
them come from the East of Turkey, which is the rather less developed part of 
Turkey; they would have had assimilation problems if they – instead of Gel-
senkirchen, Cologne, Münster or Berlin – had gone to Istanbul or Ankara. 
Because, in the villages they come from, there wasn’t a traffic light. Maybe 
there isn’t today. This, I think, population-wide marks the Turkey’s image 
quite strongly.] (Polenz) 
 
The menace of the welfare state – substantially endangered by economic and demo-
graphic megatrends as only in few other nations in EU Europe – lets the feeling of 
security disappear; this insecurity nourishes deeply-rooted German psychological 
characteristics like fears of change and alienation. In this context even positive eco-
nomic developments in Turkey ironically are rephrased as threats to the German 
wealth. Turkey’s perception in Germany provides a clear indication how stereotypes 
develop in a struggle with the own identity.  
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Germany’s population is largely unaware of some bounds to Turkey like today’s 
NATO partnership, the historical comradeship in arms during WW I or Turkey’s 
refuge for numerous German scientists during WW II. These potential reasons for a 
special German-Turkish relationship are not penetrated to the broad publics.  
 
The literature shows how also within the German political debate domestic and for-
eign politics perspectives cannot be kept apart in dealing with the issue of Turkey’s 
EU membership (Alkan, 2000). Maybe due to the role of the largest member-state, 
the historical-cultural argument of the Bosporus as Europe’s border and of incongrui-
ties between Islamic and European orders is more dominantly represented in the 
German discourse (Giannakopoulos/ Maras, 2005: 7).  
 
The individual nation brand dimensions contribute differently to Turkey’s image in 
Germany. Despite more than 4 million German tourists to Turkey per year, this brand 
dimension does not manage to sustainable break firmly held stereotypes of Turkey. 
Although good holiday experiences might evoke a favorable short-term opinion of 
the country, packaged sun&beach tours are not regarded as leading to substantial 
relationships or a better understanding of Turkey, because the cultural background is 
largely faded out.  
Although Germany hosts the largest Turkish community in Europe, products from 
Turkey – except food and textiles – are not visible in the market-place with a clear 
reference to the country-of-origin. A substantial improvement of Turkey’s image 
resulting from Turkish imports cannot be expected. The stabilizing economy bring-
ing along good investment cases is well received in Germany’s economic domain. It 
will be interesting to observe if this positive reception of Turkey’s economy boom 
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has the potential to positively impact Turkey’s overall image in Germany. This 
seems mainly dependent on the willingness of the German media to transport these 
success stories.  
 
The media situation showing only little intention to back Turkey’s accession appears 
peculiar in Germany. Partly against the opinion of knowledgeable correspondents, 
who are sometimes overruled by their editors back home in Germany, even quality 
media are suspected to intentionally bias Turkey’s image in Germany. Old patterns 
of news making on Turkey are retained. For the yellow press, the issue of Turkey as 
a trade-off between strategic and short-termed interests seems too complicated to 
function within the schemas. Discourses related to 9-11 caesura facilitated the search 
for Muslim scapegoats to blame in the game of globalisation.  
 
Structural explanations for this German polarity can be suspected in the separation of 
political parties on the question of Turkey’s membership. Unlike other European 
countries, in Germany there is not only a rift between general public and political 
parties, but also between conservative political forces, who oppose Turkish EU 
membership and promote a special partnership instead, and the left spectrum more-
over favoring Turkey’s accession. But even more, as underlined in the literature, the 
borderline between rejection and approval runs sometimes even within the parties: 
both within the conservatives and the social democrats positions in favour and 
against Turkey’s membership can be found (Grosse Hüttmann, 2005). This lack of a 
clearly outspoken political solidarity seems to largely influence the split political 
image of Turkey in Germany between fear and support, as described before. Turkey 
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is not a sentimental affair for any major political personality, and subcutaneous is-
sues like genetic central European reservations based on history etc. might persist.  
 
At the end stands a clearly negative public opinion with 21% pro and 74% con 
against Turkey’s membership. Noteworthy seems a slight difference in the opinions 
between East-(former BDR) Germans (27% pro) and West-Germans (19% pro) 
(European Commission, 2005b). These numbers underline the findings collected 
from the German experts.  
 
In Germany, the dividing line on Turkey’s image consequently does not pass be-
tween politics and general public, as in other EU European countries, but right in the 
middle of the society, separating subsystems like the media, economy or politics. The 
issue is therefore debated comparably intensely among the different fractions and has 
a significant awareness in Germany. It will be interesting to see how stereotypes will 
behave in the long run in the light of such intense social discourses.  
 
8.2.3 United Kingdom  
The first clue to the comparably good image of the nation brand Turkey in the UK 
can be found in the integration issue. This time, however, Turkey’s perception is not 
influenced by negative immigration stories, but by positive experiences. A quite 
small Turkish minority lives well-integrated in the British society; the bulk stems 
from North Cyprus, and all experts agree that these immigrants resemble a different 
type of Turkish immigrants than the ones who came to Germany or the Netherlands. 
Far better educated, mostly a proficient level of English, more open-minded etc. were 
often time mentioned as advantages. Most of these advances could be explained with 
 185 
the status of Cyprus being an earlier British colony until 1960. In addition the com-
munity being quite small, due to the good integration process they are also hardly 
visible as of Turkish descent.  
 
But more, it is also claimed for the UK that the Muslim population is generally better 
integrated than in some continental European societies. It is claimed that this positive 
immigration history in the UK also reduces fears of labor migration or alienation, but 
especially been quite productive in preventing religious divides to come up. 
“Our perceptions of Turkey and Turks are different, we have a different ex-
perience. We have quite, I think a well integrated Muslim immigrant popula-
tion.” (Mc Cormick) 
The literature underlines that discourses on religion or minorities seem a lot more 
laid-back in the UK compared to the “highly essentialist reading of Turkey's EU ac-
cession” (Anastasakis, 2004: 45) in most other EU countries. 
 
Finally, the UK is without doubt the spearhead of a looser and wider conception of 
the European integration process. Notions of the EU being a Christian club are as 
greatly frowned upon, as are most concepts of a European super state. With the pre-
vailing idea of EU being an intergovernmental connection among nations probably 
the implications of Turkey’s potential membership are not seen as far reaching as 
they would within the context of a federalist understanding of EU.  
“I think in UK, Turkey has a very positive image and that's reflected in the 
political and public opinion. We're a bit different from some other Europeans. 
We’re also an island which, we’re kind of a bit separate, we have a different 
mentality.” (Mc Cormick) 
 
Yet, the interviews also gave momentum to the hypothesis that – within this rather 
positive mindset – there is a certain class rift becoming increasingly visible.  
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“This feeling of struggle amongst working classes, and even now low middle 
income classes in England is growing so any thought of having the accom-
plishments they have in their lives eroded by Muslim, coming in and looking 
for working class jobs is a frightening thought.“ (Anderson) 
 
This rift between social strata is resembled and nurtured by the media. While so 
called quality newspapers have a well-balanced and rather positive coverage of Tur-
key, yellow press formats like e.g. the Sun have – according to the observation of 
Richard Anderson – started to negatively impact Turkey’s perception among their 
reading audience stemming mainly from the lower social brackets. They reactivate 
some elder culturally deeply rooted images of Turkey, which are – in certain groups 
– still negotiated to the very day:  
“It started with Midnight Express. And it still pervades people’s perception of 
Turkey. Everyone that talked to you abroad first thing he says yeah I’m going 
to Turkey on holiday, you know, they will say, oh is still like that? Is it still 
like it’s portrayed in the film, which is absolutely shocking” (Anderson).  
 
Given this, tourism to Turkey, which is quite popular in the UK due to a well-
received value-for-money advantage over other destination and yet a persistent touch 
of exoticism, contributes unanimously positive to the existing good image of Turkey 
in the UK. Similar do investment opportunities in Turkey and some successful im-
port products from Turkey, although much less relevant.  
 
In sum stands a comparably clear better image of the nation brand Turkey in UK than 
in many other EU European countries. “Within this European climate of scepticism 
and emotive ambiguity, the UK appears to be different in that it is significantly more 
relaxed and cool-headed towards Turkey” (Anastasakis, 2004: 39). Current Islamic 
terror on the other hand has left quite visible roots in the UK leading to some general 
fears related to the Muslim world. The ratio of 38% pro and only 42% against Turk-
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ish EU membership in the British public opinion as a snapshot in fall 2005 (Euro-
pean Commission, 2005b) well resembles the general trend and the polarity between 
general support and some reservations present at that time. The general acclaim pro-
vides a good groundwork for a quite rational and pragmatic discourse with average 
involvement on Turkey’s EU membership.  
 
8.2.4 Spain 
The main factor to positively influence Turkey’s nation brand image in Spain seems 
the absence of factors that in other places impact the picture. Spain has practically no 
Turkish immigrants.  
“It’s a special case in Spain, there are of course many countries because they 
know the Turkish population in Europe is concentrated mostly in Germany, 
Austria, the Netherlands, some in France, Belgium, that’s all. So I mean you 
are more direct witnesses of how Turks do behave in the context of your own 
country. This is not a case of Spain.” (De la Pena) 
 
Furthermore Islamic culture and religion, despite significant immigrants from Mus-
lim countries, is not dominantly visible in Spain.  
“It’s not like France. In France, you have many Arabs coming from Algeria, 
Tunisia and they are very radical. They are fundamentalist. In Spain, I mean 
I'm saying this, and we had a terrible terrorist attack, but you don’t see in the 
streets the people that you see in Amsterdam or in Berlin. The Turks with the 
scarves, normally in Spain, you don’t see. You can see but not frequent.” (Li-
gardo-Cofrede) 
 
Tourism to Turkey is largely a niche market in Spain, and if trips are undertaken they 
mostly focus on Istanbul or Cappadocia; these are not typical mass-market 
sun&beach vacations and generally evoke unrestrained positive attitudes and associa-
tions. Textiles from Turkey enjoy a good image in Spain, in general however the 
trade relations are ‘unbranded’ and there is no relevant industry image of Turkey in 
Spain. Finally, the cultural domain provides positive tail winds for Turkey. Religious 
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issues don’t seem to play an accentuated role in Spain these days, mainly because the 
extent of own religious practises is rapidly decreasing. In addition, it was repeatedly 
emphasized that due to positive cultural theming of historical alignments between 
Spain and the Arab world with long-time presence of Moors in Spain, who left 
memorabilia to the very day, quite a positive ground for living together with the 
Muslim world is generated in Spain. Daily routines in dealing with the Arab world 
have additionally reduced fears of contact:  
“Because we are used to the Arabs. We are very close to Morocco, we are in 
daily contact with thousands of Arabic people so we know”. (Ligardo-
Cofrede) 
 
This sense of similarity even leads to quite interesting patterns of association.  
“If you don’t consider the religion, Turkey is like Spain 40 years ago. With-
out considering the religion. Also in Spain we are having a lot of problems. 
We cannot compare for sure but we have also big problem in Spain. During 
these 5-6 months, almost 40 women have died in Spain, killed by their part-
ners. So of course, there is nothing, you cannot compare the society but...But 
if you ask a German citizen who visit Spain 30 years ago, and visit Turkey 
now, he will tell you that is really the same”. (Ligardo-Cofrede) 
 
With these associations in mind, Turkey’s political image in Spain turns out to be 
quite positive. Based on the own, very positive experiences resulting from the EU 
membership facilitating the enormous development of the country in the past 20 
years, the potential of Turkey’s development can be potentially best conjectured in 
Spain. Governments have been clearly outspoken in favor of Turkey’s EU accession. 
The literature supports the assumption that the question cannot evoke fierce debates 
in public sphere or in political circles (Soler i Lecha, 2005). Public opinion is with 
40%-33% generally welcoming Turkish membership. The value of 27% in the 
“Don’t Know”-category however also transports the large public disinterest (Euro-
pean Commission, 2005b).  
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One condition however has to be made which was repeatedly stated in the inter-
views: This positive perception occurs obviously in the context of significant eco-
nomic prosperity in Spain, which is also a function of EU’s subsidies in the past. 
From the day Spain changes its status from a net receiver to a net payer in terms of 
EU financing, the experts explicitly conceded that Spanish perception of Turkey 
could change. This prognosis nicely underlines the argument that perception of im-
ages largely also depends on the perceiving state of mind.  
 
8.2.5 Sweden 
Turkey’s factual political issues such as human rights or minority policies largely 
shape its political image in Sweden. Among these, the Kurdish issue sticks out in the 
public discourse in Sweden.  
“Every time a Swedish politician coming out to Turkey, they go to Diyarbakir 
as the Kurdish capital. And...what they...I would say they are very restricted 
towards Turkish politics and they call them ‘not democratic’ and kind of 
things. They support the Kurdish side more than the Turkish side and Kurdi-
stan doesn’t even exist.” (Achouri) 
 
This is partly explainable by the high value for tolerance and minorities generally 
granted in Sweden. Linked to that is a moreover sensitive media coverage, especially 
from the left spectrum, on these Turkish domestic policy issues. With alert attention, 
also recent changes in Turkish treatment of minorities have been recognized and con-
tribute to a slightly positive political image of Turkey in Sweden.  
“And lots of Swedish parliamentarians have been here in NGO’s, and univer-
sity representatives and what not so the changes that taken place in Turkey 
has been closely observed by people who have a position in Sweden whereby 
they can lead public opinion. So I think that the picture has swung in that 
sense and that it’s been very important for us to have all of this close observa-
tion of the situation at the Southeast for instance”. (Kärre) 
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Another solid pillar of Swedish sympathy for Turkey builds on own recent EU acces-
sion history and the fact that pros and cons, but also the feeling of not being neces-
sarily wanted in the EU are still quite present in the Swedish consciousness.  
“Because at the time when we finally decided to apply we did not feel ex-
tremely welcomed in the EU, in fact the certain resistance, not from all but 
some countries were extremely accommodating but some countries, that’s ex-
actly what you have in this situation. Some of the EU countries have been 
very much against us, starting accession negotiations have been practically 
dealt against until we got this decision and we felt a little bit the same when 
we applied. So I think there is a sympathy in Sweden because it’s not very 
long ago this happened, it’s only ten years ago, but we stood before the same 
type of situation”. (Asp) 
 
In addition, similar to the UK, Turkey is also politically largely welcome in the con-
text of a looser vision of the EU. Consequently, political parties are unanimously 
supportive of Turkey’s bid. The literature confirms the broad consensus for accession 
talks with Turkey, presupposing the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria (Langdal, 
2005). A 48% majority of the public holding a favourable opinion of Turkish EU 
membership with 41% being against in October 2005 (European Commission, 
2005b) ranks Sweden as the most welcoming of the old EU (EU 1561) countries. 
Remarkably, the Swedish discourse manages to get by almost without any reference 
to religion or culture, and if at all the positive implications of potentially integrating 
an Islamic country into the EU are highlighted. Following from that it is underlined 
that accession talks with Turkey should not be regarded as special, but be conducted 
as with all the other candidate countries. All in all, the Swedish position towards 
Turkey well resembles the generally quite pragmatic and strictly intergovernmental 
Swedish EU-philosophy (Langdal, 2005). 
 
                                                 
61 EU before the most recent enlargement (May 1, 2004).  
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In general across the population little brand knowledge of the nation Turkey can be 
found in Sweden. This might partly be due to ignorance: partly the issue, as pointed 
out earlier, has not a high relevance in Sweden anyhow. In terms of immigrants with 
Turkish descent, Sweden has a median position within the sample. Especially in re-
cent times, positive outcomes of successful integration politics have become visible, 
including Turkish immigrants.  
“What I was saying about that our picture has been formed by Turkish immi-
grants that left Turkey that they do not hold in high esteem from a political 
point of view that has also been an important part in changing that perception. 
Because our large numbers of immigrants, well-integrated immigrants also 
has meant that we have a government minister who is a Suryani, we have 
some several parliamentarians who are of Turkish or Kurdish Suryani back-
grounds”. (Kärre) 
 
Some reservations towards Turkey and Turks are visible especially across elder gen-
erations. Comparably high awareness of the movie “Midnight Express” and a 
stronger tendency for national cultural distinction than distributed among younger 
generations explain this tendency.  
“Many Swedes still have, at least in my generation, have the perception of 
Turkey that film Midnight Express, it was devastating I think to the Turkish 
image. I’ve never seen a film provoke that kind of a lasting impression of a 
country. And that is going to take time for Turkey to wipe out that picture 
with the old generations in Europe”. (Asp) 
 
The young mindset in Sweden seems to show great appreciation of multicultural and 
intercultural developments and display comparable greater welcome towards Turkey.  
“Well, from the age differences, 18 to 65 or 80, I would say that young peo-
ple would find it more reasonable to have Turkey in the EU […]. And from 
40 to up, they wouldn’t...they would feel more nationalist and they can't see 
themselves as a neighbor with a big Muslim country as Turkey”. (Achouri)  
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Tourism contributes without exception positively to Turkey’s good nation brand im-
age in Sweden, while neither export products nor investment opportunities reach a 
sufficient level of nation brand visibility in order to be of any effect.  
 
In essence, we see a positive image of the nation brand Sweden due to general toler-
ant dispositions in the country, good travel experiences, successful domestic integra-
tion politics, long-term foreign policy strategies and sympathy in the light of the own 
accession history. An interesting rift seems to occur along generation borders.  
 
8.2.6 Slovenia:  
The nation brand Turkey has currently comparably a quite low relevance and aware-
ness in Slovenia. 
“Turkey is not a big issue in Slovenia, it’s not like the Balkans. Croatia, Bos-
nia, Serbia and because these are countries, we used to be one country, Tur-
key is like you know European Union is your priority and Turkey is there, 
somewhere in the back”. (Petelinkar) 
There are almost no (emotional) contact points to Turkey, and the religion issue, 
sometimes upheld in other EU European debates, does not qualify as a factor in Slo-
venia either.  
 
Neither migration or trade nor tourism account for significant connections to Turkey 
and thus practically cannot influence Turkey’s nation brand image. Developments in 
these dimensions are visible, but seem not weighty as of today. In the tourism do-
main, the exotic character was repeatedly mentioned; similar, the equation of Turkey 
and China for export products can be interpreted as expressing large distance and 
unfamiliarity. 
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Furthermore, religious arguments seem not to occupy much space in the Slovenian 
discourse. Images of Muslim religious practice might dominate some stereotypes, 
however it is doubted that they will have much relevance. Contact points with Bos-
nian Muslims, for example, reveal a rather good coexistence of religions. With the 
recent atheistic past of having been a socialist Yugoslavian republic religion had 
generally lost its relevance in the public domain.  
“Ich meine nicht, weil bei uns, gut, man nimmt Religion als eine sehr private 
Angelegenheit“ [I don’t think so, because where I am from, religion is seen as 
a very private affair]. (Grasseli)  
 
This reading of religion in the public domain seems also helpful when approaching 
an explanation of the distinct Slovenian interpretation of Ottoman invasion history, 
which seems remarkably different from other EU countries. Although sites and 
memorabilia are still visible as in other countries, they are neither an emphasized part 
of the education canon nor connected to Turkey’s accession issue in the public dis-
course. Religion does not provide reason for grief over loss of symbols of a former 
Christian identity in the far past. In addition, for example compared to Austria, the 
history of invasions has not developed a large-scale cultural myth (apart from some 
sayings and tales).  
“Vienna of course has a big history everybody knows about that, they are 
studying in the school about that everything. For us story of Turks is invaders 
but like coming in towns, run through burn some stuff burn churches, taking 
the money the food or children this is like sporadic sometimes, they never 
been there actually, but maybe because we are really not so deeply devoted 
people into Christianity yet, cause we are socialist country you know, it 
doesn’t hurt us so much that they burned down some churches, partisans did 
the same maybe for us it’s more it’s not that painful memory historically... 
there is... my grandmother speaks lot about Turks sometimes but she is from 
Volvodina, that part of Serbia not far from, they are a lot under the influence 
of Turks”. (Kovsca) 
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Slovenia seems to take on rather a neutral stance towards Turkey. The country is still 
well employed coping with the consequences of own recently acquired membership 
to the EU. From this situation also stems some solidarity towards Turkey’s member-
ship bid. The rather positive public opinion expressed in the Eurobarometer of 49% 
pro and 45% against Turkey’s EU membership could be explained in this light:  
“Maybe because we just entered the European Union, it gave us the opportu-
nity the benefit of the Union, they allowed us to enter to show us what we can 
do, so probably Slovenia is like other countries could have the same opportu-
nity”. (Petelinkar) 
 
Media discourses also seem not to take place on Turkey, either, so, as indicated ear-
lier, the nation brand Turkey just does not qualify for the public awareness. 
“MP: I still think that most of the Slovenians wouldn’t really pay attention to 
Turkey in EU, it’s not like the German. Because Slovenia is not that influen-
tial country and maybe just to form some public opinion, I never heard any-
body talking about Turkey 
JK: So it’s not in the media either? 
MP: Not really”. (Petelinkar) 
 
In sum we see Turkey’s nation brand image in Slovenia as the result of a clearly low 
involvement with the object. The rather undecided public opinion could also be in-
terpreted as indifference.  
 
8.2.7 Turkey 
The analysis of Turkey’s self-image has – with regard to the data situation – is done 
in two steps. First, there are some insights about why the Turkish experts perceive 
Turkey like they did. Secondly, some indicators were collected to explain Turkey’s 
nation brand perception abroad as seen from the Turkish perspective. The latter per-
spectives should lead us closer to the interpretation of the perception data generated 
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in the EU countries, while the first should find indicators for the quite positive Turk-
ish self-image described earlier.  
 
The own background and the extent of international mindedness influence the peo-
ples’ self-perception of Turkey. 
“Well it is of course, I consider myself also because of my profession that you 
know I was, I can think more from an international perspective and therefore 
perhaps a wider view of not only Turkey but of anything. And in that sense 
perhaps I’m not a regular nationalist type in this country. […] The more na-
tionalistic you are the more you are against EU, that you will lose your sover-
eignty and independence and what not, so there is this correlation I suppose”. 
(Sungar) 
 
Furthermore the identity rifts and the nation’s multitude, which have already troubled 
the task to describe Turkey’s nation brand image for the foreign experts, also blur the 
self-perception of the country.  
“Turkey’s image is chaos because we have so many, we do not have any fo-
cus in presenting, we have something from west, something from east, this 
and that in the streets, operational in the outside world, we have so many dif-
ferent people representing us, both the workers and the intellectuals. A politi-
cian in the past is massively different than the current politician. […] What-
ever Turkey reflects is not well matched with each other. We have this and 
that and so many. We have historical baggage, we have all those geographical 
sites and everything. What will you put forward?” (Molu) 
 
The informants hold sometimes a quite outspoken opinion on guest workers of Turk-
ish descent in Europe. Their judgement sounds sometimes even harsher than those 
found in European stereotypes. The impressions of the guest workers are made 
mainly responsible for the bad perception of Turkey in the EU. In addition, some 
general fears based on (historical) encounters with the Muslim world are offered to 
explain negative images. These two dimensions, the historic Ottoman presence in 
Europe and the current presence by guest workers, clearly clash and it is interesting 
that they are oftentimes overlapping in the European image of Turkey and Turks:  
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“They do not like Turks, they do not like Ottomans, but they are kind of 
strong and fighting with, they are strong soldiers and everything. Whereas in 
the modern images, Turks, workers create a perception that they are kind of 
downward, in Turkey we say icedonuk, introvert people. They were introvert 
people they cannot get used to new life conditions. They cannot open. They 
are not open-minded. They live as they were in their own villages.” (Molu)  
 
With regard to the outside perception, furthermore a lack in the ability to sell Turkey 
abroad is criticised. This PR deficit might also be partly causing what the experts 
stress as lacks of knowledge on the Europeans’ side; but they especially complain of 
an absence of live-experiences with the multitude of facets of Turkey. Experiences of 
the richness of Turkish culture would lead to less negative European perceptions.  
“Some people are very aware of its vibrancy. And actually see all these Mus-
lim elements, the fact that it’s young, it’s youthful, as a very positive thing. In 
some cases though this is seen as 40 million Anatolian peasants. Because 
awareness is not there. I think on the whole the question would be correct if 
you ask that to a person who came to Turkey. There is a big difference be-
tween someone who has been to Turkey, who has seen Istanbul, who’s seen 
some parts of Turkey. And the person who’s just watching Turkey from tele-
vision in Germany.” (Boyner) 
 
Apart from tourism/travel, also products and investment opportunities could better 
contribute to Turkey’s nation brand image; they are not perceived to their full poten-
tial at the moment. However, some domestic constraints, especially the low educa-
tion of the workforce, also limit the Turkish performance.  
“On the other hand of course the negative side of that was the Turks in gen-
eral have been subject to little education or if you look at population, the 
cross sections, like education shows everywhere. So here’s the potential of 
young people which we bring up to be good citizens of Turkey, and the 
world, but then the education system needs a real reform effort.” (Yücaoglu) 
 
The political image of Turkey abroad is seen by the experts also to be the result of 
the leadership role model by EU politicians. For rifts between political and public, 
which are the overall interpretation if you hold the Eurobarometer (European Com-
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mission, 2005b) data against the political action taken, different angles on issues are 
held responsible.  
“Political and public, they are different. Public is all about today and past. Po-
litical is all about today and future. So when you ask public something 
they’ve got all those historical and modern current images of Turkey and they 
see Turkey as a whole, as a very big sort of bite against their social security, 
against their welfare in Europe, against their own environment habitat, be-
cause they cannot keep it out and they’ll be everywhere”. (Molu) 
 
This is why politicians do and should position themselves uncoupled from the public 
discourse in the eyes of some Turkish experts. They therefore criticize the fact that 
the issue of Turkey’s EU membership is already blended with domestic affairs in the 
EU countries, which additionally contributes to Turkey’s negative nation brand im-
age.  
 
Finally, interplays of media system and lobbying organisations against Turkey in 
EU-Europe are held responsible for a negative perception of Turkey’s nation brand 
abroad.  
“They’re institutional efforts to create negative image for Turkey. Just to give 
you an example, there is an Armenian organization in Brussels, just in Brus-
sels, not other countries, which employs at least about 21 people they have a 
budget of 10 million dollars a year to defame Turkey. Period. So whatever 
this country does, it’s not only bringing up information but you also have to 
fight the negative image distribution”. (Yücaoglu) 
 
 
8.3 Evaluation of antecedents of Turkey’s nation brand image 
 
For the cross-sectional analysis of common findings, again the guiding questions 
developed in the earlier theoretical part of this thesis should be employed. As indi-
cated, some of them – e.g. some structural indicators about the country’s individual 
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EU background or commercial relationships to Turkey – were covered in the sample 
design. Some more abstract constructs like values or religion and some summary 
constructs like involvement should be investigated for their explanatory value re-
garding Turkey’s nation brand image content.  
 
8.3.1 Nation’s size, wealth, role in the EU 
The size of the country was mainly mentioned in the small nations Netherlands and 
Slovenia. It was implied that power and influences are perceived as rather limited 
there. In such a sense, the size of a country might have some impact in the relevance 
a EU related issue can have in the public discourse of such a small EU member-state, 
in brand terms it influences the awareness question. It does not seem to have an im-
pact on the image content developing within the national societies.  
 
Wealth of a member-state seemed influential to the perception of the nation brand of 
Turkey. Especially in Spain the potential shift from a net receiver to a net payer 
within EU’s finance system was brought up as a potential consequence of poorer 
nations entering newly to the EU, which would clearly leave its traces in the public 
attitude formation on Turkey. At the moment however, this factor was not visible 
already. On the other hand, fear of labor migration was well distributed as a compo-
nent of the public discourse among rather rich nations like Germany or Sweden as 
well at the poorer end of the EU in Slovenia. Only UK sticks out where this seems 
not to pose a threat, potentially due to the still quite positive economic situation.  
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8.3.2 EU perspective  
EU visions, usually split between intergovernmental and federal, and approximately 
expressed in the sample by the public acceptance of the EURO as common currency, 
proved quite important for the explanation of public attitude on Turkey across the 
different nations. UK and Sweden as prominent proponents of an intergovernmental 
EU and generally in favor of further enlargement also held a rather positive public 
nation brand image of Turkey. In Germany and Netherlands, probably by majority 
devoted to a deeper, federal EU, more negative perceptions of Turkey were collected. 
Both Spain and Slovenia are difficult to schematize within this system.  
 
Very elucidative proved furthermore to look at the duration of the country’s EU 
membership. A positive political image of Turkey in the accession context was re-
peatedly reasoned with the countries own, still quite present accession experiences. 
This issue was raised in Spain, Sweden and Slovenia, all of which joined the EU in 
the last 20 years; this stretch of time is obviously still present enough to consider. In 
all three countries, the idea of solidarity, of not begrudging a potential new member 
the same positive effects just experienced themselves, was found. With increasing 
membership duration, especially in the EU founding members Germany and Nether-
lands, this awareness might have disappeared and property preservation goals might 
prevail instead (Kramer).  
 
8.3.3 Connection to Turkey 
The geographic location of the nations within Europe and the relative proximity to 
Turkey so far did not suggest being influential for the nation brand image of Turkey. 
Neither did the research find something like a particular Southern or Mediterranean 
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solidarity e.g. between Spain or Turkey, nor were arguments elicited that the large 
distance of Sweden or UK or the colder Northern mentality lead to a particular dis-
tance to Turkey. Slovenia, as the most adjacent nation in the sample, probably has 
the greatest indifference and least profound knowledge structures on Turkey of the 
nations compared.  
 
Without any doubt, the presence of immigrants from a Turkish descent largely influ-
ences Turkey’s nation brand image in the EU nations and the related stereotyping. 
This factor was presented both in positive correlation assumptions, which would hold 
for the Netherlands and Germany with a large former guest worker community of 
Turkish descent influencing negative images, and in negative correlation, like in the 
UK or Slovenia where the absence of Turkish immigrants was explicitly mentioned 
as a factor for a rather positive or at least average nation brand image of Turkey.  
 
It is interesting that for both large Turkish immigration countries in the sample 
(Germany and Netherlands) the danger of tourism producing not necessarily only 
positive images was articulated. This is clearly different from countries like the UK 
or Sweden, where tourism is regarded as the main positive image driver for Turkey. 
These findings hold for the sun&beach category. The more culturally focused Istan-
bul-tourism, as for example seen in Spain or Slovenia, has the potential to introduce 
different sides of Turkey, but would still comprise biased impressions by still show-
ing only a fragment of Turkey.  
Turkish experts blame a lack of representative live-experiences of Turkey by Euro-
peans, which would provide valuable insights into the rich Turkish culture, to be a 
main source of negative Turkish image. In the light of the findings in EU countries, 
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sun&beach-centred tourism to Turkey however might turn out to be a too narrow 
experience in order to be influential for the general EU accession purposes. The 
Turkish experts in the sample seem not to fully penetrate these relationships at the 
moment. Tourism in general, although an important brand dimension of Turkey in 
terms of the overall nation brand image, seems to be a more complex bundle.  
 
In their study on Turkey’s tourism image, Sönmez/Sirakaya (2002) quote the WTO 
(1979: 3): 
 “The tourist image is only one aspect of a country’s general image. Even if 
there seems to be no link between them at first sight, the two are closely inter-
related. Nobody is likely to visit a country for tourism if for one reason or an-
other s/he dislikes it. Conversely, a tourist discovery may lead to a knowledge 
of other aspects, of an economic, political or cultural nature, of that country” 
(Sönmez/Sirakaya, 2002: 188).  
 
The phenomenon that tourism messages can not overpower but instead rather con-
firm existing psychological and cognitive structures pre-existent in the minds of the 
travellers especially from countries with large immigrant groups from Turkey like 
Netherlands and Germany was also reflected by Mastnak (2000):  
“People generally prefer meeting what they expect within a foreign culture to 
seeking out what is novel about it. Prejudices and stereotypes serve as a rigid 
frame of reference for the interpretation of situations. Thus interpersonal con-
tact may be experienced as a reinforcement of stereotype images than as a 
challenge of true communication” (Mastnak, 2000: 253). 
Similarly O’Shaughnessy/O’Shaughnessy (2000: 59) observe the existence of domi-
nant images that are able to crowd out all other meanings.  
 
History of the Ottoman invasion of Europe provides other illuminating aspects. Some 
informants suggested history to influence Turkey’s nation brand image; however, it 
seems difficult to generate a clear-cut picture. Some discourses seem still to prevail 
in Central Europe (it was mentioned for Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Italy and 
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Slovenia in the interviews), but the issue is weighted differently. In Austria it is still a 
dominant issue (reported by Sungar and Molu, also Kritzinger/Steinbauer, 2005) and 
in the Netherlands it has been taught at school to the elder generations. In Slovenia, 
however, Ottoman invasions, although presumably similarly firmly set in the na-
tion’s mindset, are regarded as history with no connection to today. A number of 
memorials are still visible, but the argument does not make it to the current public 
discourse on Turkey in the political context.  
 
Somehow mixing tourism, geography and history, the discussion of how much exoti-
cism is appreciated enters the picture. UK, Spain and Slovenia explicitly mention the 
attraction of exoticism, while very different in Germany the fear of the “Otherness” 
is repeatedly articulated. As we will analyze more deeply when discussing brand 
management implications, there seems somehow a dilemma between the different 
brand dimensions. While exoticism on one side partly qualifies as distinct brand di-
mension for tourism, it might on the other side deter Europeans in their fear of dif-
ference and otherness in political or social dimensions.  
 
Trade involvement with Turkey can clearly not qualify as a vehicle of nation brand 
image at the moment. The factors like export-products or attraction of capital are 
largely unfamiliar among EU-Europe’s citizens. The emerging or stabilizing Turkish 
economy and the resulting investment opportunities seem generally to take place in 
insider discourses, but have not reached the broad publics as an image facet of Tur-
key.  
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8.3.4 Stereotypes on Turkey 
The very strong and persisting stereotypes on Turkey and Turks are interesting quali-
tative indicators of connections to Turkey. They display quite a notable variation 
throughout Europe with individual nuances leading to different judgements.  
· Prevailing stereotypes among the average Dutch population mainly circle 
around the exclusion of the West, standing for “poor”, “not civilized” or 
“backward”.  
· Dominant German stereotypes paint an old, backward picture of the Turks, 
who are unfriendly, somewhat dilapidated and isolated, at the same time sly 
and insidious.  
· Common stereotypes in the British population see backwardness rather prob-
lematic in economic terms than in cultural terms. In that sense poverty and 
unreliability are held as negative stereotypes of Turkey, while only little res-
ervations based on cultural or religious aspects can be observed.  
· In Spain, widespread stereotypes include a notion of Arabic and exotic, equal 
to distant and strange, but not in a negative sense. Stereotypes are not unani-
mous, though; since there is no clear picture of Turkey in Spain.  
· Stereotypes among the Swedish population, as reported by the informants, 
seem to depend on the age strata. Quite conservative and negative reserva-
tions are largely spread especially among the older population. The younger 
strata of Sweden’s population draw a less negative picture of Turkey, how-
ever key visuals like headscarf or “noisy, lazy people” prevail. In general 
though, it can be said that the preoccupation with Turkey in the Swedish 
population is rather low. The issue has no particular significant relevance in 
public discourses. 
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· Some negative stereotypes visible in Slovenia relate to poverty, dishonesty 
and slow conduct of life. Some historic roots have left traces in the language 
in the form of proverbs, but they are not necessarily disadvantageous. Also, 
the long Ottoman presence in Balkans left behind some projections from 
Turks to Balkan people; people from the Balkan are suspected to be rather 
slow because the Turks told them to be so. As in Sweden and Spain, Turkey 
has quite a low profile in Slovenia.  
· The Turkish experts identify strong, prestigious and heroic views of Turkey 
with little self-criticism as the dominant stereotypes of their own country held 
by mainstream fellow-countrymen. But they also see many lines of conflict in 
Turkey’s society fighting for a Turkish identi ty: not only do multiple identi-
ties clash with regard to ethnic belonging, but polarisations like traditional vs. 
modern, or gender- and generations-questions put fractions of the Turkish so-
ciety into conflict with each other. 
 
The stereotypes I collected especially in the immigrant countries are clearly in line 
with the literature. The impact on the general image seems immense:  
“Consequently, the image of the Turk that lurks in the subconscious of Euro-
pean public opinion, teachers, social workers, health professionals, and politi-
cians is but too classic. At best it is one of sordid reality; it often verges on 
(deprecating) caricature. The Turkish male traits his North African counter-
part when it comes to integration. He is thus backward and more often ‘fun-
damentalist’, violent, uninterested in his children's educations other than reli-
gious instruction, exploits social benefits, moonlights, and has close ties with 
‘Mafia networks’. He retreats readily into his ghetto and deliberately refuses 
contact with the society that was so kind as to take him in. The portrait 
painted of the Turkish female is no better: She is illiterate, blindly submissive 
to her parents or her husband’s family, must cover her head under the as-
sumed pressure of her entourage, is the victim of arranged marriages, is the 
victim of family violence assumed to be the rule, and is unable to take control 
of her own fate. She thus must be helped to ‘rise up against the patriarchal 
domination to which she is the subject’” (Manco, 2000: 29). 
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Without any doubt these stereotypes play an important role in explaining the overall 
negative Turkish nation brand image in the political contexts. As argued in the theo-
retical section, they enter images as very influential collectively negotiated knowl-
edge structures.  
 
A category so far overseen in the framework, but closely connected to stereotypes, 
are the cultural practises related to Turkey in EU-European societies. In almost every 
nation in the sample for example typical collocations or proverbs in the language 
related to Turkey were found. Partly they express historical relationships (like e.g. 
“Mamma mia, the Turks are coming” in Italian), partly they reveal cultural entities 
(like the children song “C-A-F-F-E-E” in Germany warning not to drink too much 
coffee, since the Turk drink is not good for children). Awareness of these might not 
necessarily explain individual dispositions towards Turkey, but indicate the cultural 
context of the stereotypes. 
 
The literature points out that the European opinion formation on Turkey and espe-
cially the genesis of these persisting stereotypes does not necessarily reveal personal 
direct experiences with immigrants in the European nations, but is equally and nota-
bly mediated through public images. “Europeans also discover Turks who live near 
them indirectly, through the prism of international current events. [...] The way they 
are covered by European journalists is deliberately alarmist, sometimes simplistic, 
and not always impartial” (Manco, 2000: 29). The role of media in general was also 
critically mentioned by my informants and needs to be analyzed in more detail.  
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8.3.5 Media Information  
Especially in the cultural context media information on Turkey seems quite influen-
tial. The movie “Midnight Express” from the 1970s e.g., of which it was reported 
earlier to have devastated Turkey’s image in the United States for a long while, had 
also left its impact in the UK and Sweden as English-speaking or closely connected 
countries to the English-speaking world. Interestingly though the movie was not 
mentioned in any other country except these two. In general, media coverage of Tur-
key was explicitly found to be significantly influential in the public discourses in 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and UK. Instead of necessarily transporting the 
strategy provided by political leaders, the media mostly well-resemble and nurture 
the main dividing lines between strata, generations or political convictions within the 
respective societies on the issue of Turkey’s nation brand image and the EU acces-
sion. Without doubt the media play a key role in impacting Turkey’s nation brand 
image.  
 
8.3.6 Turkey’s Communication Activities  
Turkey’s own communication activities have only been mentioned in connection 
with tourism advertising in Spain and the UK. Other purposefully disseminated mes-
sages like advertising or directed PR activities from Turkey in the EU context have 
not gotten through to such an extent that they would qualify as important explana-
tions. There are however numerous complaints about poor PR by Turkey or disad-
vantageous media performance by Turkish politicians in general. So the ‘not paid 
news content’ about Turkey seems to have a much higher impact than the paid activi-
ties. It might be promising to furthermore differentiate the different types of media 
messages in favor or not in favor of Turkey in future research projects.  
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8.3.7 Religion 
Rather challenging is the interpretation of religion. No reason was found to explain 
different perceptions of the nation brand Turkey based on dominant protestant or 
catholic Christian religious orientiation. Religion in general does not seem to make 
up a serious argument. However, even without any deep-rooted religiousness, the 
cultural ‘moodboard’ connected for example to a Christian Europe of tolerance etc. is 
largely appreciated. Potentially religion discourses only serve as a metaphor for cul-
ture in order to ward off strange behaviors; the entity itself has lost meaning and its 
original reference. 
 
It seems not the religion itself of the EU country that influences Turkey’s nation 
brand perception. So, the talk about a Christian club and fears of the Muslim world 
seem to not necessarily hold for Turkey’s perception and might be shadow boxing. It 
seems to be another rift that becomes visible in the Turkey issue. Without a doubt, 
religious impact and practices are declining in Europe. So, at the end it is not the 
kind, but the degree of exercise related to religion that influences the perception:  
“In broad terms, Europe is becoming a post religious continent. In any case 
convictions, religion are very private affair. Whereas Turkey is a very reli-
gious country. So the difference is not only being Muslim against Christian 
but a very religious, fervently religious country vis-à-vis a post-religious con-
tinent.” (De la Pena) 
It is moreover the extent of the own religious practises than the religion itself seems 
that seems to provide explanations for the nation brand image of another country. 
 
8.3.8 Values/Beliefs 
Yet, some appreciation for an appropriate cultural behavior shaped by the Christian 
religion might survive. It was mentioned e.g. that it would be important for Turkey to 
attach itself to the value of tolerance, which was suggested to be of Christian origin. 
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In that sense, religion cannot be isolated as a specific cultural practise anymore, but 
should rather be interpreted as part of a more general value or belief system prevail-
ing in European countries.  
 
Another interesting value-related question appeared regarding the polarity of other-
ness vs. similarity. While for some purposes otherness transported positive connota-
tions (when referred to exoticism), otherness was mostly associated to create fear. 
Similarity to European countries would be an important value-related characteristic 
of Turkey to impact positive perceptions. To follow more closely on appreciation vs. 
rejection of otherness could provide interesting insights.  
 
8.3.9 Turkey’s national identity  
Turkey’s fierce struggles for identity between Orient and Occident, which were of-
tentimes reflected in my interviews to be blurring a clear-cut image of Turkey, are 
also present in the literature: “Turkish history constitutes one of the most worthwhile 
to study the experiment of coping with the problem of living in a “West” dominated 
world as a “non Westener” (Tezel, 2005: 8). This struggle continues to the very day: 
“They [the Turks] want to be like, to follow the model of, to become the Other” 
(Ger/Askegaard/Christensen, 1999: 168).  
Ironically, despite all historical Turkish efforts to westernize, in most Western Euro-
pean discourses exactly the argument of Otherness persists when judging Turks. In 
such a sense, Turkey’s nation brand has yet not managed to become Western enough, 
if this would still be the goal. The nation brand does not display the values of being 
Western.  
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In general, Turkey’s identity conflicts seem not to be broadly received in Europe at 
the moment; however they are realized by the knowledgeable experts and identified 
to hinder a clear-cut image of the nation brand Turkey on their sides. It can be as-
sumed that increasing brand knowledge on Turkey will lead to an increasing aware-
ness of these conflicts; Turkey’s brand perception in EU is endangered to potentially 
move from “bad” to “blurred” with increasing involvement with Turkey’s issues. 
The awareness of Turkey’s identity conflicts might make up an interesting indicator 
of brand knowledge.  
 
8.3.10 Familiarity/Knowledge of Turkey 
In her quantitative explorative study on conditions of Turkey’s overall nation image 
in 1991, Ger finds tourism (sun&beach) impressions, economic aspects and issues 
related to political repressions or human rights as dominant free associations of Tur-
key (Ger, 1991: 394). She furthermore detects positive impacts of both knowledge 
and personal travel experiences on the attitudes developed towards Turkey (Ger, 
1991: 396). My qualitative explorative study in the context of the EU accession as-
sumed also this relationship and found some evidence mainly for tourism, however 
also indicated that the positive relationships of knowledge/familiarity and perception 
do not necessarily need to hold for political images.  
 
Without doubt, familiarity with the nation brand Turkey partly explains the overall 
image of the nation and serves as an important criterion. All experts, by definition 
more familiar with Turkey, distanced themselves clearly from the mainstream dis-
courses in their home countries, of which it can be assumed that they are conducted 
on a much lower level of particular knowledge. The fact that almost all experts held 
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rather favorable images is the most obvious indicator that familiarity and knowledge 
must be regarded as very influential for a nation brand image. However it is impor-
tant to take a closer look at the knowledge and familiarity structures.  
 
Knowledge structures like e.g. tourism experiences can positively influence an image 
if they don’t collide with other dimensions of a nation brand that might even be more 
persistent and present. Both for the Netherlands and Germany, generally positive 
tourism experiences are not able to substantially contribute to Turkey’s image in the 
political context. It seems as if they can’t get through the dense layer of existing 
stereotypes. Different in UK and Sweden, where no deeply rooted prejudices seem to 
exist and nation brand images can contribute to the overall perception.  
 
Proximity and familiarity lead to a mixed picture: Spain and UK both are in not in 
close negative contact with the Muslim and/or Arab world, which seems to positively 
influence perception of Turkey. Germany and Netherlands, however, are in closed 
negative contact with Turkish immigrants, which leads to a quite negative position 
towards Turkey. Slovenia has no contact, which leads to a rather indifferent position. 
So familiarity will need to be carefully differentiated for the case of Turkey’s EU 
accession depending on the circumstances.  
 
8.3.11 Involvement/Commitment 
Involvement as an umbrella construct for familiarity, knowledge, interactions etc. 
related to the nation brand Turkey can not hold as a clear-cut explanation. Spain and 
Slovenia resemble the cases of quite low-involved societies with Turkey’s matters. In 
one case the image turns out to be quite positive, in the other case it is average. In the 
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sample, UK and Sweden stand for average involvement cases. The issue of Turkey’s 
EU accession itself has for different reasons not a high priority, yet ties to Turkey are 
quite visible. Despite these structural similarities we find good, average and bad 
overall nation brand images of Turkey in the findings. Germany and Netherlands, at 
last, seem to represent the case of a highly involved receiver. The image of Turkey’s 
nation brand there is rather low.  
 
Of course the specific role of Turkey’s immigrants has to be underlined to illustrate 
these relationships. Turkish migration seemed a very strong explanation for the turn-
out of Turkey’s image abroad. However, not necessarily the amount, but especially 
the perception of status and socio-economic situation of the immigrants seem to 
shape the picture and should be differentiated. The case of the Netherlands showed 
that this perception is moreover relative to the perception of other immigration 
groups.  
 
 
8.4 Consequences/Behaviors 
 
Nation brand researcher Simon Anholt’s conclusion for the overall brand image of 
Turkey reads:  
“Turkey […] suffers from an image which has been forged during an earlier 
and very different political era, and which now constantly obstructs its politi-
cal, economic, cultural and social aspirations. In many ways, Turkey’s brand 
image today in the West is in the same shape as if Atatürk had never lived” 
(Anholt, 2005d: 3).  
 
Although in the light of my findings Anholt largely overlooks the great impact of 
migrants of Turkish descent across Europe, the influence of past’ events on Turkey’s 
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image has also become clearly visible in the previous analysis. Anholt continues to 
forecast that Turkey’s “weak international brand image is likely to play a more fun-
damental role in questions of international relations and regional integration than 
many people imagine” (Anholt, 2005d: 3). We shall see in the following how the 
manifest formation of opinion and voting intention on the individual level in the con-
text of Turkey’s EU accession might be influenced by the nation brand image.  
 
The interpretation of the findings is slightly challenging. It is mainly difficult to de-
termine manifest action or political behavior as the outcome of perceptions and 
stereotypes.  
 
8.4.1 Voting intention  
Referenda are not seen as realistic, or they don’t ma ke up a relevant scenario at the 
moment because they still seem far away. Too many factors might influence the 
question whether there will be referenda on Turkey at all, and then, in the second 
step, what exactly these referenda would measure where.  
 
Accordingly, the attempt to have informants prognosticate potential referenda out-
comes on Turkey in the sampled EU nations did not produce a clear picture. For 
Spain the respective experts agreed on a clear yes and for Germany and the Nether-
lands a clear no was generated. For all other cases, however, the experts had either 
deviant outlooks or failed to give a forecast, the latter partly also because they re-
fused the entire scenario as not realistic or feasible.  
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In general referenda are judged quite negatively in the context of an EU accession 
decision; this finding holds for all nations in the sample and all backgrounds of the 
experts. Largely still impressed by the negative outcome of the referenda on the EU 
constitution in France and Netherlands in May 2005, almost all experts agree that 
this instrument will not qualify as a responsible way to treat Turkey’s membership 
accession. Voting decisions in referenda are blamed to be low-involved (Stauss) and 
dominated by emotions, which overshadow rationales (Leoprechting); referenda 
seem the opposite of rational decision making in a high-involvement situation. Ref-
erenda are not linked to reality (Schlötzer) and for the case of Turkey they would 
produce substantial rifts between the countries (Polenz).  
 
“I’m not a great supporter of referendums because I think people often vote 
for issues that have nothing to do with the question they are being asked. I 
think the French and the Dutch votes last year were heavily influenced by the 
economic and the general political atmosphere in France and the Netherlands 
at the time. I don’t think so many people who had voted had read the draft 
constitution. And they had conflicting idea about what it actually contained. 
So in the UK equally if British are asked to vote a referendum on Turkey’s 
membership I think inevitably people would vote on the issues that have 
nothing to do with Turkey. If for example it coincide with a period of racial 
tension, if there have been some unpleasant incident, some terrorist bomber 
like we saw last summer, and feelings with the Muslims become more nega-
tive then I think there would be a strong risk that people might vote against 
because they think Turkey Muslim, yes, Turks terrorist, no we mustn’t let 
them in. And I think the turnout would be low as well, as we inevitably not a 
very good reflection of what the nation thought, if it thought anything at all, I 
mean. So I think it is application of responsibility by the politicians actually. 
That’s why we elect governments, to decide these things for us. And I think 
when you hold a referendum then you are hoping somebody else does it for 
you so I hope the British government doesn’t hold a referendum because I 
simply don’t think people will necessarily give an accurate reflection of what 
they really think about Turkey.” (Jones) 
 
Also the Turkish experts spoke out clearly against referenda. Saying no in referenda 
is always easier than saying yes, because a no means no change (Ural), and com-
pared to previous accession practises referenda were regarded as unfair, because 
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there were none before (Arikan). Also, as indicated by Jones above, they can easily 
be instrumentalized for domestic affairs of the EU nation not paying any respect to 
the factual reality (Arikan). Negative public opinion could also be used as stalling 
tactics towards Turkey (Kramer).  
 
Because of these qualms, it is occasionally doubted that there will be referenda at all 
in Europe on Turkey’s EU accession (Kramer), or at least explicitly ruled out for 
some specific countries like Sweden (Kärre) or Slovenia (Grasseli).  
 
Therefore, referenda as measures of output of Turkey’s nation brand image in politi-
cal context currently don’t seem to provide a decent case for analysis.  
 
But, more than just for referenda the issue of Turkey qualifies obviously significant 
for purposes of domestic politics in general:  
“More and more it’s becoming material for local politics in Germany, in 
France, in Austria, and so all of a sudden European politicians started to use 
this image of Turkey created rightly or wrongly in some cases. As a means to 
get votes from their people. I don’t like Turks or I don’t want Turks in some 
countries can get about 5-10 % of votes.” (Yücaoglu) 
 
Especially with high unemployment or other negative economic developments topics 
like Turkey’s EU accession can bring along some momentum for election campaigns 
(Stauss). On the other side might a comparably high level of political correctness in 
the media discourses on politics especially in Europe’s elder democracies like Ger-
many be in the way of a clear and explicit theming of Turkey in regional or national 
elections. While the Turkish experts repeatedly articulate the fear of Turkey being an 
ongoing side-issue in national elections, most experts from Europe don’t see the 
topic relevant enough for a permanent campaign. Regular election situations in the 
 215 
future 10 years in EU member-states therefore neither qualify as a good indicator of 
political behavior nor as a function of Turkey’s nation brand image.  
 
8.4.2 Political actions and image 
In another main trace of argumentation, many experts mention facts speaking against 
negative image. Turkey’s positive reform process might eventually evaporate public 
resistance (Asp) and hence counteract images. Turkey must just keep up its positive 
path and the rest will follow.  
Interestingly, in these discourses there is a great amount of political rationality as-
sumed for the consumer of politics, as if realities can fully do away with images. The 
classic opposition of image and reality/facts is reactivated, but even stronger. Images 
of Turkey in the context of the discussion of consequences are not seen as amplified 
realities, but as oppositions to reality.  
It is repeatedly underlined that Europe and Turkey will both look a lot different in 10 
years. Kramer argues that images of political entities like nations tend to only very 
slowly change; eventually facts change much quicker than perceptions.  
All these arguments don’t seem deeply reflected in the context of current theory of 
political marketing. In a way the informants at this point advocate an idealization of 
political conduct as a purely rational discourse, which seems somewhat odd in the 
light of evolving political marketing practises we discussed before.  
 
More realistic seems to view image in interplay with political action. A long acces-
sion process will provide more knowledge on Turkey and make Turkey more famil-
iar to Europe (Asp). The understanding of image as a brand knowledge structure is 
supported here. Success stories of other new member states might produce new con-
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fidence about EU enlargement in general. Positive images attached to Turkey in time 
might gain strength when for example new contenders like Ukraine enter the picture. 
Also political action is the result of Turkey’s nation brand image. The negative per-
ception provides additional motivation to attack substantial political changes. At the 
end of successful political processes in Turkey and EU aiming at a full membership, 
there might even be a point at which Turkey might not need the goodwill of EU na-
tions anymore. A good image might therefore not become an ultimate aim, but prove 
its importance rather mainly during the process:  
“But my point was that if Turkey reaches to a point, closes all the chapters 
and accepted and then one referendum it’s rejected, I don’t think that this will 
create too much problems because this would mean that we have reached to 
the level of perhaps Norway or Switzerland, where these countries, you know 
they are not keen on becoming a member. So on one hand this is vitally im-
portant, not for the full membership at the end, but through the process when 
we will be facing lots of obstacles. If we can manage to have a positive image 
during the process in those difficult countries, in quotations, then we might 
have less problems during the process”. (Sungar) 
 
8.4.3 Favorability of Turkey’s EU accession  
In a general trend, the distribution of public opinion as measured in the Eurobarome-
ter studies is in line with my findings. The interplay of this opinion data and my find-
ings about perceptions, attitudes and collective discourses on Turkey reveals how-
ever some unexpected details.  
The dominant negative public opinion in Germany was well explained by the nega-
tive image Turkey has there; especially the immigration situation combined with 
some peculiarities related to the German character turned out to elucidate Turkey’s 
bad perception. In addition it was indicated that the fact of 4,5 million German tour-
ists to Turkey cannot counterbalance the negative impression.  
Also the rather positive opinion on Turkey’s EU membership in Spain, Sweden and 
Slovenia was affirmed in my study; in all three countries a rather positive image of 
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Turkey was found. Surprisingly though no initially presumed categories like religion 
or distance vs. proximity, which are occasionally present in public discourses, seem 
to give reason for this favourability, but rather the absence of negative experiences 
paired with recent positive EU accession experiences.  
The cases of Netherlands and UK require some special attention. Public opinion of 
Turkey’s EU accession in the Netherlands turns out slightly more positive than it 
could have been anticipated in the light of my findings. Although in general the opin-
ion about Turkey’s EU membership is still negative, in both categories of favourabil-
ity and nonacquiescence in the Eurobarometer data (European Commission, 2005b) 
there is a 20% gap compared to Germany, although for both countries similar condi-
tions for the important factor immigration with Turkish descent hold. The interviews 
showed a slight tendency in Dutch society to differentiate between different groups 
of Muslim immigrants especially in the aftermath of religious clashes in the recent 
past with an improving perception of Turks vis à vis e.g. Moroccans. Possibly this 
trend was revealed in the expression of public opinion in fall 2005.  
UK’s public opinion of Turkey is not as enthusiastic as one could expect from my 
findings. Clearly Turkey does not have a negative image there. However, the Euro-
barometer data (2005b), which had been collected in October 2005, shows 42% 
against Turkey’s EU membership. It can be assumed that this expression of opinion 
was also still largely impacted by the Terrorist bombings in London during summer 
2005. Especially with earlier public opinion data (European Commission, 2005c, 
Altinbasak Ebrem, 2004) being more positive on Turkey, this temporal bias might 
reasonably be assumed to explain this slight deviation, underlining the volatility of 
opinion pointed out earlier.  
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8.4.4 Impact on public opinion and political behavior  
In qualitative research it is the full contextual interpretation of the data that leads to 
interesting findings (Coffey/Atkinson, 1996). For the case of Turkey’s EU accession, 
the expressed indignation by almost every informant about potential referenda, and 
the line of their reasoning on the importance of factual improvements in opposition 
to mere images as shown above, serves as a very good indicator of how important 
images in fact have become for the political marketing in general and for the case of 
Turkey’s nation brand in particular.  
 
Clearly, all informants largely welcomed the scenario of a communication and public 
diplomacy campaign disseminating positive messages on Turkey. There can be no 
doubt that the informants have some consciousness of the relevance of Turkey’s na-
tion brand image for the future conduct of EU accession process. We will discuss 
some of these managerial implications later.  
 
It seems therefore clear that Turkey’s nation brand image will be influential and full 
of consequences in the EU accession process, during which political actions cannot 
be seen independent of underlying images. Kramer points out that no government 
can – in the long run – rule against the majority will in the population. So, Turkey’s 
image will need to undergo changes eventually and a clearer picture of the nation 
brand needs to be perceived until the time has come to decide on Turkey’s accession.  
 
The difficulty of finding an expression of political behavior, which could be ade-
quately operationalized for the outcomes/consequences of the Turkish image, was 
mentioned before. Public opinion has been criticized as a weak snapshot and not a 
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substantial psychological state throughout this thesis. Regarding public opinion ex-
pressions on the degree of appreciation of Turkey’s EU membership, for which a 
good amount of data is at hand with Eurobarometer (2005a, b) and others, Polenz, 
Kramer and Yücaoglu all point out how difficult an appropriate measurement of a 
loose construct like opinion will be62.  
 
 
8.5 Reflection of framework and study design  
 
Within the pillar of antecedents of Turkey’s nation brand image, the structural char-
acteristic of the respective EU country like wealth, size, and duration of EU member-
ship had some interesting implications. Also the general vision towards the EU pro-
vided some explanatory value. The status of a nation within the international political 
system EU will probably impact the perception of potential new members. Extent of 
religious practises turned out more interesting than the religion itself. For the media 
information, the differentiation of ‘paid’ and ‘unpaid’ content seems to provide in-
sights. Besides some structural criteria, the stereotypes and also the cultural practises 
related to Turkey qualified as helpful indicators to explain Turkey’s nation brand 
image content. Value-systems especially with regard to their treatment of otherness 
were found to be of notable impact. Finally, within the complex construct of famili-
arity and knowledge, particularly the distinction of familiarity with Turkish immi-
grants, Turkey itself and with the Muslim world in general turned out to be meaning-
ful subcategories for any further analysis.  
 
                                                 
62 They show, for example, that already omitting or adding the phrase „if Turkey meets all EU crite-
ria“ when asking if or not Turkey should become a member of the EU, will have a crucial impact on 
the outcome.  
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To collect a decent measure of image content, the different dimensions like tourism, 
exports form Turkey etc. turned out to be an appropriate spectrum for the analysis of 
Turkey’s nation brand image content. The fact that Turkey seems currently not to 
score well especially in some economy-related issues makes the perception of “made 
in Turkey” or of investment opportunities interesting to watch parallel to expected 
continuing improvement of the overall economic performance. A dominant finding 
was that Turkey’s nation brand’s image is largely influenced by the perception of its 
people; it is therefore suggested to isolate this brand image dimension. The cultural 
dimension and the religious dimension should also be separated for the case of the 
secular, dominant Muslim country entering the EU, and also to better isolate the ap-
parently decisive people factor.  
 
Having potential referenda voting behavior depicting possible conative structures 
within Turkey’s nation brand image turned out as a difficult approach. This scenario 
is much too uncertain, too complicated and too distant in time to be reasonably ap-
plied. It seems as if the flashlight opinion on Turkey’s membership would need to 
suffice as an indicator of behavior. However it is suggested to differentiate the condi-
tional case [‘if Turkey has successfully negotiated the Aquis Communitaire’] from a 
general mood about Turkey’s membership. By this, the suggested interplay between 
factual developments and images, and between the affective and cognitive structures 
of Turkey’s nation brand image with regard to their conative implications could be 
more closely observed.  
 
These reflections lead to the following revision of the framework developed before.  
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Figure 8-9: Revised framework of Turkey’s nation brand image in EU contexts  
 
It turned out that the sample included more EU nations that favor Turkey’s accession 
than those that oppose in terms of the Eurobarometer opinion data 63; yet this was 
“pure random” and not considered during sampling. From the author’s point of view 
this fact seems not to harm to the findings. Clearly a majority in the EU holds a nega-
tive image of Turkey, and therefore the sample is biased in this regard. However, 
especially with respect to managerial issues to be discussed later, this bias might not 
even be disadvantageous. With Germany and the Netherlands two solid cases of 
rather negative public opinion were present in the study and provided rich explana-
tions.  
 
Looking back at the conduct of the interviews, the topic guide of the study seemed 
too restrictive and excessively structured in certain areas. The investigation of the 
different dimensions of the image content, for example, was mostly directed. An ex-
ploration of additional contents did not occur. A couple of other previous studies, 
                                                 
63 Compare to 5.2.6 
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especially the Nation Brand Index work (Anholt/NBI 2005 a, b, c, d) and the study of 
Altinbasak-Ebrem (2004) applied a similar framework supposedly successfully. 
However, a chance was wasted to more deeply explore the content dimensions of a 
nation brand image as far as they are meaningful in a political context.  
 
Sampling experts turned out to be a two-edged sword. Their expertise was mostly 
quite valuable; however the levels of depth, partly correlated to the time they could 
spare for the interviewes, were quite deviant. Interviewing political experts from the 
embassies might have not always been a good decision. As touched upon earlier, 
their universally comparably more positive outlook on Turkey was noticeable: they 
might have a non-negligible bias due to their function serving in a way both home 
and host country. Maybe interviewing e.g. members of the national parliament with 
special knowledge on Turkey, but without diplomatic constraints could have served 
the purposes better.  
Of all informants, political or marketing consultants and journalists were the most 
impressive sources. It might be their professional routine to operate in interviews or a 
special method to process and reflect knowledge that qualified them as most insight-
ful sources.  
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8.6 Connections between nation brand image and general brand image models 
 
This thesis was rooted in different research traditions on brands and brand images. 
As these theory traits were taken to the political domain to be applied as a context, 
looking at the findings of the applications some transfers back to the general level of 
brand models seem tempting. Both for the status of brands as theoretical entities and 
for instrumental implications for brand communications some connections can be 
made in the light of the cultural branding theory developed by Douglas Holt (2004), 
which was introduced earlier as an interesting current theoretical folio for this re-
search contexts.  
 
8.6.1 Nation brands and cultural branding  
The analysis of the case model of Turkey has shown how productive stereotypes and 
the underlying collective negotiation of Turkey’s nation brand were for the actual 
image. Current mainstream managerial image models accounting for individuals as-
sociations and attributions would fall short covering these aspects and fail to provide 
substantial explanatory power for Turkey’s rejection across Europe. For nation 
brands it was shown how discursive formations in the social background like cultural 
roots, stereotypes or general nomological networks were highly influential. 
 
At present there seem to be many indications that similar processes also hold for 
other comparably complex entities in the marketplace. Increasing awareness for the 
social role of companies, often discussed with the label corporate social responsibil-
ity, indicates the growing embedding of corporate brands in societal networks. Con-
sequently also at the level of corporate brands a broader managerial approach as well 
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as a more complex theoretical model accounting for the cultural role of these entities 
– as suggested by Holt (2004) – can be expected.  
 
Turkey served as a very interesting extreme case of nation brand image, where – as 
claimed theoretically – the division line of inside and outside of a brand indeed 
turned out to be helpless. Turkey’s nation brand identity, the negotiation of ‘Turkish-
ness’ within Turkey’s society and between Turks in Turkey and migrant Turks 
abroad, shape how Turkey’s nation brand image is perceived. In Holt’s definition a 
brand is seen as a performer of an identity myth (Holt, 2004: 14), reconciling internal 
and external approaches to brands: “Identity myths are usually set in populist worlds: 
places separated not only from everyday life but also from the realms of commerce 
and elite control” (Holt, 2004: 9). Insiders in the cultural context of a brand are the 
source material in the populist world, and it does not matter for this model if these 
insiders are on the payroll of a company or not. For the case of Turkey most hetero-
geneous groups would qualify as source material for the nation brand’s myth – Turks 
in Turkey, Turks outside of Turkey and also knowledgeable foreigners about Turkey 
serving as messengers to their fellow country men.  
 
Figure 7-10: Social Network of Brands (Holt, 2004: 140) 
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It can be assumed that similar for complex corporate brands most different types of 
“insiders” placed within and outside the organizational spectrum of the corporation 
generate the source material for a brand’s myth serving to followers and feeders on 
the outer layers of brands.  
 
Especially in Germany or the Netherlands it became clear that Turkey’s image is 
largely shaped outside the sphere of control of the nation brand Turkey. Brand mes-
sages presumably within the Turkish sphere of influence such as products or tourism 
have either only little impact on the attitude formation or lead to a quite biased pic-
ture. It is however mainly the Turks in Europe shaping the image of Turkey in the 
EU nations. The nation brand of Turkey in these cases definitely better represents the 
assumption of a culturally shaped entity than the model of an organisation owning a 
set of associations in a firm brand DNA – to again apply the distinction made by Holt 
(2004: 14).  
 
The informant Kramer kept calling the blend of Turkey’s impressions in European 
publics’ minds “subcutaneous”, and by this referred to an entity which is deeply cul-
turally rooted – not explicitly present in the conscious mind, but in a way genetically 
predisposed and part of a cultural code. Turkey as a nation brand, whether actively or 
not actively, qualifies as an identity brand in the broader sense of Holt’s concept of 
brands “that have spun such compelling myths that they have become cultural icons” 
(Holt, 2004: 5). Successful (political) communication activates and applies these 
deeply rooted cultural values trying to keep Turkey out of EU. Unfortunately for 
Turkey such a “cultural” argumentation is currently mainly applied by conservative 
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streams in the EU opposing Turkey’s membership referring to historical prejudices 
or religious fears.  
 
8.6.2 Nation brand communication  
The status of Turkey’s nation brand as a socially negotiated network of meanings 
suggests that it is especially the collective discourses that produce brand knowledge 
on Turkey. Therefore the role of “people to people”-communication, as the informant 
Ural put it, will be crucial. This approach would be largely backed by the finding that 
the “people factor” was isolated as the most decisive nation brand dimension of Tur-
key.  
 
Holt’s model of the social networks around brands suggests that there exist a hierar-
chy of brand involvement descending from insiders over followers to feeders (Holt, 
2004: 140). Of special importance is the alignment of insiders with the brand for the 
purpose of successful brand communication. Insiders are nodal points in the commu-
nicative network of a brand. For Turkey to initiate interaction between different 
groups of audiences initiated by the insiders seems quite promising. This also implies 
the necessity to well connect to the Turks living abroad. Maintaining a good connec-
tion to these insiders might be a key in the ‘people-to-people’ communication task.  
 
Again, a link to the commercial realm seems permissible. The importance of “word-
of-mouth” has been detected by the marketing industry in the past 10 years and 
popular concepts like BUZZ, below-the-radar marketing or viral marketing flow 
around. Holt (2004: 35) criticizes these approaches in that they mostly focus on the 
fact that brands are talked about at all, and tend to ignore the quality, the contents of 
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the myths activated in these brand interactions. From the findings of my research this 
criticism needs to be emphasized. The negative, self-feeding rumour about Turkey 
clearly qualifies for a nice viral project in the commercial world, but also indubitably 
does Turkey massive harm. Socially held and negotiated meanings of brands would 
be productive for the Turkey’s nation brand’s perception only if they lead to a posi-
tive discourse. In the present form as roaming and self-feeding negative stereotypes 
they are detrimental.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS FOR TURKEY’S NATION 
BRAND IMAGE 
 
 
 
On the periphery of my research, some interesting findings hint at managerial impli-
cations of Turkey’s nation brand image; they seem relevant with regard to the con-
crete challenges related to the conduct of nation brand management in political con-
texts awaiting Turkey in the following years, especially with regard to the public 
diplomacy process just starting in Turkey.  
 
 
9.1 Managerial challenges for Turkey’s nation brand image 
 
As mentioned before (Thompson, 2004b; Dogan, 2005a), Turkey’s EU accession is 
also at last a major communication and PR task. The most pressing aspects found in 
the interviews should be summarized. Turkey faces also a couple of brand position-
ing dilemmas. Finally, the actual management process of the complex entity of Tur-
key’s nation brand should be addressed.  
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9.1.1 Selling Turkey’s politics 
Turkey’s PR deficit is looked at from different angles. Both Boyner and Sungar con-
cede that Turkey’s ability to sell itself has never been outstandingly good: “That is 
why firstly we are a nation who really doesn’t know too much about public relations. 
And still there is gap in that regard” (Sungar). This blame is directed to the entire 
people: “I mean when you look at the Turkish culture, it’s not just this government. 
When you look at our republic’s history we always have a problem of expressing 
ourselves. Or putting out the correct picture” (Boyner). 
First of all, this refers to mere quantity and the fact that Turkey should take place 
more often with positive news and, probably even more importantly, less often with 
negative news. 
“The first and by far the most important thing is avoiding negative headlines, 
don’t put your most famous novelist on trial. Don’t put your top journalists in 
court. Relax. These people are not threatening the existence of Turkey. Tur-
key’s a lot stronger than that. Have confidence in your own country and cul-
ture. Change these laws, get rid of 301. Because in a way the less we hear a-
bout Turkey in the news the better for Turkey’s image.” (Jones)  
Recalling the many negative image issues debated in the media across Europe listed 
in chapter 6, this rather simple advice seems convincing. 
 
But, of at least equal importance seems the quality of conduct: how are Turkish poli-
tics sold abroad? These style-related aspects of brand communication are sources of 
nation images for Turkey and currently transport negative characteristics.  
“It’s [Turkey] taken a very defensive view at itself. So for example, when 
anyone has made a critical comment about Turkey, rather than digesting that 
intelligently, and responding at the right time, it amazingly becomes defen-
sive and aggressive and goes into an attack mode. And it does it very very 
quickly and it generally says the wrong things that stimulate even greater kind 
of questioning and antipathy towards Turkey.” (Anderson) 
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This conduct leads to irritation among Western audiences and thus it is not only con-
tent, but also packaging of nation brand communication that will influence the recep-
tion.  
“In the eye of Dutch politicians and in the eye of Dutch public opinion, they 
[Turkish politicians] should really refrain from making what you may call a 
bit bluntly these very Mediterranean, agitated ‘I’m a leader, therefore I'm 
strong guy’ kind of speeches. Because that doesn’t go down very well with 
both politicians and public opinion. And the colder north western areas of 
Europe”. (van Haaften) 
 
Finally, in line with the overlaps between internal and external brand image and 
identity mechanisms, selling Turkey’s EU accession at home will be of strategic im-
portance. Without such inner will articulated in Turkey, Ümit Boyner thinks that any 
external promotion approaches make little sense. And vice versa, all issues addressed 
abroad must and will be reflected at home: 
“Actually whatever we do outside of Turkey will be reflected here. I think it’s 
important that because of the issues we’re addressing I think it’s important for 
the Turkish public to know what European Union means for us. If you ask 
that question to Turks you’ll get many different answers. So I think it’s an 
educational process for all of us. So whatever we do outside will have some 
sort of a reflection back home.” (Boyner) 
The Nation Brand Effect introduced in Chapter 3 seems definitely at work here.  
 
Recalling Sweden’s accession process this importance of reaching internal audiences 
is largely underlined:  
“Today you see a number of difficult issues on the agenda like Cyprus, well 
known to everybody, but there will be other small things that will be ex-
tremely difficult and for the public opinion so the government needs to fore-
see these difficulties, they need to have a strategy internally towards the Turk-
ish population. I think if you go back and look at every single accession, what 
you will see is that people are extremely excited when the decision is taken to 
start to negotiate and then eventually as you get deeper and deeper into the 
negotiation eventually you have the perception that those people are bureau-
crats in Brussels, they now have the saying about a lot of things and they are 
going to decide over our lives. And we will have very little to say about that. 
And so if you look at the public opinion during accession negotiations, you’ll 
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probably see that there is not a single case the opinion of the people are in fa-
vor of the accession.” (Asp) 
 
All in all, there is a high relevance to professionally organize Turkey’s nation brand 
PR towards all stakeholders: “The need for trust also means that EU accession is 
partly a public relation exercise” (Grabbe, 2004: 16). A closer look at current mecha-
nisms of Turkey’s nation brand PR will be taken later. 
 
9.1.2 Positioning dilemma  
Positioning Turkey as a nation brand and identifying the most relevant messages 
poses an interesting challenge. 
The positive discourses on Turkey are highly rationalized and touch upon strategic (= 
distant in time and relevance) issues that will not directly affect European publics’ 
lives (Kramer). Yet, from political communication standpoints ideally emotional 
issues should be focussed (Stauss).  
“These are hard issues to describe, from communication point of view. So we 
have to find out more emotional visuals, other than rational ones, but more 
emotional.” (Ural) 
 
Unfortunately, positive emotional messages for Turkey seem hard to generate. “Also 
ich sehe da nichts, wo man sozusagen rein über die emotionale Schiene sozusagen 
auch das Subkutane umkrempeln könnte.“ [So, I don’t see anything that merely on 
the so to say emotional track could turn the subcutane upside down] (Kramer). Mes-
sages from tourism might turn out to be quite ambivalent in their effects for countries 
especially with significant immigration with Turkish descent. Other positive emo-
tional connecting points stemming from Turkey’s nation brand image across large 
publics were not elicited in the previous analysis. For issues like youth or economic 
vibrancy, positively highlighted in some interviews, it was shown that – possibly 
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dependent on the dominant national character – in other environments they may lead 
to envy or fear. Apparently improving situations for women or minorities are not 
strong enough to qualify as a core message.  
 
In addition, for those nations where tourism seems unboundedly positive among 
broad publics, there is still a dilemma with regard to the main selling points of the 
umbrella nation brand Turkey. Tourism to Turkey contains the exotic, slightly Arabic 
character of Turkey as part of the special charm. In other words, for tourism promo-
tion staging of otherness would probably contribute positively. However, with re-
spect to advancing Turkey’s EU membership it was found important to underline 
rather similarities in terms of developed business quarters, Western-mindedness of 
the people or general Mediterranean character of cities.  
“Turkish cities, they don’t look so different to cities in other parts of southern 
Europe. Yes, they're Muslim, yes it's a different cultural environment, but at 
the end of the day it’s the food, the air, the people, the drink, it’s not so diffe-
rent. In fact it is very similar. So maybe trying to project this idea, Turkey’s 
been another Mediterranean country as, like Spain or Italy,  
JK: So similarity rather than otherness?  
GJ: Yeah. Obviously that’s a bit tradeoff. Because Turkey also needs to pro-
mote its otherness for purposes of tourism, so that people would be attracted 
to that. As long as it's not too other, and too threatening, that’s part of Tur-
key’s charm, part of its attraction. But it can be seen partly familiar, but at the 
same time exotic. It’s kind of like exoticism light.” (Jones) 
 
How can this dilemma between otherness and similarity be moderated with regard to 
brand management aspects? Maybe it can’t or doesn’t have to at all, and this di-
lemma makes up Turkey’s tribute to the EU – harmonizing tradition with modernity:  
“Even if they are not the same type of images, one is the modern industrial-
ized and then the other is the more traditional, where there are perhaps needs 
where the EU can contribute, the one is where Turkey gets some thing to us 
and the other is where we can give something to Turkey.” (Kärre) 
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Turkey’s historical struggles for identity between the poles of Orient and Occident 
are likewise resembled in this positioning dilemma. Without any doubt it will be a 
very complex task to operate Turkey’s nation brand.  
 
9.1.3 Integrative nation brand management  
In line with, but also in addition to the general recommendations and findings regard-
ing nation brand management outlined in chapter 4, the management of the brand 
Turkey will need to be integrative in several directions.  
 
As indicated earlier there is a multitude of messages and identities stemming from 
Turkey. What used to be one main essence of the Turkish Republic, the unity of a 
Turkish identity, seems endangered nowadays. Consistence of Turkish identity, fa-
cilitated by rigid centralism, which was highlighted as outstanding initial branding 
work for Turkey by Atatürk (see chapter 6), is hard to find when it comes to branding 
tasks related to Turkey in the 21st century. 
“Also you know very secular, almost anti-religion stance of the, that wasn’t 
enough. I think it was OK in the 1920’s but later on, to have a sort of dog-
matic state, with a state ideology, that was the wrong thing. Our education 
system...all our approach, Turks are just learning to become analytical people. 
Because our education system is, it was a dogmatic state ideology. It's too 
narrow, to try to put 70 million who have different religious beliefs, who have 
different cultural identities, I think it just exploded.” (Boyner) 
 
Accordingly, coherence in messages for the brand Turkey seems difficult to accom-
plish with these history- and identity related contentions at work: 
“We are a continuation of the Ottoman empire in one sense. So I think that 
the lack of homogeneity is giving a lot of different perspectives and sort of 
putting it in a melting pot is very difficult.” (Boyner) 
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Compared to other nations then also the identification of the core brand messages 
becomes quite a challenge: “Turkey is very hard to brand with one or two simple 
messages” (Yücaoglu), who e.g. takes Ireland focusing on being an attractive FDI 
object and on Golf as a counterexample.  
 
Finally, the task is furthermore complicated with Turkey disseminating also nation 
brand messages through the emigrants to some EU states.  
“We for example, know very well, that the perceptions are shaped very much 
with the Turkish migrant workers in Europe. And today to what extent the 
Turkish people in Europe represent Turkey at large is a different story, I 
mean, a part of it, a segment of it, maybe that’s fine. And we should be honest 
as well to see that Turkey is not necessarily the Turkey that we are trying to 
portray abroad as well. So we have to come up with the real strengths of Tur-
key”. (Özcelik) 
 
Reconciling inside and outside of Turkey’s nation brand, as indicated earlier makes 
the challenge quite particular, as well as identifying and controlling (as far as possi-
ble) the brand messages: EU’s enlargement will also be decided in Berlin-Kreuzberg 
(Rosenkranz, 2004a). 
 
Although branding, PR, promotion, perceptions or general strategies were mixed up 
in above collection, in a sense all these constraints circle a similar problem – who or 
which institution coordinates Turkey’s nation brand?  
 
Among the experts in my sample there is a large disagreement on management of 
brand and later brand communication for Turkey. In line with most theoretical mod-
els (see Chapter 4) a central steering body is desired by some:  
“There should be somebody, a conductor. It’s an orchestra but the flutes are 
playing differently and the violins... So someone has to put them in harmo-
ny.” (Sungar) 
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Accordingly, a principal need for some centrality in terms of commonly aligned mes-
sages is realized.  
“But of course you have to have one common message but for tourism, for 
business, for security, these are important, you have different target groups, 
you have to... So you can use a different sort of campaigns.” (Ural) 
 
Yet, not all agree on such an extent of centrality.  
“Because it would be great if there was a concerted effort on some level 
but...it’s very easy to fall into the trap of trying to count the trees and not see 
the jungle. If you spend so much time on the framework, then you're losing so 
much time because if you have so many people engaged into this effort, right 
now they’re trying to bring all civil initiatives under one umbrella. TOBB 
says I will be the umbrella. They say IKV should be the umbrella. As 
TÜSIAD we don’t believe it’s realistic. Everybody can have an effort and we 
can help each other. But to actually have an umbrella and others come into 
play and we don’t believe it would work well.” (Boyner) 
 
This scepticism on the side of TÜSIAD is probably also influenced by the negative 
experience the nation brand initiative TÜ®KIYE (see chapter 6) brought along; it 
was initialized, but – when presented after significant efforts were made by individu-
als and non-governmental initiatives – abandoned by the government without stating 
an explicit reason64. 
 
The role of the government in the nation brand management of Turkey is critical. 
The lead role might be self-evident due to financing matters: “The government as the 
one who pays the money, we have this saying, the one who pays the money have the 
instrument to tune, something to that effect”. (Sungar)  
 
                                                 
64 There is some unclarity as to what exactly motivated the Erdogan administration to not follow-up at 
all on the framework produced by TÜ®KIYE by winter 2003. Some experts claim there were mainly 
budgetary constraints at work preventing any realization of the framework. Others however blame 
competence demarcations between the public and the private sector or ignorance on the side of the 
government for the failure.  
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Beyond budget issues, many informants suspect competence shortages on the side of 
the government to conduct meaningful nation branding. The solutions would be to 
enrich government by some kind of committee. This steering committee, consisting 
of competent members from governmental and non-governmental areas and integrat-
ing political, marketing, technical etc. competencies, would execute the coordination 
of the nation brand.  
 
Another challenge stems from the need to demarcate competencies within such a 
steering scenario. Not only between the public and the private sector, but also among 
governmental institutions themselves like ministries or information agencies the co-
ordination seems to be a troublesome task.  
 
Finally it is the shortage of robust information database on Turkey’s nation brand 
perception posing a challenge to management and coordination. Neither private or 
public nor the academic sector has so far produced reliable quantitative data on Tur-
key’s nation brand image abroad. Budgetary constraints, but also issues of compe-
tence demarcations and deviant perception of information needs between the differ-
ent agents in Turkey’s nation brand seem responsible for this critical lack of informa-
tion.  
 
 
9.2 Turkey’s nation brand political communication activities  
 
In the light of the previous findings the present conduct of Turkey’s nation brand 
communication seems worthy of a closer look. Brand communication is one of only 
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few antecedents of a nation brand image that seem under control of the nation brand 
itself.  
 
Two general strings of Turkey’s nation brand promotion can be distinguished. Tour-
ism and trade promotion, which are not mainly designed to promote Turkey for the 
sake of a successful EU application, but which will of course contribute to the gen-
eral perception of the nation on the one hand65; and a specifically directed communi-
cation effort addressing the central issues of Turkey’s EU accession process and 
membership perspective on the other hand. In the context of this thesis we shall focus 
on the latter.  
 
9.2.1 Communication activities related to the EU accession process 
On EU level approx. €40 Mio. are expected to be spent on dialogue projects includ-
ing community programs and bilateral exchange projects between partners in Turkey 
and EU (Rehn, 2005: 57). These budgets are located within the ‘civil society dia-
logue’ program, which was substantially increased after the lost Constitution refer-
enda in 2005 (Parker). 
 
This support from the EU is quite important. It seems evident however that the larg-
est task to positively impact Turkey’s image in EU-Europe rests on the shoulders of 
Turkey and the Turkish people:  
                                                 
65 The author earlier analyzed recent and historic advertising campaigns for Turkey and was involved 
in some current planning for new global advertising and promotion campaign plans executed by the 
agency Wunderman. As a main finding it can be said that the tourism promotion is not connected to a 
larger contextualized nation brand campaign. It does not reveal a representative picture of Turkey but 
concentrates on the tourist hotspots. As reported earlier, tourism is not necessarily the helpful key for 
Turkey’s overall nation brand image. In terms of nation brand promotion Turkey has been focussing a 
long time on tourism, and it necessary to broaden this perspective. In foreign trade promotions, cur-
rently mostly individual products or industries are highlighted. As for tourism, it is not visible how 
export promotion pays in to a coherent and substantial campaign for the nation brand of Turkey (Ar-
tok, 2002).  
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“Without doubt, the EU governments must help us [...], but it is primarily our 
responsibility to demonstrate what we are and what we are not. We shouldn’t 
forget that we cannot impose ourselves on Europe, irrespective how much we 
deserve to be in the club. We have to show the Europeans that it is the very 
best interest of each and every EU citizen to have Turkey included in the un-
ion” (Kanli, 2004: 3). 
 
EU enlargement commissioner, Olli Rehn, has to be consented therefore that “Tur-
key’s best asset to gain support in public opinion in the EU is to show unambiguous 
and relentless commitment to democratic transformation and European values. As 
Turkey produces good news […] this will have a great impact on European opinion” 
(Rehn, 2005: 57).  
 
Relevant communication activities initiated by the government are mainly organized 
in the so-called ‘European Union Communication Group’ ABIG (Avrupa Birligi 
Iletisim Grubu), which was founded in fall 2003 and located at the Foreign Ministry. 
It claims to coordinate communication activities by the Foreign Ministry, of the Min-
istry of Culture and Tourism, of the General Directorate for Press and Information 
and by the General Secretary for EU affairs in Turkey (Dogan, 2005a: 35) and is 
responsible for the “comprehensive presentation of Turkey’s candidacy for member-
ship of the European Union to a large national and international audience” (ABIG; 
2005: 180). As most important tasks of this office press and media relations with EU 
countries and – together with other partners – the initiation and organization of 
events and festivals like the Eurovision Song Contest in Istanbul 2004 or the culture 
festival “simdi/now” which was held in different EU capitals in 2004 and 2005 are 
regarded (Dogan, 2005a: 36). Apart from that a website66 to feed different target 
groups like the general public, opinion leaders, the education sector, political institu-
                                                 
66 www.abig.org.tr 
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tions and government bodies, local authorities and specific professions with back-
ground information on Turkey and its European aspiration are said to be provided by 
the organization (ABIG, 2005). 
 
Within this scope, some solutions for the positioning dilemma indicated earlier might 
evolve. Intercultural encounters might well contribute to approximate Europe and 
Turkey closer. The civil society dialogue initiatives by the EU, if implemented suc-
cessfully, must be welcomed in the light of the findings from the expert interviews. 
Numerous informants underlined the necessity to increase interactions between the 
societies. Considering the power of collectively stored and activated brand knowl-
edge on Turkey such as stereotypes, and acknowledging the fact that Turkish people 
were found out to be the most relevant and productive brand dimension of Turkey at 
the moment, increased multilateral interaction even might turn out to be a solution 
for the problems finding emotional ties to Turkey outlined earlier.  
“I think one way is maybe to do some campaigns from people to people. [...] I 
guess people understand themselves more easily they can interact so, I will 
suggest but this is not easy to implement such a campaign. […].This is the 
best way to understand that because they’re interested people, the people, 
mostly just other people like the politicians or governments, this is why they 
are afraid, they are afraid for the people, Turkish people, not the Turkish go-
vernment. […]The people always think with their emotions, act with their 
emotions. Even before the rational issues you have to show them the emotio-
nal part of this problem. So it’s also the easiest way to make people to react, 
just to use their emotions. Contact with the emotions. I think we should do 
more emotional...rational is OK, you can talk to business communities, but 
when it comes to general public, again people to people.” (Ural)  
 
Accordingly, of course also the progressing integration of EU citizens with Turkish 
descent gives reasons for hope. Their participation in societies in terms of academic, 
artistic, sports or general cultural achievements will bear the potential to improve the 
image of the Turks in general and outline a positive scenario of multiculturalism. 
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Celebrities like the film director Fatih Akin or the singer Tarkan with cross-cultural 
migration biographies lead the way. Such positive role models would also help to 
overcome the positioning dilemma sketched before: the integration of both the occi-
dental and oriental world in post-modern European societies. 
 
One of the most influential NGOs in Turkey, TÜSIAD, which is the main industrial-
ist lobby, arouse some attention in fall 2005 when they announced to mount its own 
campaign stressing the countries economic progress. The 10-year campaign is de-
signed to transform Turkey’s image in Europe by convincing people to look beyond 
old stereotypes (Bilefski, 2005). The project is lead by one of Turkey’s leading busi-
nesswomen, Ümit Boyner. She is quoted by Boland (2005: 1) on the purpose of the 
campaign: “I don’t think we Turks think enough about how public opinion is so im-
portant”. The campaign, independent from the government, shall underline the rich-
ness of the country in terms of art, business and civil society (including women is-
sues) (Boland, 2005).  
 
From this initiative currently a strong call goes back to the government to amplify 
efforts on their side: “As long as the government fails to develop a strategy for ex-
plaining to the people why the EU project matters for the future of their children, 
TÜSIAD’s lobbying campaign abroad will have no meaning in the literal sense” 
(Briefing, 2006a: 2).  
 
Integration of activities from the governmental sphere and the initiatives by organiza-
tions outside the political/diplomatic domain is partly attempted by ABIG67. In the 
                                                 
67 In its self-presentation (ABIG, 2005), ABIG underlines the involvement of TOBB, TÜSIAD and 
the Foundation for Economic Development (IKV) in the project. Recent clashes between TÜSIAD 
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judgement of some experts however, the coordination of these activities with the 
horizon of strategic brand management is not done very successfully. Tourism pro-
motion, for example, situated at the Ministry for Tourism and Culture, is not related 
to investment promotion of Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and ABIG has no 
organizational ties to the General Directorate for Press and Information BYEG, 
which is attached to the Prime Minister’s office, in terms of concerted actions related 
to the nation brand strategy.  
“So you have various institutes in the government, with their own budgets 
doing this. But nobody is really yet considering the total branding coordinati-
on.” (Yücaoglu) 
 
The scenario of a brand steering committee – in line with the benchmarks of other 
nation brands – was already upheld by the TÜ®KIYE framework and considered by 
many other political and non-political advisors since then. To the very day, however, 
according to the informants of this research, such a function is not executed.  
 
And between governmental action and the non-governmental TÜSIAD initiative, 
obviously also no coordination is aspired at the moment:  
“We don’t really want to cooperate with the government on projects, because 
we’re a civil initiative and we’d like to keep the government...we don’t want 
to become partisan in one sense.” (Boyner) 
 
This initiative deplores negligence on the side of the government failing to initiate 
proper nation brand management and guiding the way for potential partners.  
“The government should pave the way for most civil initiatives to answer 
such questions, or to have more power in dealing with some social problems 
because it’s already happening there.” (Boyner) 
 
                                                                                                                                          
and governmental information policies (Briefing, 2006a) however leave some doubt if the integration 
of the NGO-sector was largely successful.  
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Turkish government, on the other hand, seems momentarily insecure if they would 
be able to live up to such an expectation and lead the way accordingly.  
“I don’t think that we’re capable of doing nation branding or something that 
TÜSIAD has started. That’s a fine thing but, I don’t know. Because if you 
brand a nation wrong, then it is not easy to reverse the situation. I don’t think 
that they will be doing anything.” (Özcelik) 
 
As we will see later it might currently be the insecurity on behalf of the government 
regarding a proper positioning of Turkey’s nation brand leading to some hesitation. 
In the light of nation brand theory reviewed in the literature part of this thesis, both 
the current state of delay on the side of the government and the extensive activism by 
TÜSIAD would call for a critical assessment. Some coordination at the level of 
brand strategy and message dissemination seems not only desirable, but eventually 
inevitable. And, with respect to the time dimension, some immediate concerted ac-
tion to improve the situation should be called for. One must agree with the well-
publicized columnist Mehmet Ali Birand when he underlines that already a lot of 
time was wasted in the meantime and that the extent of the challenge to turn around 
European public opinion should not be underestimated. His recommendation: “time 
to act is now” (Birand, 2005c: 1). In this context probably the recent initiative by 
Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to kick off a public diplomacy process 
in line with most current conceptions by other Western nations68 can be understood.  
 
9.2.2 Turkey’s public diplomacy initiative 
Apparently, the need to restructure Turkey’s reputation management abroad is cur-
rently also realized by the government in Ankara:  
                                                 
68 Turkey is well-advised by some renowned experts on public diplomacy and partly follows a man-
ual/framework called “Public diplomacy in practise” developed for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Netherlands (Melissen/d’Hooghe, 2005).  
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“We will draw upon this insight when we debate among ourselves and try to 
determine how we should proceed to conduct our public diplomacy in a more 
effective way. [...] Now it is time to move away from a series of ad hoc re-
sponses, and to fully integrate this approach into our policy implementation. 
It is evident that the profile of a diplomat in the 21st century is taking on a 
new shape. Public diplomacy requires skills we need to sharpen. The outreach 
programmes will gain further importance. My colleagues have always been 
keen and very successful in adapting to new conditions, and I believe they are 
all equipped with the skills that will allow us to perform our duties much 
more effectively” (Gül, 2006: 4-5). 
 
It is understood that Turkish diplomats nowadays are not equipped to deal with such 
matters like image work: “The first stage, as far as we are concerned, was firstly to 
instil into the minds of our diplomats” (Özcelik). However it is not only the diplo-
mats who should undergo a sustainable mind-shift, also the top-level of ministries 
should understand the necessity and the process: “And there are the real troubles, 
problems is that the top managements […] is not aware of what this whole thing en-
tails. They think that it is a matter of organizing conferences” (Özcelik). 
 
The difficult coordination task seems realized within this project: “For that, we 
would need to readjust our internal structuring, and revamp the coordination among 
governmental and nongovernmental institutions” (Gül, 2006: 4). At the moment this 
question is seen as a matter of finding better synergies between different initiatives, 
especially with regard to budget constraints.  
“I don’t know, coordination of the EU issue, on this, on that, which is not 
necessarily the case, because we are spending so much money on so many 
different programs, and for what? Of course they serve a certain purpose. But 
can’t we make use of, we make better use of such funds? That’s the point. 
When you come to that, in that case, you would like to actually have better 
control on certain funds, which have got to do with foreign audiences. Would 
that ministry really wish to give up that authority, and so on so forth” (Özce-
lik) 
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The initiative, still being in the launch phase, does not yet have a formulated, long-
termed strategy of how to link different nation brand dimensions. The authorship of a 
governmental institution seems not without problems in Turkey:  
“Whether that coordination should be a loose one, whether it should be a 
more structured one, if you get into more structured ones, then you have legal 
constraints, this and that. All sorts of things. But again from the Turkish char-
acter you know that if a ministry like the Foreign ministry takes the lead on 
certain things, the other people listen to it, not necessarily hear it. But... I 
think they would hear maybe 20% more than the other ministries” (Özcelik) 
 
In addition, some competition with non-governmental initiatives can still be ex-
pected: “With the private sector, it is tougher. Because quite often you see that they 
actually believe that they are doing everything much better than any other public 
sector” (Özcelik).  
 
Also at the level of messages, not a final strategy decision is made about modes of 
coordination. A special challenge seems to arise from the plea in public diplomacy to 
deliver credible messages. 
“Now I fear that some people may expect or understand from such a coordi-
nation effort, that it should always be giving the same messages, through dif-
ferent actors overall. That’s an approach of course, that’s an approach. If pub-
lic diplomacy has got to be credible, if the credibility of the message is impor-
tant, and if the message that you have chosen is credible enough to be, you 
know, perpetuated by all these organizations, then it’s fine. But I doubt my-
self.” (Özcelik) 
The criterion of credibility will definitely impose the devotion of particular attention 
to the quality of brand messages within a given strategy. Murat Özcelik’s doubt that 
this special awareness can be generated within loose coordination structures between 
different initiatives seems legitimate.  
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With all these insecurities and undecided issues at hand, the starting phase of Turkish 
public diplomacy initiative at the MFA is structured in three consecutive steps69. The 
first step can be labelled to mainly serve generating awareness. This stage started 
with a kick-off conference with renowned international capacities in public diplo-
macy and respective follow-ups in February 2006. As a subsequent measure, data 
collection on Turkey’s actual perception abroad is intended. At the moment the plan 
for this data collection is to have the employees of the embassies abroad deliver 
grounded reports. With regards to my findings on potential biases caused by embassy 
personnel this strategy seems not recommendable. But budgetary constraints seem to 
prohibit other methodological settings at the moment. A third step would be to define 
some focus messages and brief the diplomatic stuff accordingly. The coordination 
would, at the present state of planning, mostly contain public diplomacy initiatives 
by the foreign missions.  
 
It will be interesting to observe how public diplomacy and nation brand management 
for Turkey will develop. A realistic view provided by people in charge of the main 
public and private initiatives showed that the goal of efficient coordination seems 
lost out of sight at the moment. Especially critical seems that still no database as a 
fundament of conduct is available.  
 
                                                 
69 Again according to information from Murat Özcelik, responsible group head in Turkey’s MFA.  
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CHAPTER 10 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
 
 
 
Both for the practical case of Turkey’s EU accession process and for the theoretical 
classification of nation brands in political contexts some insightful learning has been 
generated in the course of this thesis. Only natural for such a comparably broad topic 
seems on the other hand that some limitations constrain the explorative work and that 
a number of aspects for future research need to be left open. A short look at both 
areas should round off this thesis.  
 
 
10.1 Learning 
 
The approach to interpret Turkey’s EU accession process as a problem of nation 
brand image provided interesting new explanations. The construct of image, although 
a bit laboriously to define facing it’s almost arbitrary usage in marketing theory, 
turned out to elicit a deeper and richer understanding of Turkey’s situation than opin-
ion research provided before.  
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Applying recently developed models on brand meaning, which account for the social 
and cultural embedding of brands, proved helpful to elaborate a contemporary con-
struct of image. It showed that especially two assumptions of previous understand-
ings of image seem endangered facing today’s social realities:  
· Differentiating between outside and inside of a brand, as managerial market-
ing models do when separating brand identity and brand image, seems not re-
alistic for complex social entities like corporate or nation brands due to the 
large overlaps between these areas.  
· Holding up the notion of brand image (and brand knowledge) developing in 
the individual receiver’s mind in a sense of a stimulus-organism-response 
model, seems also unrealistic with respect to social realities. Therefore the in-
clusion of stereotypes as collectively negotiated knowledge and meaning 
structures seems inevitable at the level of nation brands, and probably also for 
complex corporate brands.  
 
All in all, the model nation brand proved to be an interesting extreme case for com-
plex brand structures. Categorizing a nation brand comparable to a corporate brand in 
terms of complexity, organisation and social relevance could therefore largely refute 
common criticism related to treating nations as a brand, which mostly rests on the 
analogy to product brands. Similar can be said for political marketing in general. 
Differentiating levels of brands like products or organisations will also provide new 
perspectives for the interpretation of political branding.  
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According to the criticism towards earlier one-dimensional and individual under-
standings of brand image, for the interpretation of Turkey’s nation brand image in 
the political context of the EU membership accession a contextualized framework for 
this nation brand image was developed and applied. Critical reflection of both nation 
brand theory and political marketing theory contributed to this emerging framework.  
 
To contextualize Turkey’s nation brand image did not only imply to differentiate 
individual and collective levels of brand meaning development, but also to extent the 
collection of Turkey’s brand image beyond mere image dimensions or attitudes to-
wards both influential factors or conditions and relevant consequences resulting from 
the image in form of political behavior.  
 
Literature review showed that this political dimension and the EU accession context 
had not been covered in earlier research projects on Turkey’s nation brand image. 
Therefore a qualitative exploration was designed to discover important relationships 
and test the framework for potential surveys on the issue. 
 
A purposeful sample of 6 out of all 25 current member-states was drawn to account 
for typical political, structural and cultural characteristics across the EU. Turkey’s 
image was found to be quite differentiated across EU-Europe. In-depth interviewing 
of information-rich experts from political, economic, social and media domains from 
the Netherlands, Germany, UK, Spain, Sweden and Slovenia proved significant dif-
ferences in Turkey’s perception largely dependent on the brand dimension “people”. 
Other nation brand dimensions such as tourism or export-products had comparably 
minor influence. The success of the integration of Turkish and Muslim immigrants is 
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a very important explanation for the image content. Furthermore, a nation’s position-
ing within the EU will determine perception of Turkey’s EU accession. Thereto, 
stereotypes and cultural practises related to Turks and Turkey were found to shape 
the image, while religion and history, both often referred to in discourses on Tur-
key’s membership, seem not of major influence.  
The heterogeneous public opinion on Turkey’s EU membership was illustrated by 
the different nation brand images held on Turkey across the EU. While it is too early 
and not feasible within the research design to forecast a precise impact of Turkey’s 
nation brand image in e.g. potential referenda voting behavior in 10 years time, it yet 
became apparent that the construct image provides non-negligible explanatory value 
for EU-Europeans’ opinion and preference formation on Turkey’s EU membership.  
 
The research findings aligned well with other previous research projects. In the cases 
of deviations, it seemed either the innovative focus on the political contexts or the 
advantage to more detailed differentiate phenomena, facilitated by a larger sample of 
countries and the qualitative design of the study, that lead to suggesting alternative 
explanations. In addition, the current look at a largely changing Turkey leading to 
better perceptions e.g. at the level of economic indicators or political issues provided 
of course some new insights and provided evidence that images are dynamic over 
time. 
 
Turkey’s current rather unidirectional and top-down executed communication activi-
ties in the areas of tourism and FDI-promotion, carried out mostly by classical adver-
tising channels, seem not to substantially contribute to a positive perception abroad 
and seem not in line with modern Turkish nation brand image content. The success 
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of PR initiatives by TÜSIAD and the MFA cannot yet be evaluated. Promising po-
tential was detected for stronger “people-to-people”-directed communication activi-
ties, like e.g. intended within the EU civil society dialogue programs.  
 
10.2 Limitations and future research 
 
Investigating the question of Turkey’s nation brand image as a foreigner brought 
along natural limitations. Surely I was not able to cover all dimensions of the prob-
lem due to cultural and language-related constraints. On the other hand the outsider 
position, which was also the dominant perspective of the work, did provide some 
accesses that potentially could not have been reached as a Turk.  
 
The qualitative approach proved quite helpful and elucidated a broad range of rela-
tionships. However, looking back the choice of experts could have been optimized in 
qualitative and quantitative terms in order to collect deeper insights. Also the topic 
guide and the time limitations of the interviews restricted a broader array of findings. 
Especially the brand dimension “people/culture” was too rough and needs specifica-
tion; in this context the cultural practises like proverbs or folkloristic heritage Turks 
and Ottomans left behind in Europe were overseen and might deserve deeper investi-
gation as to how they shape Turkey’s nation brand image.  
 
After all, the problem still rests at an exploratory stage. Not only for the public di-
plomacy purposes of Turkey, but also to round off the academic investigation of this 
problem a subsequent quantitative study with the potential to analyze the indicated 
correlations in the contextual nation brand image would be desirable. A notable 
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amount of experts confirmed the lack of robust and reliable quantitative data of Tur-
key’s perception abroad. The framework developed during this research should pro-
vide a decent starting point to develop a model containing independent and depend-
ent variables of Turkey’s nation brand image.  
 
Theoretically, such a quantitative inquiry could provide additional insights into the 
relationships indicated in my exploration. Seeing political actions and opinion forma-
tion by voters directed towards another nation as a function of nation brand image 
dimensions could be researched deeper by analyzing correlations between these vari-
ables. Furthermore, especially the assumed interplay of individual and collective 
knowledge structures during the formation of images could be elucidated further by 
some quantitative indicators of relationships.  
 
From the concrete to the general further investigation of the phenomenon nation 
brand in political context as a synergy of nation brand theory and political marketing 
seems very important. The discipline of public diplomacy seems to be largely under-
theorized in several regards. Especially the definition of a political brand needs more 
depth to be applied successfully in a changing world. To follow the path of Holt’s 
cultural branding (Holt, 2004) and to develop this theory better for the case of politi-
cal/nation brands is strongly suggested. The practical need to improve nation’s bi- 
and multilateral understanding especially on the level of the civil societies cannot be 
overstated.  
 
When being broadened to nation levels, most current managerial models of branding 
have reached their borders. If we take nation brands as an extreme test case (a bold 
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conjecture in the Popperian sense) for an evolving concept of corporate branding, 
one would have to agree with Balmer/Gray that therefore “a new branch of market-
ing” is needed: “one that weft and weaves the concepts of corporate identity, image, 
reputation, image, communications along with the corporate branding” (2003: 972). 
The discussion of the concept of image for the case of a nation brand did hopefully 
indicate some problematic areas to be investigated more generally and at the same 
time in more detail.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
A Portraits of informants 
 
· Adam Achouri is a Swedish expatriate in Ankara. He moved from Sweden to 
Turkey for romantic and business reasons. He is engaged to a Turkish woman 
with a child and has been in Turkey by the time of the interview for approx. 
1,5 years. He works in medical business consulting with an education back-
ground in management.  
· Erkan Arikan is editor in chief of the Turkish radio program “Köln Radyosu” 
of WDR in Germany. With his parents being first generation guest workers, 
he was born and raised in Berlin. The journalist had worked for other German 
media before dealing with this specific Turkish issue.  
· Christer Asp has been the ambassador of Sweden in Ankara since fall 2005. 
By the time of the interview, he had been in Turkey only for 1 month. He 
served in a leading role during Sweden’s EU accession process.  
· Ümit Boyner is heading a committee of TÜSIAD responsible for an EU PR 
campaign starting in 2006. Apart from that she has been with BOYNER 
HOLDING in Istanbul for more than 12 years and currently serves as a me m-
ber of the board of directors, responsible for finance.  
· Luis Fernandez De la Pena had been the Spanish ambassador to Turkey for 
one year by the time of the interview. Before coming to Ankara, he served as 
an ambassador to Slovenia and before that worked in Croatia, providing him 
with some experience on EU accession processes.  
· Andrei Grasseli is the Slovenian ambassador to Ankara and has been living in 
Turkey for 2,5 years.  
· Gareth Jones is the British REUTERS correspondent in Ankara, responsible 
for covering political issues to the English-speaking world. He has collected a 
decent number of expatriate experiences e.g. in Russia, Japan and Balkans 
before coming to Turkey 3 years ago.  
· Josa Karre, who works as 2nd secretary in the Swedish embassy in Ankara 
and who is mainly occupied with economic affairs, has been living in Turkey 
since 2004.  
· Uros Kovsca is a graduate student from the University of Ljubljana, Faculty 
of Economics and currently an exchange student at Bilkent University. Uros 
has come to Turkey in summer 2005 and was in Ankara for 6 months by the 
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time of the interview. He has a professional background working for NGOs in 
Slovenia.  
· Heinz Kramer is the Turkey expert of Berlin-based think tank Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik (SWP) and publishes regularly on Turkey’s political 
situation. He taught Political Science at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey 
in the early 1990s.  
· Irena Krzan is a graduate student from the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of 
Economics exchanging to Bilkent University. Irena arrived in Ankara only 
two weeks before the interview and has no relevant preoccupation with Tur-
key.  
· Jose Ligero-Cofrade is a Spanish expatriate in Ankara with altogether 5 years 
experience in Turkey. He has lived in Istanbul before and holds a managerial 
position in a Spanish railway construction company in Turkey.  
· Stephen McCormick works in the political department of the British embassy 
in Ankara. He has been living in Turkey for little more than two years. He is 
also connected to some economic and matchmaking issues taken care of by 
the embassy 
· Aysegül Molu is the general director of the Turkish Advertising Agency As-
sociation (TAAA) in Istanbul. She largely coordinated the project 
“TÜ®KIYE” described earlier and edited the final framework report. She had 
several media appearances on the issue of Turkey’s nation brand.  
· Dirk Nieuwboer is the Turkey correspondent for a several Dutch and Belgian 
newspapers including De Telegraaf and De Standaard. He has been living and 
working in Istanbul for five years 
· Brigitte Özbali has been living in Turkey since the late 1980s. Together with 
her Turkish husband she rebuilt and now runs a quite successful hotel in the 
Kelebek valley closed to Fethiye, well positioned in the nature-tourism niche. 
Her academic education background is in sociology.  
· Owen Parker is a member of Turkey Team at the European Commission in 
Brussels. He is employed in the General Directory (DG) “Enlargement”, 
headed by EU commissioner Olli Rehn. Parker has been working on the issue 
of Turkey’s membership for 3 years.  
· Mateja Petelinkar is a graduate student from the University of Ljubljana, 
Faculty of Economics exchanging to Bilkent University. Mateja arrived only 
two weeks before the interview. She closely affiliated with her family busi-
ness, which currently tries to establish some trade contacts with Turkey.  
· Ruprecht Polenz is one of the most profiled experts on Turkey within the 
German parliament. He is chairman of the foreign committee of the German 
Bundestag and has been Member of Parliament for 13 years. Earlier, he 
worked as the general secretary of the conservative party CDU of chancellor 
Angela Merkel. Within the CDU of he is one of the rare voices clearly in fa-
vor of Turkey’s EU accession. 
· Nicole Pope has been living in Istanbul for more than 10 years. She is the 
correspondent of the French newspaper Le Monde in Turkey, but also works 
as an author for other publications and books on Turkey’s history and current 
society.  
· Christine Schlötzer has been the Turkey correspondent of the German news-
paper Süddeutsche Zeitung until October 2005. She had lived in Istanbul for 
5 years and worked in Turkey before as a journalist during the 1980s.  
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· Frank Stauss is one of the most profiled German communication experts for 
political campaigns. He worked for the Clinton presidential campaign in 1992 
and for German Social Democrats between 2002 and 2005. He is managing 
director of the advertising agency “Butter” and has only little personal ex-
perience with Turkey (a holiday trip 20 years ago).  
· Murat Sungar served as the secretary general of the European Union General 
Secretariat for three years until he resigned in August 2005. The career dip-
lomat had served in many other functions and positions worldwide before. 
Rumours held his resignation was also expressing discontent with the slowing 
down speed of EU accession activities on the Turkish side.  
· Mehmet Ural is Chairman of the communication agency Yorum Publicis in 
Istanbul. He had been a Board Member to the Turkish Advertising Associa-
tion and Chairman to the Turkish Advertising Foundation for many years. He 
consulted to the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP). Mehmet Ural is 
President to the European Association of Political Consultants (EAPC) and 
member of the Global Board of IAPC.  
· Willemijn van Haaften has served as the first secretary in the political de-
partment of the Dutch embassy in Ankara for 3 years. She is occupied with 
questions of the inter-religious exchange as well as minority rights etc.  
· John Verhoeven is teaching industrial engineering at Bilkent University in 
Ankara. He is a Dutch citizen and married to a Turkish woman. Both moved 
to Ankara 2 years ago by the time of the interview.  
· Reiner Freiherr von Leoprechting is head of public affairs of the German-
based METRO Group, which retail store brands like real or Praktiker become 
increasingly present in Turkey. Leoprechting is also Vice-Chairman of the 
Turkish-German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (TDIHK). He visits 
Turkey at least 2x a year. METRO AG is member of the Foreign Investor 
Advisory Council to the Prime Minister.  
· Erkut Yücaoglu was head of the board that run the TÜ®KIYE project be-
tween 2002 and 2004. Until 2000 he was chairman of the Turkish industry 
and businessmen association (TÜSIAD). At the moment he runs an interna-
tional trade company in the energy market.  
· Amberin Zaman is correspondent of The Economist and some other English 
language newspapers in Turkey and lives in Istanbul and Ankara since 1999. 
Of Turkish origin, she was brought up and educated in all parts of the world 
and finally came back to do journalistic work in Turkey.  
· Cüneyd Zapsu is special advisor to Prime Minister Erdogan and member of 
the AK Parti leadership. Large part of his youth and childhood and also some 
part of his studies he spent in Munich, Germany. Later on he attended the 
Alman Lisesi in Istanbul. He is a successful entrepreneur (he founded the low 
budget supermarket chain BIM together with his brother).  
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B Interview guideline  
 
Introduction 
 
“My name is Jan Kemming. I am a graduate student at Bilkent University at the Fac-
ulty of Business Administration. I research on Turkey’s EU accession and I am espe-
cially interested in how Turkey can gain the hearts of the other Europeans who are 
about to decide on the issue in referendums or elections.  
The main category I want to reflect on is the image of Turkey in Europe. I want us to 
compare Turkey to a product or service brand like Nike, Apple or Google. The image 
of a brand is influential on the consumer behaviour and decisions. I am interested to 
find out how Turkey’s image will affect the accession process. I want to know your 
personal opinions, but also how you think your fellow countrymen in your country 
would typically react to my questions. Your position working and living at the inter-
face of your home-country and Turkey and your professional and private engagement 
in these issues should help us to discuss these difficult issues.  
Please keep in mind that there is no wrong or right in responding to my question. Tell 
me all your thoughts and let’s discuss together about the feelings and ideas. If you 
don’t mind, I would like to tape-record the following interview. The recording is 
destined only for my research purposes and for the transcription of the interview in 
order to use it as a data source later on. Thanks a lot for your cooperation and your 
support!” 
 
(Section 1) 
 
1. Imagine, Turkey was a person.  
· How old is this person?  
· Is it masculine or feminine?  
· What kind of personality does it have? 
· How does he or she look?  
· What is its preferred TV program, magazine, cigarette brand (if he/she 
smokes)? 
[learn about immediate associations, attributions and classifications of Turkey 
through the eyes of the interviewees] 
ALT: Imagine, Turkey was an animal.  
 
2. Now, lets compare Turkey to something else. Think of Turkey as a car.  
· Which brand would it be? 
· Which model? 
[learn about immediate associations, attributions and classifications of Turkey 
through the eyes of the interviewees] 
ALT: Think of Turkey as a fashion brand. Which brand, which style, which targets? 
 
3. If I asked some fellow countrymen of yours at home, would they have chosen 
similar analogies? 
· Would they have described a similar person/animal? 
· Would they have chosen a similar car/fashion brand? 
· What would have been probably different? 
· What are the reasons for potential deviations? 
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· What are the dominant stereotypes held on Turkey? 
[find out about stereotypical perceptions of Turkey in the informant’s home country] 
 
(Section 2:)  
 
4. What is the image of Turkish products abroad in your home country? 
[differentiate certain rather rational facets of the Turkish image] 
ALT: What is the image of Turkey as a market where to invest? 
 
5. What is the image of Turkey as a holiday destination in your home country? 
[differentiate certain rather emotional facets of the Turkish image] 
ALT: What is the image of Turkey’s culture and people, the Turks? 
 
(Section 3:) 
 
6. Do you think the image of Turkey will influence the EU accession?  
[general question on possible areas of influence, introduction to political domain] 
 
7. Will the image of Turkey be influential when voters will decide on Turkey’s 
issue in referendums or national elections? 
[narrow discussion down to political image and the impact on voting decisions] 
ALT: When you and your fellow countrymen would have to vote on Turkey’s EU 
accession in a referendum or as part of elections today, how do you think the image 
of Turkey will influence this decision? 
 
8. Which elements/parts of Turkey’s image are favourable for Turkey’s EU ac-
cession and which are harmful? 
[revisit image dimensions and apply to influence question. Isolate positive/negative 
drivers] 
ALT: When you look back at our characterization of Turkey as a person or as a car 
brand, which of the aspect you had in mind and you suggested for your fellow coun-
trymen will be helpful and which will be harmful for Turkey to enter the EU? 
 
(Section 4:) 
 
9. What do you think Turkey could do to modify this image? 
[general question on theoretical and practical areas of influence for Turkey] 
 
10. If you would be responsible to run a Turkish advertising campaign for the 
EU accession, which slogan would you choose? 
[creative, concrete translation of line of thinking; practical break and condensation of 
discussion so far] 
 
11. How come you choose this slogan? 
[reasoning behind it; evaluation of and ranking of priorities in Turkish image discus-
sion] 
ALT: How would you as the advertiser summarize your thoughts about this slogan? 
How would you defend it?  
 
 
